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Abstract 
This thesis investigates human probabilistic judgment in complex real-world 
settings to identify processes underpinning biases across groups which relate to 
numerical frames and formats.  
Experiments are conducted replicating real-world environments and data to test 
judgment performance based on framing and format. Regardless of background skills 
and experience, people in professional and consumer contexts show a strong tendency 
to perceive the world from a linear perspective, interpreting information in concrete, 
absolute terms and making judgments based on seeking and applying linear functions. 
Whether predicting sales, selecting between financial products, or forecasting refugee 
camp data, people use minimal cues and systematically apply additive methods amidst 
non-linear trends and percentage points to yield linear estimates in both rich and sparse 
informational contexts. Depending on data variability and temporality, human 
rationality and choice may be significantly helped or hindered by informational framing 
and format.  
The findings deliver both theoretical and practical contributions. Across groups 
and individual differences, the effects of informational format and the tendency to 
linearly extrapolate are connected by the bias to perceive values in concrete terms and 
make sense of data by seeking simple referent points. People compare and combine 
referents using additive methods when inappropriate and adhere strongly to defaults 
when applied in complex numeric environments.   
The practical contribution involves a framing manipulation which shows that 
format biases (i.e., additive processing) and optimism (i.e., associated with 
intertemporal effects) can be counteracted in judgments involving percentages and 
exponential growth rates by using absolute formats and positioning defaults in future 
event context information. This framing manipulation was highly effective in improving 
loan choice and repayment judgments compared to information in standard finance 
industry formats. There is a strong potential to increase rationality using this data format 
manipulation in other financial settings and domains such as health behaviour change in 
which peoples’ erroneous interpretation of percentages and non-linear relations 
negatively impact choice and behaviours in both the short and long-term.   
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the thesis. Firstly, the main topic is 
introduced with a brief discussion of the motivation and rationale for the 
research. The key research interests and objectives are then explained alongside 
the scientific contributions and the outline of the scope of the thesis. This is 
followed by a description of the whole thesis structure, detailing the experiments 
undertaken within each chapter and an overview of the main findings.  
1.1   Research Motivation  
Throughout everyday life, we frequently form judgments based on numerical data 
which guide our behaviour in different contexts. These judgments range from simple 
selections with low trade-offs between choice alternatives, to critical decisions which 
can significantly impact future events. The effectiveness of such decisions depends on 
our ability to comprehend, interpret and act upon the numerical information made 
available to us at the point of judgment formation. Many judgments in non-expert 
contexts are fast and frugal with relatively low consequences. For example, deciding 
whether to make an impulse purchase based on a price promotion, choosing between 
scratch cards based on quick computation of the odds, or selecting a restaurant based on 
the best fish price per ounce. Biases and errors in numerical judgments such as these 
may not have particularly detrimental effects on future events. However, when people 
apply the same computational processes and numerical assumptions in more important 
choice situations involving future finance or health for example, the biases in 
computation of numeric information in the present can lead to estimates of future events 
which can have particularly deleterious effects.   
In consumer contexts, the effectiveness of numerical judgments depends on our 
interpretation of numerical and statistical information in a given situation and point in 
time which leads to payoffs that are realized in the near future. Depending on the 
context, various factors may interact with decision making capabilities to shape 
peoples’ judgments and use of numerical data which are independent of numerical skills 
or rationality in the mathematical sense. The underlying motives, interests, hopes, prior 
knowledge and beliefs of individual decision makers are thus important to how people 
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incorporate numerical data into judgments. Factors such as these may therefore be more 
influential to judgment and choice than the ability to accurately interpret information in 
a given data environment at any single point in time, or in isolation from wider factors.  
For example, the choice to use a high interest rate credit card to buy a holiday is 
likely to be driven by factors such as impulsivity and desirability which override 
rational financial judgment in the consumer context. Commercial and marketing sectors 
are effective in applying informational frames and manipulations which utilise human 
emotional responses such as trust and confidence. When activated in the decision 
making context, these factors are frequently shown to offset rational choice and 
behaviours. Decisions regarding personal finances and health rely upon peoples’ 
unaided judgment of the information made available to consumers by professional 
organisations and governing bodies. Therefore, depending on the motives of 
organisations and how individuals interpret and act upon the data made available, the 
favourability of future outcomes for individuals and groups can significantly vary. For 
example, signing a long-term financial agreement without fully understanding interest 
rates, or interpreting risk statistics as indicative of no need to pay into insurance 
schemes or visit a doctor are decisions which can significantly impact future health and 
wealth.  
Long-term probabilistic judgments such as these involve accurately interpreting 
initial values and comparatively evaluating data in the context of choice alternatives to 
‘cognitively model’ the likelihoods of different outcomes. In this sense, people are 
required to accurately extrapolate values into the future. The ability to accurately model 
temporal effects is therefore important to understanding how values change over time 
depending on the functional relations between different variables or the nature of cause 
and effect in a particular context. Long-term decisions involve the actualization of 
payoffs far into the future, or possibly never. Thus, the feedback which is more readily 
available on frequent, short term judgments and choices is less likely to be available for 
long-term decision making. Combined with the problems of interpreting and applying 
numerical information (in particular percentage and rate data), the absence of feedback 
on long-term probabilistic judgment is likely to contribute to the difficulty experienced 
in deciphering the most optimal choice and course of action. This is particularly 
relevant in contexts such as financial planning and health related judgment and 
behaviour.    
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In this sense, the lack of available feedback compounds the inability to 
‘cognitively model’ probable outcomes by weighting and extrapolating variables into 
the future. This effect may also interact with how values are discounted over time. For 
example, individuals who are less able to accurately extrapolate current states into 
future states may also be more inclined to discount at a higher rate, leading to more 
‘impulsive’ decision making. Conversely, individuals more capable or attuned to 
extrapolating current values into the future with greater accuracy may express lower 
discounting rates which could translate into more adaptive financial and health related 
choices and behaviours.  
The robustness of particular numerical biases in human probabilistic judgment is 
evident in the parallels between the judgmental tendencies of novice and expert decision 
makers. Trained professionals frequently make fast, heuristic judgments based on 
varied, complex numerical information which can have critical consequences and far 
reaching effects. Moreover, expert judgments are often formed under difficult 
conditions involving limited time and informational constraints. In contexts such as 
humanitarian aid, emergency services, military, finance, or natural disaster forecasting 
for example, professionals are depended upon to make highly accurate assessments of 
current events and forecasts of future outcomes. The findings in this thesis show 
however, that despite specialist domain knowledge and experience, there are judgmental 
biases and erroneous numerical processing strategies which characterise peoples’ 
judgments. The findings indicate the potentiality of hazardous outcomes in professional 
judgment domains, making it important to further examine the characteristics and 
strengths of expert decision processes to identify how best to apply specialist 
knowledge, and combine statistical model data with human intuition and insight.  
1.2   Research Objectives 
In sum, this thesis investigates the effects of numerical data on peoples’ ability to 
formulate effective judgments and choice when data is presented in different frames and 
formats. The key objectives are to investigate expert and non-expert judgment and 
choice in real-world decision domains to examine the robustness of biases and 
understand how levels of numerical skill and domain knowledge may impact judgment 
performance in different environments. Performance is tested under conditions of 
differing complexity and informational formats to identify parameters which effect 
rationality and facilitate or hinder human judgment.   
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The experiments conducted in this thesis seek to identify biases and limitations in 
probabilistic inference based on numerical information which effect human judgments 
across contexts and informational environments. To delineate the scope of this thesis, 
the objective is to examine the differential effects of numerical information on 
probabilistic estimates across data contexts and expertise levels. The professional 
contexts investigated in this thesis, namely the fields of retail and humanitarian aid, are 
domains also commonly analysed in traditional forecasting research. However, unlike 
traditional forecasting studies which often focus on the fitting of statistical models to 
data and human estimates, the experiments undertaken in this thesis are aimed at 
furthering the understanding of probabilistic judgment based on how people interact 
with data frames and formats in different contexts. The overall goal is thus one of 
practical application, involving ultimately how insights may be applied to systems and 
data formats to aid judgment and choice in both consumer and professional domains.  
Rather than comparing experts with novices per se, that aim is to examine 
performance among both groups to assess the robustness of biases involved in 
numerical probabilistic inference. As expected, the judgmental biases identified are so 
strong that experts are shown to exhibit them too. The commonalities in the judgmental 
processes observed among novice and professional populations is thus illustrative of the 
overarching biases and propensities which characterize human judgment processes and 
shape rationality where numeric computations are involved. The parallels in biases are 
indicative of inherent features in the formation of inferences which hold despite 
numerical skills, specialist training and domain knowledge. The findings contribute to 
our understanding of the underlying nature of human rationality and how cognitive 
processes interact with informational frames and formats in present-day digital and 
physical decision environments. The evidence provides implications for how we may 
optimise data environments for effective judgment and choice by manipulating frames 
and formats to promote effective cognitive adaptation to data for decision making in 
professional and novice contexts. 
Across many judgment environments involving statistical data, human decision 
processes are characterised by biases and cognitive limitations which yield judgments 
incongruent with probabilistic models of rationality. Although people are often shown 
to be ‘irrational’ in the mathematical sense, the ecological perspective suggests that 
peoples’ judgmental processes are in fact adapted to environmental demands, based on 
the development of effective and cognitively efficient heuristic strategies and ‘intuitive’ 
  
15 
judgment processes (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2008). However, an array of findings from 
various fields suggest that judgmental processes may not be adapted to particular tasks 
or environments. There are situations in which human judgments are shown to be 
particularly ineffective, even when specialist training and domain knowledge are 
involved. For example, in the context of financial forecasting (Önkal & Muradoǧlu, 
1994; Wilkie-Thomson, Onkal-Atay, & Pollock, 1997) and investment decision making 
(Newall & Love, 2015), experts are shown to make poor decisions based on inaccurate 
numerical estimates. In such cases, many experts’ judgments are shown to be no more 
accurate than those of inexperienced novices (Armstrong, 1980, 1991; Lawrence & 
O’Connor, 1993). 
 This suggests that there is a necessity to develop methods and formats of 
communicating information which are suited to the propensities and characteristics of 
human decision processes and the way in which numeric data is cognitive encoded of 
numerical data. Such an approach could be more beneficial than training people to form 
judgments in accordance with probability theory and statistical forecasting models. 
Throughout the following chapters, the findings from the domains of professional retail 
forecasting and humanitarian aid are applied to consumer judgment in an online 
financial choice environment. The results of the application to financial decision 
making successfully demonstrate the potential for using data frames and formats to 
improve judgment and choice based on enhancing the fit between data displays and 
peoples’ cognitive propensities in complex numeric judgment situations.   
1.3   Thesis Structure and Summary  
Chapter 2 delivers a review of the relevant background literature followed by the 
first of five experiments in chapter 3 in which forecasting performance is examined 
among professional retailers employed by a major UK Supermarket. Conducted in the 
forecasters’ every-day environment at the Supermarket’s headquarters, employees are 
assessed in their ability to forecast product sales following linear versus exponential 
trends when observed in absolute values versus percentage points. Findings delivered 
insights into peoples’ interpretation of non-linear growth functions and the formation of 
inferences based on applying additive versus multiplicative methods to different number 
formats. Employees showed a robust propensity to predict future sales by linearly 
extrapolating the trends based on the last two data points observed per trial. This 
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resulted in systematic under-forecasting (trend-damping) of increasing sales trends and 
over-forecasting (anti-damping) of decreasing trends.  
 In chapter 4 the analysis of probabilistic judgment in complex real-world 
environments is further explored. Experiment 2 assesses the forecasting performance of 
novices and professional humanitarian aid workers when forecasting refugee camp data. 
Despite domain knowledge and familiarity with the informational cues, aid workers’ 
predictions were no more accurate than those of novices, and both groups formed 
judgments by extracting and projecting trends linearly. Noise was shown to increase the 
tendency to linearly extrapolate and was predictive of forecasting error, particularly so 
among the aid workers. This suggests that professionals were more likely than novices 
to seek meaning in complexity, leading them to erroneously extract linear trends. 
Analysis of the effects of noise showed that when all observable cues trended in the 
same direction, both groups were more inclined to linearly project the target data 
congruently with the ‘common trend’. The tendency to seek and linearly extend the 
direction of congruous trends was associated with increased forecasting error, 
suggesting that regardless of causality, context information was incorporated to help 
guide judgment formation, thus acting to amplify the linear bias.  
In chapter 5, the effects of financial information frames and formats are examined 
using a randomized controlled trial. Experiment 3a compares traditional industry 
mortgage price comparison data formats with total mortgage costs presented in absolute 
values and framed over current versus future interest rates. The simultaneous 
presentation of the rate alternatives with a future rates default setting is shown to 
significantly increase the optimality of mortgage choices compared to traditional 
formats and the sequential disclosure of rata data with a current rates default.  
Experiment 3b furthers the examination of the framing effect identified in 
experiment 3a with the addition of a behavioural disclaimer designed to increase 
judgment effectiveness by raising the saliency of rate data and the financial implications 
of future rate variability. The disclaimer was shown have no additive impact on overall 
judgment effectiveness in either the control or the experimental conditions which 
suggested judgment performance could not be improved by simply prompting people to 
apply greater cognitive effort and attentional resources in the context of rate and 
percentage information. However, there was evidence that the disclaimer increased the 
propensity to make comparisons between rate frames based on changes in choice scores 
and proportions of choices made in the current and future rate frames. Behavioural 
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prompts may therefore be useful in judgment contexts in which cues or attributes are 
weighted more subjectively. For example, evaluative judgments involving choices 
between houses or cars could be improved by increasing the comparative analysis of 
certain attributes.  
In chapter 6, experiment 4 further explores the current versus future rate framing 
effect identified in experiment 3a and 3b in the context of monthly mortgage repayment 
judgments. The components of the effect are examined in two individual data 
disclosures to test the impact of a default manipulation on loan repayment decisions 
separately from the effect of a default with the addition of future rate context data. In 
condition 1 and 2, loan costs for repayment over the loan full term in current rates are 
disclosed alongside a default figure for the cost at a reduced loan term. In condition 2, 
the same information is presented, except with additional future rate context data. The 
added future rate information acts to heighten the saliency of the default figure and 
greatly increase the range between the minimum and maximum suggested repayment 
amounts.  
The manipulation in condition 1 was shown to significantly increase the monthly 
amount people chose to repay above the minimum suggested figure to clear the balance 
over the full term in current rates. In condition 2 however, the addition of the future rate 
data was shown to be more effective in generating higher repayment judgments. 
Combined with the tendency to arithmetically combine the minimum and maximum 
suggested amounts, the positioning of the default in highly salient future rate context 
information acted to increase the anchoring effect which resulted in more optimal 
(higher) monthly repayment judgments. Higher temporal preference and lower financial 
literacy scores were associated with the tendency to make smaller (less optimal) 
monthly repayment decisions and educational level interacted with the framing 
manipulations in both conditions. This suggests that utilising defaults and future event 
context disclosures may be useful in communicating intertemporal effects to reduce the 
harmful impact of format biases and optimistic tendencies in financial judgments among 
lower educational groups. 
The final chapter 7 provides a summary of the main results and contributions 
followed by an overall review and evaluation of the findings, including alternative 
perspectives and study limitations. This is proceeded by further research requirements 
and suggestions for practical applications and design, followed by final concluding 
comments.   
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Chapter 2  
Conceptual Background 
This chapter summarises findings relating to the theoretical underpinnings of 
human probabilistic judgment relevant to the biases identified within this thesis. 
Firstly, various themes and possible explanations are discussed for the biases and 
propensities in human probabilistic inference. This is followed by the main review 
which addresses the themes by discussing theory and findings relating to human 
biases associated with the framing and formatting of numerical information. In 
the first section of the review, perspectives on the tendency to assume linear 
relations and the importance of data format to probabilistic judgment are 
discussed. Bounded rationality vs. mathematical (optimization) models of human 
judgment are then explained, assessing the frequency hypothesis as an alternative 
rationale for linear prediction biases. Lastly, perspectives on reasoning in 
accordance with probability theory are evaluated, citing effects of noise as the 
source of irrationality.  
 
When forming decisions based on numerical information, the format and 
presentation of the data across settings and contexts can be very important to how it is 
interpreted and used in decision making. The framing and format of numerical data is 
shown to have a strong impact on how people evaluate options, judge risk and make 
choices across an array of professional and consumer judgment domains. The 
differences in interpretation can depend on peoples’ individual motives and 
expectations from a given judgment situation, combined with the computational 
methods employed to process numerical data. Thus, depending on the setting, the snap-
shot judgments and heuristic strategies we apply to on-the-spot choices can significantly 
impact our predictions, shaping future outcomes for better or worse.  
The area in which the quality of peoples’ choices and probabilistic decisions 
particularly suffer is where percentage and rate information is involved. This 
phenomenon is likely to stem from the tendency to assume that percentages can be 
treated in the same way as absolute values and thus added and subtracted arithmetically. 
This intuitive, ‘additive’ method of data processing is a plausible bias in human 
cognition because it short-cuts the time and effort necessary for more complex 
geometric operations. The tendency to process percentages and rates as absolute 
numbers also results in linear probabilistic estimates when on-the-spot numerical 
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computations are extrapolated into future values. Therefore, the propensity to interpret 
and predict events in the world around us in a linear fashion can shape both perceptions 
of the environment as well as determine actual outcomes. It also follows that a linear 
interpretation and prediction bias will increase peoples’ sensitivity to linear relations, 
heightening the inclination to seek and extract linear trends in noisier, more complex 
environments. For example, in the context of financial information, assuming linearity 
can lead to overly optimistic cost estimates by underestimating the exponential growth 
of compound interest. 
There are various possible explanations for why people are predisposed to assume 
liner relations in the world around them and to quantify event occurrences in absolute 
values. For example, applying a linear line of best fit in a complex, noisy environment 
provides an effective means of generating an estimate or choice when time, information 
or knowledge is limited or absent. Based on ecological perspectives, it is plausible to 
assume that the human mind is better equipped to rationalise in concrete terms using 
whole numbers rather than single point percentages with normalized base rates. This is 
because, pre-probability theory, people would have monitored and predicted events by 
observing them as and when they occurred, accruing data about the environment in 
frequency format through natural sampling.  
From an evolutionary perspective, people are considered to have evolved to 
rationalise using information in absolute terms. This suggests that the ability to 
physically compare and contrast information or choice alternatives is likely to be 
important to gaining the perspective necessary to derive meaning and value from data 
when making an estimate or selection. Hence, people find it easier to evaluate a 
potential option or data point when the context or surrounding information is richer, but 
also simplified and framed in absolute terms using concrete examples which correspond 
directly to the real world.  
The tendency to think and predict linearly is also likely to impact the way in 
which people interpret changes and variations in quantities of groups, objects and 
events. For example, people may be primed to seek and detect changes in event 
frequencies or populations by counting sample sizes rather than inferring proportional 
differences between subsets in the environment. This again is likely to stem from the 
propensity to monitor, collate and interpret data in absolute terms, based on counting 
and comparing frequencies using additive processing methods.  
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The downside of this bias means that people may be overly sensitive to random 
fluctuations in quantities and occurrences of events and interpret temporary fluctuations 
as being true changes in the environment. This possibility suggests that judgments 
based on concrete frequency counts and comparison of observable samples may restrict 
people’ ability to rationalise beyond the data in the immediate environment, or limit 
judgment abilities to low variance data, or non-complex domains. The ability to 
determine actual changes by detecting proportional differences would thus involve 
understanding and processing base rate information which is often shown to be a barrier 
to judgment performance. From this perspective, the tendency to think and predict 
linearly may also act to hinder judgmental processes by limiting the ability to integrate 
and interpret broader, more complex data. The linear bias could therefore contribute to 
problems in processing base rate information which is necessary for distinguishing 
between minor frequency fluctuations and actual large scale proportional shifts in the 
environment.  
The strength of the tendency for linearity and arithmetic operations suggests 
people may be inherently incapable of using percentage information or estimating 
probability in accordance with mathematical models. However, it is possible that 
peoples’ cognitive capacity for frequency data and concrete values does not preclude 
probabilistic rationality in the mathematical sense. Rather than assuming that statistical 
rationality can only be achieved through accurately interpreting data in probability 
formats, it is possible that judgments based on frequency data can translate into 
mathematically accurate probability estimates when judgment variance is taken into 
consideration. In this view, the natural variation in events as they are encoded in 
memory create noise which can present as prediction inaccuracy when judgments are 
examined in isolation. However, when considering a set of estimates for a category of 
events, it is reasonable to assume that averaging the estimates will cancel out the noise 
associated with natural sampling to yield inferences which correspond with the 
predictions made by probability models.  
This suggests that people may not be inherently ‘irrational’ in the mathematical 
sense, rather that the measurement of human probabilistic inference and the format in 
which information is communicated is key to ascertaining peoples’ judgment 
rationality. As the wealth of evidence relating to the effectiveness of frequency formats 
on statistical inference indicate, peoples’ judgmental processes and cognitive 
propensities may not be inherent blockers of statistical rationality. Instead, they 
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represent an alternative methodology for collating, interpreting and applying 
information. When the data format is fit to the cognitive methods, people are 
consistently capable of yielding mathematically accurate inferences in Bayesian 
probability tasks. It is therefore plausible that by taking the mean of peoples’ on-the-
spot probability estimates for real-world events, the variance associated with peoples’ 
sampling methods will cancel out and judgments will correspond with statistical 
models. 
In answer to these possibilities, the following review discusses the anomalies and 
biases in human probabilistic judgment relating to the framing and formatting of 
numerical information. Each subsection provides an overview of findings and theories 
which relate to the ideas and themes outlined above.  
2.1   Simultaneous Versus Sequential Information Processing  
It is well recognised in the field of finance and economics that investment returns 
must be processed sequentially using geometric operations to determine values, rather 
than simultaneously, using arithmetic operations, which can lead to gross 
overestimation of return values (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2001). For example, if a stock 
were to increase by 20% one year, and then decrease by 20% in the next year, the 
intuitive reaction to this gain and loss is to assume that the stock’s final value is equal to 
its initial value by adding and subtracting, (i.e., simultaneously processing) the two 
values; +20% (-20%) = 0. However, the final value of the stock would in fact be less 
than its initial value, computed by multiplying the values geometrically; 20% x (-20%) 
= -0.4%. The reason for this becomes apparent when drawing attention to the effect of 
the percentage changes on the base value of the stock in each year. For example, if an 
initial investment of £100 were to rise by 20% in one year, its value would be £120. If it 
then fell by 20% the next year, the final value is correctly calculated by applying the 
second percentage change to the initial value and the results of the first percentage 
change, thus yielding a final value of £96 (0.4% less than the stock’s initial value). 
Changes in percentages therefore require increases and decreases to be processed 
multiplicatively in sequence, taking into account the effects of previous percentage 
changes on base values at each time point.  
The misunderstanding of geometric mathematical operations, combined with the 
added cognitive load of sequentially processing (instead of just additively summing 
points), can lead people to treat percentages as absolute values in many contexts. This 
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results in the tendency to add and subtract percentages in the same way absolute values 
are additively combined using the arithmetic mean. Unsurprisingly, this bias is 
considered responsible for an array of judgmental errors in different settings (Juslin, 
Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008; Juslin, 2015; Juslin, Lindskog, & Mayerhofer, 2015).  
2.2   Processing Percentages and Judging Investment Returns   
The effect of percentage information on real-world decision performance is 
clearly demonstrated throughout the domain of financial decision making. When 
choosing between financial product options, or making investment decisions based on 
fees and returns, the tendency to treat percentages as absolutes can lead people to 
significantly misjudge future gains and losses. This is derived from the assumption of 
linear relations between input and output variables occurring from simultaneously 
processing percentages. Evidence of this exists in investment fields, where reframing 
percentage fees in absolute value formats is shown to increase peoples’ attention to the 
costs (Choi, Laibson & Madrian, 2010; Hastings & Tejeda-Ashton, 2008).  
The bias is also observed in experts, for example Newall and Love (2015) found 
that among 1,973 online investors, 45.7% were unable to determine that the yield from a 
stock which increased by 10% one year and decreased by 10% the next year, and did 
not pay any dividends, would be less than its initial value; with 33.9% judging it to be 
equal to its initial value. These results provide strong evidence of the propensity to 
interpret returns based on arithmetically summing the gains and losses to yield a final 
return of zero. Worryingly, error magnitude in this context is therefore dependent on the 
size of the return. For small changes such as 10%, underestimating losses may not be 
too detrimental. However, for larger returns, the underestimation of losses can be 
catastrophic.  
Newall (2016a) demonstrated that even in the face of increasing return 
magnitudes, the tendency to take the arithmetic average of the past returns remained 
robust. Again, posing the question of final stock value following equal returns of either 
+/-10% or +/-50%, Newall found that 50.8% of 981 online respondents incorrectly 
predicted the final return value of the stock for both the 10% and 50% return 
magnitudes. The modal response of “equal to its initial value” again indicated 
simultaneous processing in action. Moreover, the ability to correctly judge downside 
financial risk was shown to positively correlate with financial literacy (Fernandes, 
Lynch, & Netemeyer, 2014) and numeracy (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-
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Retamero, 2012), the levels of which were moderate and low for literacy (8.6 out of 13) 
and numeracy (1.6 out of 4), respectively.  
Increasing the +/-50% return to +/-100% (to create a final value of zero) showed 
that, although more people made correct judgments in the +/-100% conditions (53.2%) 
compared to the +/-10% condition (34.0%), the proportions of incorrect “equal to its 
initial value” responses reflecting simultaneous processing were virtually the same per 
condition (43.1% and 40.6% in the +/-10% and +/-100% conditions, respectively). 
Simultaneous processing was also found to be resistant to financial incentives, with a 
$0.10 bonus for a correct answer making no difference to rates of error (40.6% without 
incentives and 48.5% with incentives) or simultaneous processing (35.7% without 
incentives, and 37.3% with incentives).  
The only manipulation found to increase the rate of correct answers based on 
sequential processing of the returns, was the following behavioural prompt: “When 
answering, try to imagine what would happen to a $100 initial investment over the two 
years. Think about the investment's value after year one, and then its value after year 
two”. The prompt shifted the modal response from “equal to its initial value” (in the 
non-prompt condition) to “less than its initial value” in the prompt condition, and this 
was found to be equally effective regardless of return sizes.  
In sum, these findings suggest that biases associated with percentage data are 
highly robust and difficult to counteract. However, there might be advantages to 
delivering financial information relating to interest rates in multiple framings or modes. 
For example, providing rate data in absolute values or frequency formats (e.g., 
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) in combination with a text description of the data and/or 
task, may be effective in ‘nudging’ decision makers towards applying the correct 
methods of processing to improve judgment effectiveness.  
2.3   The Linear Prediction Heuristic in Financial Judgment  
Increases in judgment error with sizes of investment returns is critical not only for 
investors, but for the financial well-being of the general population. Consumer financial 
decision making is a clear example of how quick, cognitively easy computations are 
performed using the data currently available, which govern our interpretation of 
likelihood. In this respect, the tendency to simultaneously process percentage and rate 
information translates into the tendency to linearly extrapolate values into the future. 
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This linear prediction heurist is highly robust and shown to characterise human 
probabilistic inference across many judgment domains.  
For example, taking out a credit agreement based on one’s predicted ability to 
make the repayments is dependent on how compound interest rates are interpreted. Akin 
to computing investment returns, failure to process interest payments sequentially can 
result in dramatic underestimation of repayment costs. Imagine for example, a £100 
payment made on a credit card at a typical APR of 34.9%, repaid over 12 years. Figure 
2.1 shows how a quick summation of the interest costs prior to making a purchase can 
lead to a drastic misinterpretation of the final credit fee. Exacerbated by opaque and 
misleading financial information, people frequently make decisions such as these which 
can have highly adverse long term effects.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Simultaneous Vs Sequential Processing of Interest Rates 
The effects of applying arithmetic (simultaneous) processing to interest costs on a 
£100 loan at an APR of 34.9% over a 12-year period. The purple line shows how the 
total repayment cost is judged as £540 when the compound interest payments are 
simultaneously added to the new balance each month. Calculating the interest costs in 
this way results in a linear prediction of the total interest costs over the term of the 
agreement. However, the true cost of the credit (based on sequentially processing the 
interest per month) follows a non-linear curve. The red line shows the true loan costs 
(£2,692), illustrating the size of the potential judgment error.  
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Stango and Zinman (2009) formalized the notion of the linear prediction heuristic 
in an analysis of biases related to decisions to borrow and save. People showed a future 
value bias associated with saving, and a payment/interest bias associated with 
borrowing, causing borrowing costs and saving rewards to be underestimated. In each 
case, biases stemmed from what the authors refer to as the general propensity to 
linearize functions containing exponential terms, leading to the systematic 
underestimation of exponential growth, or the exponential growth bias.  
McKenzie and Liersch (2011) demonstrated similar effects when assessing 
peoples’ ability to compute savings over 10, 20, 30, or 40 years if $200 or $400 were 
paid in monthly at a fixed annual interest rate of 5% or 10%. Participants systematically 
underestimated the amount saved at each point in time, based on linear extrapolation of 
the interest. These findings highlight the widespread misconception of compound 
interest, and how simultaneously processing percentages and rates can lead to gross 
underestimations of costs.  
2.4   Function Learning Theories  
 The question of why people exhibit such a strong propensity for linear 
judgments is addressed by the study of function learning which delivers empirical 
evidence relating to how people learn predictive relationships between continuous 
stimulus and response variables.  
The theories and models of function learning are useful in explaining how people 
develop awareness of causal relations between known factors in the environment, and 
are able to make predictions about future events in new situations (Busemeyer, 
McDaniel & Byun, 1997). Such theories posit that learners do not explicitly compute 
the functional forms of causal relationships, but instead learn functional relations 
through cognitive mechanisms that give rise to a formal system of function awareness 
(Kalish, 2013). Researchers consider there to be one of two formal systems which 
perform different kinds of computations that generate the learning of functions. The first 
system is considered to hypothesize one of a small number of explicit functions in new 
scenarios and then adjust the function parameters to fit the data (e.g., McDaniel & 
Busemeyer, 2005). The second system is thought to learn through generalizing from 
training examples to novel data, based on the degree of similarity between training and 
novel stimuli (e.g., DeLosh, Busemeyer & McDaniel, 1997). 
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The extrapolation-association model (EXAM) of function learning (DeLosh, et 
al., 1997) fuses together a system of associative learning with a rule based response to 
create predictions that accurately reflect human responses in tests of extrapolation. The 
EXAM model was derived from a series of studies evaluating rule-based and 
associative-learning model fits to human extrapolation test results. One-hundred and 
eight participants were assigned to one of nine conditions which varied by function 
(linear, quadratic and exponential) and density (the number of unique stimulus 
magnitudes/inputs presented during training). The training phase consisted of 200 
correct response (output) feedback trials which were immediately followed by a transfer 
phase consisting of 45 trials of novel stimulus magnitudes presented without feedback. 
Training performance was measured as the absolute deviation of participants’ 
predictions from the correct function value (linear, quadratic, or exponential) for each 
training trial. Findings showed that learning was best for linear functions at the 
beginning of training, followed by exponential and worst for quadratic. However, as 
trials progressed, the learning for all three functions converged. In terms of transfer, 
participants deviated more significantly from the correct function in the extrapolation 
regions compared to the interpolation regions and showed underestimation in the linear 
condition and overestimation in the exponential and quadratic conditions.  
EXAM was then evaluated against two rule-learning models: the polynomial 
hypothesis-testing model (Carroll, 1963; Brehmer, 1974) and the log-polynomial 
hypothesis-testing model (Koh & Meyer, 1991); and the associative-learning model 
(ALM) (Busemeyer, Byun, DeLosh & McDaniel, 1997). DeLosh et al. (1997) 
concluded that EXAM’s extrapolations most accurately corresponded with the pattern 
of over and underestimation empirically observed in the first experiment. The accuracy 
of EXAM is due to it combining associative learning of stimulus-response pairs with a 
response generation process that is based on linear interpolation and extrapolation. It is 
a network model involving a set of input nodes and associated criterion (response) 
nodes. When a stimulus is presented, a corresponding input node is maximally 
activated, along with related input nodes which also become activated in accordance 
with a generalization gradient. The activated input nodes then activate the associated 
criterion nodes, which sets up the response.  
During training, connection weights between input and output nodes become 
modified by the associative learning process which acts to increase the association 
between particular input and output nodes. Thus, function learning develops as a 
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process of gradually increasing the associations between input values and output values 
that represent the correct response for a given input stimulus.  
When a novel input value is encountered (in the extrapolation region of the 
transfer phase of an experiment), a response mechanism is activated which is comprised 
of two components: the first being the retrieved output which is based on the associative 
learning process; the second being the activation of a linear response rule. The linear 
response rule is evoked as a means of deciphering the best response from the multiples 
of maximally activated input nodes (training stimuli) in a new situation. The output 
values associated with the multiples of activated input nodes are retrieved and a linear 
estimate is then made on the basis of these output values. In essence, a response to a 
novel stimulus occurs as the result of a linear regression performed on the retrieval of 
the multiple input-output pairs that become activated when people encounter unknown 
values in new environments.   
An alternative model to EXAM is the population of linear experts (POLE) model 
(Kalish, Lewandowsky & Kruschke, 2004) in which learners associate ‘linear experts’ 
with training stimuli and use the ‘experts’ associated with input stimuli to generate 
output values. Like EXAM, POLE is based on an associative-learning mechanism and 
assumes extrapolation is based on a linear rule. The difference lies in POLE assuming 
that input values are associated with multiple linear rules, each differing in their slopes 
and intercepts. This assumption is based on the premise that speed and efficiency are the 
most important characteristics of function learning and the most expedient method for 
learning input-output pairings, is a positive linear relation. POLE involves a total of six 
parameters which must be fitted to the data and dictates that complex functions are 
learnt through a process of deconstructing the functions into small sections which can 
be estimated using different linear functions. Linear rules are therefore used for both 
training and extrapolation stimuli in POLE, whereas in EXAM, training stimuli is not 
assumed to be confound to linear rules only.    
In a comparison of the EXAM and POLE model ability to predict (as opposed to 
fit) transfer performance, McDaniel, Dimperio, Griego and Busemeyer (2009) tested 
learning and extrapolation in undergraduate students exposed to dense versus sparsely 
sampled sets of cue values presented in concave and convex functions (experiment 1); 
and two linear segments of equal cue density presented without tick marks and 
separated by a wide gap of untrained cue values (experiment 2). The results of the 
transfer phase showed that extrapolations were flatter than the function in the untrained, 
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upper segments, but remained accurate between the linear segments in experiment 1. In 
experiment 2, transfer was consistently flatter for the untrained region between the 
linear segments. McDaniel et al. concluded that EXAM could deliver the best predictors 
of human extrapolation with an additional small modification to the initial response bias 
to set it to a positive linear function which would more accurately reflect peoples’ 
positive linear bias in function learning. EXAM’s assumptions captured human 
tendencies notably well in experiment 2 where it reconstructed a flat line in the transfer 
region between the two linear segments (as opposed to extending and intersecting the 
linear segments in the transfer region).  
Although the EXAM and POLE models posit different mechanisms by which 
functions are learned, both models support the theory that people learn functions based 
on a propensity to apply positive linear relations to stimulus-response pairings. This 
reflects and affirms the empirical findings discussed throughout the review relating to 
peoples’ tendencies to interpret numbers, compute values and predict outcomes in 
accordance with linear functions and arithmetic operations.  
In sum, EXAM incorporates an associative-learning processes (akin to exemplar-
based models of categorization) and a response process based on a linear extrapolation 
rule that operates on the retrieved associations. Although training values are retrieved 
that most closely match the novel stimulus, the slope of the retrieved training values 
forms a basis from which people then linearly extrapolate to generate predictions of 
future outcomes. Phenomena such as the exponential growth bias (Stango & Zinman, 
2009; McKenzie & Liersch, 2011), problems comprehending fuel economy based on 
MPG (Larrick & Soll, 2008), and biases in interpretation of percentage price changes 
(Chen, Marmorstein, Tsiros & Rao, 2012) are examples of everyday decisions which 
occur in accordance with these learned mechanisms, shaped by the processes 
underpinning our understanding of environmental cause and effect.  
2.5   Informational Frames in Consumer Choice Domains 
The strong tendency to assume linear functions when computing values and 
judging likelihood is also widely exhibited throughout consumer decision making. In 
this context, the tendency make choices in accordance with linear functions is based on 
peoples’ interpretation of information when presented in different numerical formats. 
As described in the studies exploring the effects of percentage information biases on 
investment decisions and financial judgments, misinterpretation of pricing and 
  
29 
promotional disclosures can also significantly impact peoples’ choices in everyday 
consumer settings.  
For example, the framing of price promotions is shown to significantly influence 
how consumers process the information and perceive value (Chen & Rao, 2007; Chen, 
Marmorstein, Tsiros, & Rao, 2012; Kruger & Vargas, 2008). Chen and Rao (2007) 
showed that people make erroneous price calculations by additively processing values 
when successive percentage discounts or surcharges are applied to consumer products. 
Numerical framing has also been shown to significantly influence consumer choices for 
economically equivalent offers. For example, choices differ depending on whether a 
particular product is framed as 50% more expensive than an alternative product, or 33% 
less expensive (Kruger & Vargas, 2008). Similarly, Chen, et al., (2012) also found that 
shoppers prefer price offers which deliver 50% more for free as opposed to a 33% 
reduction in price.  
Values framed as fractions can also pose problems for the rationality of value 
judgments. As exemplified in the case of the US food chain, A&W for example, the 
retailer was forced to discontinue their new 1/3 pounder shortly after its release, later 
learning that consumers perceived the ‘4’ in the McDonalds 1/4 pounder rival burger as 
larger than the ‘3’ in the ‘1/3’ pounder. Thus, less meat was perceived to be in the 
A&W option, creating the belief that they were being short changed by A&W (Green, 
2014).  
Systematic errors are also shown when evaluating fuel economy framed in miles 
per gallon (MPG). Larrick and Soll (2008) found people showed a strong tendency to 
assume a linear relation between fuel consumption and MPG when evaluating the 
efficiency of different vehicles, when in fact there is an exponential relation. For 
example, making a small trade by replacing a 12 MPG with a 14 MPG vehicle 
represents better value compared to a larger trade of a 28 MPG for a 40 MPG vehicle. 
Thus, the non-linear increase in fuel consumption with MPG means the saving in the 
case of the larger 28 to 40 MPG trade is only 107 gallons over 10,000 miles, whereas 
the difference between the smaller 12 to 14 MPG trade is 120 gallons (10,000/12=833 
gallons; 10,000/14=714 gallons).  
Further experiments assessing rankings of pairs of ‘old and new’ vehicles and 
willingness to pay (WTP) for more fuel-efficient vehicles based on highest fuel 
consumption reductions showed a clear linear function in participants’ choices, causing 
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them to undervalue the impact of small MPG improvements on trades for inefficient 
vehicles. However, reframing MPG as gallons per mile (GPM) was shown to be 
effective in reducing the so called MPG Illusion. Under this framing condition, 64% of 
respondents chose the most fuel efficient option which have a smaller MPG 
improvement but a larger fuel saving. Thus, by removing the computational hurdles 
associated with exponential relations and rate data, making information comparable in a 
linear format, consumer choice may be greatly improved.  
2.6   Frequency Formats and Cognitive Algorithms 
The difficulties people experience in interpreting percentage formats and non-
linear functions are likely to stem from the underlying cognitive structures which 
developed in humans in pre-mathematical environments. There is evidence to suggest 
that these cognitive structures are designed to make fast, heuristic judgments based on 
absolute counts or frequencies of events sampled naturally from the environment. As a 
consequence, people are redisposed to encode events in absolute numbers and form 
predictions by adding and subtracting numerical values which leads to the tendency to 
perceive and predict linearly.  
There is a wealth of evidence suggesting that cognitive algorithms are 
programmed to function using absolute values and frequency data. The cognitive 
anomalies associated with percentages and non-linear functions are consistently shown 
to disappear when information is presented in frequency formats using (concrete) 
absolute values (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, 1999; Sloman, Over, Slovak, & Stibel, 
2003). With the advent of probability theory, human reasoning has been considered 
analogous with mathematical optimizing models (Daston, 1988). However, the more 
recent concept of human rationality as bounded, governed by limited computational 
capacities, information and time (Simon, 1955), recognises cognitive algorithms as 
incompatible with mathematical models. Rather than optimizing, humans seek to 
satisfice via fast and frugal heuristic strategies adapted to meet environmental demands 
(Simon, 1955).  
The effectiveness of natural frequency formats is based on the concept that 
cognitive algorithms are evolved to make probabilistic inferences based on simple 
frequency counts, accrued in absolute values. Thus, the mathematical expression of 
probability is not equivalent to the psychological interpretation of probability (Fiedler, 
1988; Gigerenzer, 1991, 1994). The effectiveness of frequencies is associated with the 
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fact that they retain the original numerators and denominators, displaying the base rate 
information. Conversely, relative or normalized frequencies (single point percentages) 
are bounded by zero and one, making the base rate information difficult to access. In 
probabilistic inference tasks, presenting non-normalized frequencies of events sampled 
from a single population is shown to significantly increase performance in term of 
Bayes Rule compared to when data is presented in percentages. Using Bayes Theorem, 
the posterior probability of an event (i.e., the hypothesis) can be estimated in light of 
new information, according to the following mathematical equation:  
p(H|D) = p(D&H) / p(D&H) + p(D&−H) 
where p(H|D) represents the posterior probability that the hypothesis (H) and its 
complement (-H) is true given the observed data (D). 
For example, when predicting whether a person with a positive test result actually 
has a disease, the natural frequencies representation of the problem is as follows: In 
1000 people, 40 are infected and 30 test positive, and of the 960 uninfected, 120 also 
test positive. The probability, p(H|D) is therefore A / A + B where A represents the 30 
infected people that test positive and B represented the 120 uninfected people that test 
positive = 30 / (30 + 12) = 0.2 (20%). The base rates for both the hit rate (40/1000) and 
for the false positive (960/1000) are thus clearly communicated.  
However, when considering the problem presented in normalized probabilities, 
Bayesian reasoning becomes significantly more difficult. For example, out of 1000 
people, 40 will be infected, out of 1000 infected, 750 will test positive, and out of 1000 
uninfected, 125 will also test positive. In this format, the base rates must be multiplied 
by the conditional probabilities to determine the probability of infection p(H|D). Figure 
2.2 shows an example of a Bayesian probability task presented in a natural frequency 
format versus single event probabilities.  
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Figure 2.2 Natural Frequecy Vs Probability Formats 
An example of a Bayesian probabilistic inference task presented in natural 
frequencies (right) versus single event probabilities (left). By presenting the problem in 
the natural frequency format, Bayesian rationality is significantly improved by the 
exposure of the base rate information which facilitates prediction, p(H|D) of disease (H) 
given the presence of the symptom (D).  
The facilitative effects of frequency formats on Bayesian reasoning were first 
demonstrated among physicians in the domain of diagnostic decision making 
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995, 1999; Gigerenzer, 1996; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998; 
Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 2000). A wealth of studies have 
subsequently followed which confirm the effects of frequencies in numerous 
experimental settings (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Brase, 2002, 2008) and applied 
contexts such as screening for Down syndrome (Bramwell, West & Salmon, 2006), 
juror verdicts based on DNA evidence (Hoffrage et al., 2000; Koehler, 1996, Lindsey et 
al., 2003) and HIV test result interpretations among AIDS counsellors (Gigerenzer, 
2002). Teaching people frequency representations shows robust long-term learning 
effects, including the ability to teach others (Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001; 
Kurzenhauser & Hoffrage, 2002), and frequencies enable children to perform Bayesian 
reasoning as accurately as adults (Zhu & Gigerenzer, 2006). Moreover, frequencies can 
also support Bayesian reasoning in more complex environments involving multiple cues 
and cue values (Krauss et al., 2002; Hoffrage et al., 2015). 
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2.7   Icon Arrays and Denominator Neglect  
Findings relating to graph literacy and judgments of medial risk show that 
dynamic icon arrays (i.e., the use of symbols to convey sample frequencies) are 
particularly effective in increasing probabilistic inference and the accuracy of risk 
judgments, specifically among individuals with higher graph literacy (Okan, Garcia-
Retamero, Cokely, Maldonado, 2011). In the context of medical screening, findings 
show that statistical data is widely misinterpreted by both expert physicians and patients 
(Garcia-Retamero, Wicki, Cokely & Hanson, 2014; Schwartz, Woloshin & Black, 1997; 
Wegwarth, Schwartz, Woloshin, Gaissmaier & Gigerenzer, 2012).  
Inaccurate judgments of statistical information in this context are related to 
incomprehension of probability formats, associated with lower levels of numeracy and 
risk literacy (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal & Garcia-Retamero, 2012; Galesic & 
Garcia-Retamero, 2010; Gardner, McMillan, Raynor, Woolf & Knapp, 2011; Keller & 
Siegrist, 2009; Lipkus, Samsa & Rimer, 2001; Peters, 2012). Converting probability 
information into graphical frequency formats (icon arrays) however, is shown to 
significantly facilitate risk judgment across high and low numeracy groups (Garcia-
Retamero & Cokely, 2013; Galesic, Garcia-Retamero & Gigerenzer, 2009; Zikmund-
Fisher et al., 2008; Gaissmaier, Wegwarth, Skopec, Muller, Broschinski & Politi, 2012; 
Zikmund-Fisher, Witteman, et al., 2014; Okan, et al., 2012; Garcia-Retamero & 
Galesic, 2010). Figures 2.3 and 2.4 give examples of how icons arrays are used to 
increase risk judgment accuracy in medical decision making contexts.  
Visual frequencies also facilitate inference in cancer screening decision making. 
In a comparison of icon arrays with frequencies in numerical formats combined with 
text information, Petrova, Garcia-Retamero and Cokely (2015) confirmed previous 
findings, showing the de-biasing effect of the format even in complex highly emotive 
situations involving counterintuitive information. Cancer screening risk comprehension 
was significantly higher where icon arrays were presented, even among participants 
with a low belief in the severity of the consequences of cancer.  
  
34 
 
Figure 2.3 Cancer Risk Conveyed Via Frequency Format 
An example of the frequency format used to convey a lifetime risk of breast 
cancer for a 50-year-old woman. The lifetime risk of 9% is portrayed in a frequency 
format with a denominator of 10 (Schapira, Nattinger, Colleen & McHorney, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 2.4 NHS National Prescribing Centre Frequecy Communication 
NHS National Prescribing Centre: Reduction in Cardiovascular Risk from Taking 
Statins (Should I be taking statins?). This is an example of a frequency representation 
used to by the NHS to communicate the probability of cardiovascular disease in the 
general population when statins are taken (right) versus when they are not (left). As can 
be seen, the total number of smiley faces represent the sample population (100 people). 
The green faces represent the frequency of those without cardiovascular disease (80 out 
of 100), in relation to those with cardiovascular disease (20 out of 100). The yellow 
smiley faces on the right represented the reduction in the frequency of cardiovascular 
disease when statins are taken (5 out of 80, thus indicating a 5% reduction in the risk of 
cardiovascular disease).  
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The process underpinning the effectiveness of icon arrays is the increase in 
attention to base rate information. This acts to eliminate denominator neglect, 
recognised as the tendency to focus on numerators and ignore denominators in ratio 
information. For example, people judge the risk of cancer as a greater when described 
as “killing 1,286 out of 10,000 people” compared to “24.14 of 100 people” because the 
numerator (1,286 versus 24.14) is weighted, irrespective of the size of the denominator 
(10,000 versus 100) (Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; Yamagishi, 1997). Similarly, Denes-Raj 
and Epstein (1994) showed that when tasked with selecting a winning red bean from a 
bowl of white beans, people opt for a bowl containing seven red and 100 white beans, 
rather than a bowl containing one red and 10 white beans. Again, this exemplifies the 
strong tendency to ignore denominators when estimating event probabilities.     
By making the focal and non-focal feature frequencies easily comparable, icon 
arrays give context and meaning to the data which increases statistical rationality in 
individuals with low numeracy and ability for statistical inference (Garcia-Retamero & 
Galesic, 2009; Okan et al., 2012).  Specifically, icon arrays convey spatial features and 
conceptual relations between data which are shown to be important to visual encoding 
of the focal feature (Cleveland & McGill, 1984, 1986; Simkin & Hastie, 1987; Newman 
& Scholl, 2012; Okan et al., 2012), and the preservation of natural correspondences to 
the physical environment (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Tversky, 2001, 2009; Tversky, 
Kugelmass, & Winter, 1991; Fischer, 2012). These factors promote active elaborate 
processing of numerical information, which combined with text prompts, can enhance 
statistical inference (Okan, Garcia-Retamero, Cokely & Maldonado, 2015).  
The effectiveness of frequencies in supporting elaborate processing was 
demonstrated in an analysis of psychiatrists’ judgments of the likelihood of psychiatric 
patients reoffending six months after discharge. Slovic, Monahan and MacGregor 
(2000) found that, when framed in frequencies (i.e., “20 out of every 100 mental 
patients typically commit a violent act after their release”), 41% refused discharge. 
However, when framed in percentages (i.e., “a 20% chance that patients will commit a 
violent act after their release”), 21% refused. The researchers concluded that frequency 
framings evoked a clearer perception of an individual patient, which in turn increased 
their risk perception, whereas percentage information was more ‘benign’ in that it did 
not create the same imagery and was therefore not as meaningful.      
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2.8   The Importance of Comparison to Statistical Inference 
When considering user experience and interface design, it is recognised that 
people derive value from numerical information by ascribing meaning through a process 
of comparing attributes and choice alternatives (Roller, 2011). Judgement performance 
is shown to differ considerable depending on whether numerical information is 
presented and evaluated simultaneously or independently. Based on an analysis of 
presentation mode, Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount and Bazerman (1999) posit the 
evaluability hypothesis, in which all judgments are described as made in either a joint 
evaluation mode (JE), in which multiple attributes associated with a particular value are 
viewed simultaneously and evaluated comparatively, or a separate evaluation mode 
(SE), in which attributes are presented and evaluated in isolation. Attributes differ in the 
extent to which they may be evaluated, with difficult-to-evaluate attributes exerting 
more influence on judgments when presented in joint evaluation mode, which can lead 
to preference reversals between values presented in JE versus SE.  
In the extended general evaluability theory, Hsee and Zhang (2010) clarify 
evaluability as the extent to which a person has relevant reference information 
necessary to assess the utility of a particular value. Evaluability is thus considered key 
to judgment performance, and is heightened in situations when decision makers possess 
knowledge about the domain and the attributes are either presented in joint mode, or 
they are inherently evaluable (i.e., they are assessable without learning/knowledge or 
social comparison, such as when assessing ambient temperature for example).  
In the context of probabilistic inference, it is therefore important to consider not 
only the informational format, but also the nature of the surrounding context or 
reference information. Additional context information has the potential to create noise 
which can limit judgment performance in more complex prediction environments 
(Harvey, Bolger & McClelland, 1994). However, strongly correlated causal data which 
is specified to the judgment task is shown to facilitate prediction performance (Becker, 
Leitner & Leopold-Wildburger, 2007, 2008). For example, highly reliable trend change 
information is shown to positively impact judgment accuracy (Remus, O’Connor & 
Griggs, 1995) and increases in the reliability of temperature reference data was found to 
improve the accuracy of soft drink sales forecasts (Lim & O’Connor, 1996). This 
suggests that the type, format and specificity of surrounding contextual data is important 
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to peoples’ ability to interpret and apply reference information when forming judgments 
and determining preferences.  
 Findings suggest that the ability to contextualize data through comparison against 
a reference point of some sort is shown to facilitate statistical inference in many 
different contexts. For example, participants rated a gamble involving a 7/36 chance of 
winning $9 as less attractive compared to a gamble involving a 7/36 chance of winning 
$9 in joint mode with the added potential for a small loss – a 29/36 chance of losing 5c 
(Bateman, Dent, Peters, Slovic & Starmer, 2007). Researchers suggested that people 
preferred the latter gamble because in the first case, it was possible to evaluate the 
probability as it has known upper and lower bounds, however there was no means of 
contextualizing the monetary gain as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Therefore, a relatively low 
probability (7 out of 36 chances) was deemed unattractive. In the joint evaluation mode 
however, the addition of the 5c loss created a reference point, giving the $9 gain 
meaning which made the win/lose ratio attractive, i.e., the relatively small chance of 
loss seemed worth the gamble for the comparatively high value gain.  
Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor (2002) demonstrated the how percentage 
and frequency formats presented in joint mode can influence decisions by mediating the 
affect heuristic (the tendency to make ‘good’ or ‘bad’ judgments). When informed that 
new airport safety equipment would “save 98% of 150 lives”, participants were 
significantly more in favour of the expenditure compared to when they were informed 
that it would “save 150 lives”. In isolation, “150” has no meaning and is difficult to 
evaluate as being positive or negative. However, when put into the context of “98%”, 
participants were able to assign meaning to the data, and evaluated “150” as highly 
positive, indicated by “98%” being so near the upper bound of the percentage scale. 
 Similar effects are also found when assessing peoples’ sensitivity to the scope 
(i.e., the size, frequency or duration) of an outcome. For example, when choices are 
presented in isolation, people are willing to pay the same amount to save 2,000 birds 
from oil spills as they would 200,000 birds (Desvousges, Johnson, Dunford, Boyle & 
Wilson, 1993), and donate the same amount to help one victim as they would to help 
multiple victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005). When framed in the context of other 
information, these biases are eliminated. Joint evaluation mode is also shown to impact 
forecasting judgments, particularly when causally correlated information cues are 
provided (Becker, Leitner & Leopold-Wildburger, 2007, 2008).  
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Preference reversals between joint and separate evaluation mode are also apparent 
in decisions where attributes differ categorically and incrementally. For example, Hsee 
(1998) showed that in SE, people were willing to pay more for a 24-piece intact 
dinnerware set than for a 40-piece set containing some broken pieces, however in JE, 
preferences reversed. Similarly, people in SE paid more for a 7-oz ice cream served in a 
5-oz cup (overfilled) than for an 8-oz ice cream served in a 10-oz cup (under-filled), yet 
their preference reversed in JE. When presented with a choice between a set of 13 mint 
condition baseball cards, or a set containing 10 mint and three poor condition cards, in 
SE, the latter choice received higher bids, whereas in JE the 13 mint condition cards 
were more popular (List, 2002). This demonstrates that when no reference point was 
provided, the incremental difference of whether the card set contained 10 or 13 was 
irrelevant to perceived utility. However, when evaluated in the context of the other 
choice, the categorical difference of the number of mint cards provided a measure of 
value.  
Further analysis of frames and presentation modes is necessary to understand how 
to utilise evaluative judgment processes to improve judgments involving categorical, or 
‘real’ change perception. Hsee and Zhang (2010) thus postulate that in JE, probability 
estimates will be less linear than in SE. This is due to the incremental differences in 
probability estimates that a person will express when comparing multiple attributes in 
JE (i.e., on a continuum), versus the categorical (0/1) probability estimate which will be 
made when evaluating an attribute in isolation (SE).  
2.9   Data Formats and Proportion Change Judgments   
 The framing of numerical data is also shown to influence peoples’ ability to 
detect actual changes in the environment distinct from random fluctuations in sample 
sizes. Fiedler, Kareev, Avrahami, Beier, Kutzner, Hütteret (2016) tested participants’ 
detection of genuine change by comparing responses to pairs of stimuli which varied 
either in sample size, n (a random fluctuation), proportion, p (a genuine environmental 
change) or both n and p.  
In 49 trials, participants were shown 24 pairs of stimuli which each involved 
different frequencies of shaded and dotted rectangles representing the focal and non-
focal features, respectively. Each symbol appeared in a 1 second interval and all 
symbols remained onscreen for 3,000 milliseconds per trial.  In half of the pairings, 
large and small increases and decreases in p (the focal feature) occurred across different 
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sample sizes (n = 8 and n = 16), and in the other half, n changed but p did not. 
Participants then indicated per trial whether the sample was drawn from the same set as 
the previous, or whether it was drawn from a different set based on whether p had 
changed between each pairing (i.e., the frequency of shaded rectangles).  
Fiedler et al., (2016) found that peoples’ detection of change was influenced by 
actual p changes, with p increase judgments occurring most frequently followed by no-
change, then decrease judgments. However, p change judgments were consistently 
higher for cases where n increased (8 to 16) and lower where n decreased (16 to 8). 
Moreover, judgment accuracy was highest when n changes occurred in the same 
direction as p changes, indicating a strong bias to detect real-world changes based on 
superficial fluctuations in samples.  
Difficulties in distinguishing changes in sample frequencies from true population 
changes can have important consequences in real-world contexts, for example when 
judging student performance, public opinion votes or disease rates. To test the effects of 
n on p in a more realistic setting, Fiedler et al., (2016) examined the effects of format by 
comparing the symbols (control), to a probability-plus-n format in which participants 
observed normalize percentages of the focal feature plus the relevant n per trial (e.g., 
“Drawn were 8 (16) symbols, 75% shaded and 25% dotted”), a probability-only format 
which omitted n, and a descriptive natural frequency format in which the frequencies 
were presented in absolute values (e.g., “Drawn were 12 shaded and 4 dotted symbols”). 
A robust replication of the findings occurred for the control condition, with 
increasing n supporting p increase detection but hindering decrease detection, and vice 
versa for decreasing n. Surprisingly, the same was found in the frequency condition, 
with main effects for both p and n changes indicating that p change judgments scores 
were subject to the same biases as those shown in the control condition. However, 
presenting focal and non-focal feature frequencies as normalized percentages 
(probability-plus-n condition) showed a strong main effect for p change judgments 
(with no n changes effect or interaction), indicating the elimination of the bias. The 
probability-only format yielded the same results, suggesting that the sample size was 
ignored when percentage was presented.  
Communicating the task using the symbols may have been unduly abstract or 
confusing, particularly when pairings were presented sequentially with the focal feature 
positioned randomly making comparison more difficult. To investigate whether the bias 
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held when inductively experienced frequencies were presented in a more salient 
context, the rectangles were replaced with smiling and frowning faces and participants 
imagined themselves as politicians. They then had to judge the popularity of different 
campaign speeches based on public reactions (i.e., frequencies of smiling audience 
faces). This time the trial pairings were presented simultaneously on the right and left of 
the screen across four n combinations (i.e., n left = 8 vs. n right = 16 and vice versa, and 
n right = 8 vs. n left = 8, and n right = 16 vs. n left = 16). The smiling and frowning 
faces were positioned randomly and shown onscreen for 2,500 milliseconds. Despite the 
fact that visual-spatial changes in proportions (from left to right) were involved, as 
opposed to temporal changes (as with the rectangles), the findings were the same. 
Again, p change judgments were effected not only by p changes from left to right, but 
also by n changes from left to right. Both n left and n right samples contributed to the 
effect of n change on p change judgments.  
Therefore, whether meaningless geometric symbols were presented sequentially, 
or smiling human faces in a socially meaningful context were presented simultaneously, 
proportion change judgments were biased by n changes in exactly the same pattern (i.e., 
n increases facilitated p increase detection but hindered p decrease detection, and vice 
versa for n decreases). Moreover, n changes were strong enough to influence p 
judgments even when no p change occurred, and in some cases n changes fully overrode 
the influence of p changes on participants change judgments.  
On first inspection, these findings are surprising given the body of evidence 
relating to the effectiveness of frequency formats, and in particular icon arrays, in aiding 
inductive reasoning (e.g., Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2013; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 
1995). No advantages were found from icon array formats although it seemed likely that 
semantically meaningful face icons combined with simultaneous sample presentation 
would have facilitated deeper level processing and increased judgment accuracy. Spatial 
comparison of the focal feature frequencies (i.e., via simultaneous presentation), should 
have been more effective in conveying spatial features and conceptual relations, thus 
yielding higher performance compared to when the proportional changes were assessed 
temporally (i.e., when the symbols were presented in sequence).  
Anomalies in p judgments occurred when proportional changes were inductively 
learned from an experienced sample (i.e., observing frequencies of symbols or smiley 
faces). However, confusions between sample and proportional changes were eliminated 
when normalized percentage formats were presented. It is therefore possible that the 
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data formats tested were inappropriately applied or measured in this particular judgment 
task, or that design oversights contributed to the findings in this particular context. For 
example, the 3,000 millisecond viewing time combined with the non-consecutive 
display of the focal feature (i.e., symbols and smiley faces) may have reduced peoples’ 
ability to inductively learn proportional changes. Schapira, Nattinger & McAuliffe 
(2006) demonstrated a similar effect when comparing frequency displays 
communicating lifetime risk of breast cancer. When the focal feature was consecutively 
highlighted versus randomly highlighted within the population sample (see figure 2.5), 
risk was judged as lower by both numerate and innumerate participants.  
In the case of Fiedler et al’s., (2016) numerical frequencies condition, the 3 
second observation time might have also hindered responses. For example, to determine 
whether a proportional difference actually occurred, the frequencies had to be summed 
per trial to compute n before comparing per pairing. Again, the sequential presentation 
of each pairing might have made the comparison more difficult under the time 
restriction.  
 
Figure 2.5 Consecutive Vs Random Highlighting of Focal Features 
The left panel shows an example of consecutive highlighting of the frequency of 
the focal feature versus random highlighting (on the right) as used by Schapira, 
Nattinger & McAuliffe (2006) when comparing the effectiveness of icon arrays in 
communicating the 9% lifetime risk of breast cancer in 50-year-old women.   
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2.10   Reasoning in Accordance with Probability Theory 
Contrary to Fiedler et al’s., (2016) findings, the effectiveness of normalized 
percentage formats over and above natural frequency representations are not widely 
supported. Standard normalized percentage formats are consistently shown to yield 
biased probability estimates, suggesting that rather than reasoning in accordance with 
probability theory, people employ various heuristic strategies (Cesana-Arlotti, Téglás & 
Bonatti, 2012; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Shafir & Leboeuf, 2002; Ariely, 2009; 
Kahneman, 2011). The systematic biases associated with probability formats support 
the notion of human judgment as incompatible with mathematical models of 
probability. This is indicative of the view that rationality has evolved to function based 
on environmentally adapted heuristic strategies which facilitate human survival 
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999).  
However, using a simple model based on probability theory’s addition law 
(equivalent to the equation for disjunction), P(AvB) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A^B), Costello 
and Watts (2014) showed that people do possess the ability to make unconditional 
probability estimates in accordance with the laws of probability. From this perspective, 
judgmental biases such as conservatism, subadditivity and the conjunction and 
disjunction fallacies (Hilbert, 2012; Tversky & Koehler, 1994; Tversky & 
Kahneman,1983) are the result of random variation or noise in the judgment process 
which disappear when predictions for everyday repeated events (i.e., weather events) 
are averaged. The following simple probability model for events A and B was used to 
test the assumptions of the heuristic perspective of probabilistic reasoning by creating 
conjunctive (“and”) and disjunctive (“or”) probabilities, P(A^B) and P(AvB), as well as 
the individual probabilities P(A) and P(B).: 
XE (A,B) = PE (A) + PE (B) - PE (A^B) - PE (AvB)    
where PE (A) represents a person’s estimate for P (A) and PE (B) represents the 
person’s estimate for P (B), etc. There are there are an equal number of positive and 
negative terms in the expression which mean that the d, or noise terms are cancelled out. 
The rationale therefore, is that when averaged across predictions, the various biases on 
the individual expressions will cancel out, resulting in XE (A,B) = 0, in accordance with 
probability theory’s law of addition:  
X(A, B) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A^B) - P(AvB) = 0. 
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Participants made predictions, PE (A), PE (B), PE (A^B) and PE (AvB) for 12 pairs 
of A, B weather events from two sets (cloudy, windy, sunny, thundery and cold, frosty, 
sleety) which created pairings of low, medium and high probability events. Participants 
were asked what the probability of a given weather event would be on a randomly 
selected day in Ireland, for either a single (cloudy), conjunctive (cloudy and cold), or 
disjunctive event (cloudy or cold) (probability format), or on how many days they 
thought the weather event would occur from a 100 randomly selected days (frequency 
format).  
There was no effect of question format on predictions, and XE (A, B) values for 
each participants’ predictions across the 12 pairs of A, B events were symmetrically 
distributed around zero with an average XE value of 0.66 (SD = 27.1) which is very 
close to that predicted by probability theory (the predicted mean of 0 lay within the 99% 
confidence interval of the observed mean). Conjunctions and disjunctions were recorded 
at rates of 49% and 51% respectively, however even participants with high conjunction 
and disjunction fallacy rates still yielded values of XE close to zero.  
In a repeat experiment, the results held for estimates of event probabilities for 
conjunctions with negations, A ^ ¬B (A and not B), and B ^ ¬A (B and not A) where 
the derived sum equalled zero, and also for non-symmetric expressions involving an 
unequal number of positive and negative terms which generated left over noise terms 
(d). Averaging across the symmetrical models yielded a mean of -0.01 (SD = 29.2) 
(predicted mean = 0), and when one/two noise terms were left after cancellation, the 
same units of bias were observed in participants’ judgments. The mean probability 
estimates for the biased models showed values closely clustered around the predicted 
values, with a mean less than 0.001 SD from the predicted values.   
In this view, systematic biases in probabilistic judgments are therefore the result 
of noisy retrieval from memory and that by taking the mean of people’s estimates across 
repeated events, biases vanish to yield judgments in agreement with probability theory. 
This presents an interesting perspective on how we might approach probabilistic 
decision making in many situations. However, the importance of informational format 
to decision processes and performance are still opaque. It is likely that different 
probabilistic decision situations activate different judgment processes which are better 
supported by some frames and formats and not others – sometimes percentages and 
single point probabilities may be appropriate. The interplay between reasoning and data 
format is likely to be more complex than the frequency hypothesis suggests, particularly 
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as the type and variety of data we regularly interact with is rapidly increasing in all 
domains. The probabilistic revolution is thus ensuing at an increased rate and it is 
plausible that the human capacity for reasoning in accordance with probabilistic models 
is strengthening as our scientific and technological focus is being increasingly 
underpinned by machine learning approaches and mathematical modelling.  
Like Fiedler et al., (2016), Costello and Watts (2014) found no difference in 
probability estimates between framing questions in a numerical frequency formats 
compared to a probability or percentage data formats. Although on face value this is 
counterintuitive to the widely supported frequencies hypothesis, it does not rule out the 
possibility that in a broad sense, people do in fact reason in accordance with the laws of 
probability (as these laws are conceived by human minds), however, the cognitive 
processes behind the estimations are still based on recall of raw frequencies drawn from 
experience. The would account for why biases are cancelled out when judgments are 
averaged across successive estimates for repeated events. When sampling from memory 
this would be expected because of the noise in recall which would correspond to natural 
variation in the environment, including the degree to which events co-vary and interact 
with one other.  
It is likely therefore that the recall of frequency data is likely to be the default 
method of human statistical inference based on the automatic encoding and storage of 
event frequencies in memory (Hasher & Zacks, 1984). Evidence of probability 
estimates among children and animals using frequency data which align with optimizing 
models further support this perspective (Cesana-Arlotti et al., 2012; Kheifets & 
Gallistel, 2012).  
It is therefore likely that no one information format may be ‘good’ or ‘bad’. 
Instead, it is probable there is an interplay between how a particular data format is 
interpreted in a particular situation, the cognitive strategies activated by the task, and the 
measure used to determine judgment rationality. Thus, rather than perceiving 
inaccuracies in inferences as a sign of cognitive flaws and biases, it is more likely that 
such discrepancies represent the variations in event occurrences as they were encoded in 
memory (i.e., noise associated with the different co-dependencies and co-occurrences of 
events). As Costello and Watts suggest, averaging over a sample of a persons’ 
probability judgments for a given set of events over time may counteract biases 
observed when considering individual judgments in isolation. This method may be 
effective in yielding an overall probability estimate which aligns with probability 
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theory. However, judgment ‘rationality’ may differ considerably to rationality in the 
mathematical sense when considering specific real-world contexts and the measures of 
performance unique to those contexts.  
In sum, the findings discussed in the above review suggest that people possess a 
strong tendency to additively process numbers and assume linearity in the environment 
based on the ease and efficiency associated with learning and applying linear functions. 
These tendencies suggest that cognitive algorithms have developed to process 
information in concrete, absolute formats, based on event frequencies naturally sampled 
from the environment. The result of being predisposed to ‘think linearly’ and predict 
events based on linear relations, means that people are better able to interpret and use 
absolute values which require arithmetic operations and tend to make errors where 
percentages are concerned. Percentage format biases involve mishandling base rate 
information (i.e., failure to apply geometric operations) which translates into problems 
interpreting non-linear data and predicting future outcomes which following exponential 
trends.  
Although the propensity for additive processing and linear predictions is highly 
robust through human decision making, it is not necessarily the case that people cannot 
reason in accordance with statistical models based on probability theory. By altering the 
informational format from single point probabilities into frequencies using graphical 
frames and creating context in numerical judgment situations for comparative analysis 
of the data, people are shown to make mathematically accurate probabilistic inferences. 
Aside from incomprehensible probability formats, random noise involved in the 
encoding and recalling of events (i.e., potentially associated with event co-dependencies 
and co-occurrences) may also account for peoples’ judgment irrationality in the 
mathematical sense. As demonstrated when taking the average of a set of human 
judgments, mean predictions align with those of probability models.  
These results suggest that peoples’ probabilistic judgement processes may not be 
inherently ‘flawed’. Instead, the biases that exist result from the developmental 
processes of human cognition, yielding a propensity for handling data in absolute terms 
and anticipating the world in a linear fashion. Modern day probability theory thus 
presents a barrier to peoples’ interpretation of information, but not necessarily the 
human ability to rationalise. Depending on the situation, informational format and 
surrounding context, people can be facilitated to form effective judgments which are 
both statistically and environmentally ‘rational’. The onus is thus on matching data 
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formats and frames to fit with task demands and the motivational factors and cognitive 
strategies activated in certain environments to best support the characteristics of human 
judgment processes.  
In the following three chapters, five experiments are discussed which aim to 
address the questions raised throughout the review relating to how human rationality is 
differentially effected by numerical data framings and formats. To examine the 
robustness of biases across different judgment domains and levels of expertise, the 
probabilistic inferences of professionals and laypersons are assessed in noisy, real-world 
environments and consumer choice scenarios. Experiment 1 assesses the judgment 
performance of professional retail forecasters employed by a major UK Supermarket. 
Employees are tested in their ability to forecast product sales following linear and 
exponential trends when observed in absolute and percentage formats. This design thus 
assesses prediction performance based on interpreting matches versus mismatches 
between numerical functions and formats. Despite experience, employees displayed a 
robust tendency to additively process percentages and predict sales by linearly 
extrapolating trends based on the last two observed data points. This bias resulted in 
systematic under-forecasting (trend-damping) of increases and over-forecasting (anti-
damping) of decreases.  
Experiment 2 furthers the analysis of expert probabilistic judgment in the complex 
domain of humanitarian aid forecasting. Aid professionals are compared to non-experts 
in their ability to forecast real-world refugee camp data. The effects of noise on 
judgment performance is tested by presenting target time series data in sparse (i.e., 
single time series) versus rich (i.e., additional non-causal time series) contexts. Experts’ 
predictions were no more accurate than novices’ and both groups formed judgments by 
linearly extrapolating the data in both contexts. The tendency to linearly extrapolate 
increased in noise, particularly so among experts and correlated with forecasting error. 
One way in which noise impacted judgments was by influencing the trend direction of 
extrapolation. When all cues trended in the same direction, experts and novices tended 
to linearly project the ‘common trend’ and this tendency was predictive of forecasting 
error.  
Experiment 3a applies insights drawn from the previous chapters to the domain of 
consumer financial decision making. Using a randomized controlled trial design, 
mortgage choices are compared between three disclosure conditions involving a control 
(standard industry price comparison format) versus total mortgage costs disclosed in 
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current versus future interest rates with either a ‘current rates’ default (condition 2) or 
‘future rates’ default (condition 3). Combined with simultaneous onscreen presentation, 
the future rates default was significantly more effective in optimizing loan choices 
compared to the control or sequential presentation with a current rates default. 
Experiment 3b tests the framing effect identified in experiment 3a in conjunction 
with a behavioural disclaimer. The disclaimer is added to each condition to promote 
consideration of risk associated with BoE rate rises by increasing rate comparisons and 
depth of evaluative analysis of choice alternatives. The robustness of the framing effect 
was verified by finding no effect of the disclaimer on the proportion of fully optimized 
choices per condition. However, there were changes in proportions of choices made per 
rate frame and the degree of decision optimality (i.e., choice scores) alternated between 
rate frames with the addition of the disclaimer manipulation.  
Experiment 4 extends the rate framing effect to monthly mortgage repayment 
decisions. In condition 1, total loan costs and interest charges are framed over the full 
term (20 years) versus a reduced term (10 years) combined with monthly repayment 
amounts necessary to clear the balance over each term option. In condition 2, the same 
disclosure is used except with the addition of current versus future rates for the 20 
versus 10-year term costs. The combined disclosures of terms and rates in condition 2 
significantly increased repayment amounts above the least effective choice (i.e., most 
optimistic and unrealistic) scenario of the minimum necessary to clear the balance over 
20 years in current rates. The combined disclosures were thus more effective in 
counteracting riskier financial decision making associated optimistic perceptions of rate 
variability. As expected, higher temporal preference and lower levels of financial 
literacy were predictive of the tendency to make smaller (less optimal) monthly 
repayment decisions. Educational level interacted with the framing manipulations in 
both conditions, indicating the potential advantages of the combined disclosure in 
counteracting poor financial judgment associated with lower educational levels. 
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Chapter 3 
The Linear Prediction Heuristic in Expert Retail 
Forecasting 
This chapter seeks to address the theoretical question of whether people are 
prone to treat percentage points as whole numbers and make predictions by 
linearly extrapolating numerical data. Based on these possibilities, we predict a 
specific pattern of results among professional retail forecasters employed by a 
major UK Supermarket when assessed in their ability to forecast product sales 
trending linearly vs. exponentially and observed in absolute vs. percentage 
formats. Performance was worst when observed formats ‘mismatched’ functions 
and best when formats and functions ‘matched’. A robust tendency to linearly 
extrapolate based on the last two observed data points was shown, leading to 
systematic under-forecasting of increases and over-forecasting of decreases. 
3.1   Background and Rationale 
As discussed in the background literature review in chapter 2, the evidence 
relating to the tendency to make erroneous judgments where percentage and rate 
information is concerned is numerous and widespread. Both consumers and experts 
alike are shown to engage in cognitive short-cuts by arithmetically processing 
percentages when geometric operations are necessary.  
In professional settings there is a high demand on experts to make fast, accurate 
forecasting decisions, often based on highly variable data collated across multiple 
sources. In retail contexts for example, experts forecast future sales and make stock 
ordering decisions for thousands of individual products as well as whole product 
categories.  
Effective forecasting decisions in this context involve the application of rich tacit 
knowledge based on individual experience in the field combined with interpretation of 
statistical model data. For example, seasonal variability, individual product lead times, 
promotions and pricing variation, competitor activities, product trends and supplier 
negotiations are all important ‘un-modelled’ data points which shape forecasting 
decisions. Although a proportion of experts’ judgment is based on knowledge which 
exists outside of statistical models, individual stock and sales forecasting accuracy still 
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depends however, on peoples’ interpretation and application of the data generated by 
statistical models. Thus, when it comes to utilizing numeric information in the 
formation of a forecasting estimate, the ‘rationality’ of judgments in this particular is 
context is dependent on the ability to correctly interpret trends in data in different 
numeric formats which are generated by different statistical models and forecasting 
systems. The forecasters are then required to synthesize the various data points to make 
judgments which are informed by the multiple data sources.  
To mirror the real-world demands of the forecasting task, experiment 1 involves 
the retailers making point forecasts for three-monthly sequences of sales data presented 
in absolute or percentage formats. Akin to the differences in the trends and formats of 
the model outputs, the sequences in both formats trend either linearly or exponentially. 
The rationality of judgments is thus dependent on the forecasters statistical 
understanding of the effects of formats and functions. Specifically, the experiment tests 
the ability to correctly distinguish the effects of linear versus exponential functions and 
to correctly project the trends in situations when the observed numeric format differs to 
the trend function.  
Working with different statistical systems to forecast thousands of products across 
numerous different categories effectuates the propensity for costly errors. For example, 
interpreting a 10 percent decreases as a 10-point decrease in stock or sales in one 
display or data set, or summing a +10%, -10% rise and fall to predict no change from 
base can result in significantly inaccurate predictions of available stock or future sales. 
Such errors can have dramatic financial impact, especially when dealing with large 
orders or products involving high manufacturing costs and long lead times. Figure 3.1 
shows an example of a commercial forecasting tool in the retail domain, demonstrating 
the complexity of the prediction environment. The tool encompassed a vast array of 
data for all general merchandise product categories stocked by the retailer. Forecasters 
are required to synthesize multiple cues across graphical and tabulated data frames and 
in percentage and absolute formats to formulate forecasting estimates for stocks and 
sales levels.   
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Figure 3.1 Professional Retail Statistical Forecasting Tool 
Example of a statistical forecasting tool used by professional retail forecasters to 
formulate sales predictions and make stock ordering decisions. The forecasting 
environment for these retailers was complex and varied, involving multiple data cues 
framed in percentage and absolute values. Judgments were formed based on the 
synthesis of domain knowledge, time-series and tabulated data points which heightened 
the propensity to err, based on the process of data comparison across numerical formats 
and visual representations covering different time horizons.  
 Given the high task demands involved in professional retail forecasting, and that 
forecasters deal with multiple data sources daily, it is intuitive to assume that experts 
will accurately process sequential percentage changes and correctly interpret the effects 
of non-linear functions. However, the robustness of the tendency to additively rather 
multiplicatively process percentage information suggests that the human propensity to 
form predictions based on linear extrapolation will persist, despite experts’ specialist 
forecasting training and experience. To test the hypothesis that experts will exhibit the 
same interpretational errors and prediction biases observed in consumer and non-expert 
settings, experiment 1 examines expert merchandise forecasters’ ability to forecast sales 
trending in linear versus exponential functions when viewed in percentage versus 
absolute number formats.  
By alternating linear versus exponential growth functions with the numerical 
format of the sales figures, comprehension of the effects of numerical functions is 
revealed through the correct/incorrect use of additive versus multiplicative processing 
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when forming predictions. For example, figure 3.2 shows an exponentially increasing 
sales trend over four months and what the deleterious effects of additively instead of 
multiplicatively processing the percentage points can be when forming an estimate for 
the fourth month of sales.  
 
Figure 3.2 Arithmetically Processing Exponential Trends 
An example of an exponential sales trend increasing in +50% increments at each 
time point (blue line) with the sales figures displayed in absolute values and the effects 
of a sales forecast for the fourth month based on additive processing of the sales figures 
(the red point). The correct prediction for the fourth month is 337.5 units, which is 
computed multiplicatively by following the exponential trend (100x0.5, 150x0.5, 
225x0.5). However, if month four is computed arithmetically by adding +50 points to 
the base value at each time point (100+50, 150+50, 200+50=250), a significant under-
forecast results. In a retail context, linearly extrapolating an exponential trend in this 
way can have severe financial impacts which increase in accordance with the magnitude 
of the base measure. For example, one product unit may represent several 
hundred/thousand individual products, thus compounding the costliness of the 
prediction error in terms of the stock deficit.  
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3.2   Experiment 1  
Professional retail forecasters are trained and experienced in monitoring stock and 
sales levels and making ordering decisions based on predicted sales for thousands of 
products spanning different categories. The demand on professionals in commercial 
settings to make effective judgments is thus high, as the financial consequences for poor 
judgment can have highly detrimental business impacts.  
The patterns and biases in professional forecasting judgments can create effects 
over time which significantly shape business outcomes and impact financial 
performance. To examine experts’ propensity for linear biases (based on additively 
processing percentage data and linearly extrapolating non-linear trends), the prediction 
performance of professional retail forecasters employed by a major UK supermarket is 
assessed for exponential and linear sales trends which alternate between percentage and 
absolute number formats. It is expected that experts will treat the percentage points as 
absolute numbers and additively process the onscreen figures (i.e., add or subtract the 
values) even when inappropriate. It is predicted that this will lead to the formation of 
linear forecasts based on the arithmetic difference between the last two observations in 
each sequence. Findings are discussed in relation to the robustness of the linear 
prediction heuristic which is shown to characterize judgments in this expert domain.  
3.2.1   Method  
Participants  
One hundred and thirty-seven professional retail forecasters employed by a major 
UK supermarket (42.7% female, Mage 34.1 years, SDage 9.3 years) were recruited via a 
random sampling technique using a mailshot sent to their company email accounts. 
Each employee possessed an average of three years professional forecasting experience 
and their full-time duties involved forecasting and ordering all non-food items sold by 
the supermarket. To compensate for participation, a coffee voucher was emailed to 
participants on completion of the experiment.   
Design 
In a repeated measures 2 x 2 design, participants underwent four trials in a 
percentage format condition and four trials in an absolute number format condition. In 
the percentage condition, all the observed trial stimuli were shown in percentage format, 
whereas in the absolute condition, all the observed stimuli were presented in absolute 
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values. In both conditions, two trials increased and decreased in exponential functions 
and two trials increased and decreased in linear functions. Thus, each condition 
involved a match between the observed numerical format and sequence function in two 
trials and a mismatch between the observed format and sequence function in the other 
two trials. Trials were repeated (4 x 2) and randomized per condition and conditions 
were counterbalanced per participant.    
Materials  
Observed Trial Stimuli 
Table 3.1 shows the stimuli presented onscreen in each of the four trials per 
condition. Each trial involved a sequence of three numbers which related to the changes 
in product sales over three consecutive weeks. Trials 1 and 2 show the matched increase 
and decrease sequences for the absolute condition (i.e., linear trends observed in 
absolute values) and trials 3 and 4 show the mismatched sequences (i.e., exponential 
trends observed in absolute values). In the percentage condition, the opposite is shown, 
with trials 1 and 2 displaying the mismatched trial sequences (i.e., linear trends 
observed in percentages) and trials 3 and 4 displaying the matched sequences (i.e., 
exponential trends observed in percentages).  
Table 3.1 Observed Stimuli Per Trial and Condition in Exp 1  
The observed stimuli per trial relating to product sales for three consecutive weeks 
in the absolute and percentage format condition. 
 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 
Linear increase Linear decrease Exponential increase Exponential decrease 
Absolute condition 
+203.125 units -203.125 units +100 units -337.5 units 
+203.125 units -203.125 units +150 units -225 units 
+203.125 units -203.125 units +225 units -150 units 
Percentage condition 
+101.56% -20.06% +50% -33.3% 
+50.39% -25.01% +50% -33.3% 
+33.51% -33.51% +50% -33.3% 
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Figure 3.3 shows the onscreen display of the trial stimuli. Each trial involved each 
three number sequence presented on a black background with each individual number 
displayed one at a time, transitioning down the screen from top to bottom for a period of 
three seconds per individual number. After the three second transition period, each 
individual stimuli value was removed from view and replaced by the next number in the 
sequence which then transitioned from top to bottom in the same mannor, until all three 
numbers had been viewed. After the three stimuli had been observed, a response box 
was displayed at the bottom of the screen and participants were prompted to enter their 
sales forecast for the fourth week to the nearest whole number (decimal points, minus 
values, zero’s and non-numeric values were not permitted) and press then ‘return’ when 
satisfied with their response.  
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Figure 3.3 The Trial Stimuli in Exp 1 
The visual presentation of the trial stimuli in both conditions showing an example 
of a mismatched exponential increase trial in the absolute format condition. In the 
absolute condition the individual stimuli (sales figures) were followed by the term 
‘units’ and in the percentage condition the stimuli were followed by a ‘%’ sign. All 
increasing sequences were presented in green with a preceding plus sign and all 
decreasing sequences were presented in red with a preceding minus sign.  
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Generation of the Trial Stimuli  
The trial stimuli in each condition were generated using a ‘design function’ 
(shown in figure 3.4) created specifically for the purpose of testing the hypotheses 
relating to the processing of numeric data in accordance with arithmetic versus 
geometric operations. The design function had a start value of 200.00 and an end value 
of 1012.50. In both conditions, the increasing trials were generated by moving across 
the function from left to right, and the decreasing trials were generated by moving from 
right to left. The italicized values relate to the linear and exponential changes in base 
rates between the start and finish points, each of which remained hidden throughout all 
trials. Table 3.3 displays all the values shown per trial and condition which were 
generated by the design function, including the unobserved base rate values as both an 
absolute value and percentage point.  
The correct predictions for the matched trials in the absolute condition were 
generated using the arithmetic mean of the three observed stimuli points (e.g., 
203.125+203.125+203.125 / 3 = 203.125 for linear increases), whereas the correct 
predictions for the mismatched trials in the absolute condition were computed using the 
geometric mean (e.g., 100*1.5*1.5*1.5 = 337.5 for exponential increases). In the 
percentage condition, the correct predictions for matched trials were produced using the 
geometric mean of the three observed values (e.g., 200*0.5*0.5 = 50 for exponential 
increases), whereas the correct predictions for the mismatched trials were computed by 
applying the arithmetic mean to absolute value changes from base (e.g., 203.125+ 
203.125+203.125 / 3 = 203.125 for linear increases). The arithmetic means for 
percentage condition mismatched trials were then converted back into percentages of 
the target value base rates to attain the correct predictions in the same format in which 
the observed trial stimuli was presented. 
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Figure 3.4 The Design Function used to Generate Stimuli in Exp 1 
The design function which was developed by the researchers to generate the trial 
stimuli used to test the hypothesis. The solid line shows the linear trials and the dotted 
line shows the exponential trials. Moving from left to right across the design function 
generated the increasing trials in both conditions, and moving from right to left 
generated the decreasing trials. The italicized values are the linear and exponential 
changes in base rate between the start value of 200.00 and end value of 1012.50. The 
base values remained hidden from participants in all trials. The values labelled as ‘units’ 
were the trial stimuli observed onscreen in the absolute condition, and the values 
labelled with ‘%’ signs were the trial stimuli observed onscreen in the percentage 
condition. All the observed and hidden stimuli values generated by the design function 
per trial and condition are shown in table 3.2. In the percentage condition, the far right-
hand column shows the conversion of the onscreen percentages into absolute values. 
The method used to convert the observed stimuli in the percentage condition into 
absolutes can be viewed in appendix 1. Participants responses to the percentage 
condition trials were also converted into absolute values using the same method to 
simplify the analysis by having all values in the same format as the design function.  
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Table 3.2 All Values Generated by the Design Function in Exp 1 
All observed trial stimuli and hidden base rate values generated by the design 
function per trial and condition. 
 
Absolute condition 
 Trial stimuli (Observed) 
Target forecast 
(4th point) 
(Hidden) 
Base rate 
changes in 
absolute values 
(Hidden) 
Base rate changes in 
percentages 
(Hidden) 
Linear 
increase 
203.125 
203.125 
203.125 
203.125 
200 
403.125 
606.25 
809.375 
2.015625 % 
1.503876 % 
1.335052 % 
1.250965 % 
Exponential 
increase 
100 
150 
225 
337.5 
200 
300 
450 
675 
1.5 % 
1.5 % 
1.5 % 
1.5 % 
Linear 
decease 
-203.125 
-203.125 
-203.125 
-203.125 
1012.5 
809.375 
606.25 
403.125 
0.799383 % 
0.749035 % 
0.664948 % 
0.496124 % 
Exponential 
decrease 
-337.5 
-225 
-150 
-100 
1012.5 
675 
450 
300 
0.666667 % 
0.666667 % 
0.666667 % 
0.666667 % 
Percentage condition 
 
Onscreen 
percentages 
(Observed) 
Target forecast 
(4thpoint) 
(Hidden) 
Base rate 
changes 
in absolute 
values 
(Hidden) 
Conversions of 
onscreen 
percentages into 
absolutes values 
(Hidden) 
Linear 
increase 
101.56 % 
50.39 % 
33.51 % 
25.01 % 
200 
403.125 
606.25 
809.375 
203.125 
203.125 
203.125 
203.125 
Exponential 
increase 
50 % 
50 % 
50 % 
50 % 
200 
300 
450 
675 
100 
150 
225 
337.5 
Linear 
decrease 
-20.06 % 
-25.01 % 
-33.51 % 
-50.39 % 
1012.5 
809.375 
606.25 
403.125 
-203.125 
-203.125 
-203.125 
-203.125 
Exponential 
decrease 
-33.3 % 
-33.3 % 
-33.3 % 
-33.3 % 
1012.5 
675 
450 
300 
-337.5 
-225 
-150 
-100 
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Procedure  
The experiment was conducted at the supermarket’s head-quarters on the 
employee’s personal computers during an ordinary working day. An invitation to 
participate was sent via mailshot to the employees work email addresses which 
contained a link to the online experiment. After clicking on the link, participants were 
provided with the following information on the landing page of the experiment before 
giving informed consent:  
“In this brief experiment you will observe eight trials involving sales of general 
merchandise products over a three-week period. Green numbers indicate that the sales 
increased that week whereas red values indicate that they decreased. After observing the 
changes for each of the three weeks, you will be asked to predict how much the sales 
will increase or decrease in the fourth week.”  
After proving details of age, gender and years of professional forecasting 
experience, participants were then instructed to “press return when ready to observe the 
sales changes by week” which took them to the first trial.  
As shown in figure 3.3, each trial involved the three sales figures for each week 
transitioning in isolation from the top to the bottom of the screen in a three-second 
timed interval. After the third sales figure had been observed, a response box was 
immediately provided at the bottom of the screen and participants were asked to make 
their prediction for the fourth week by typing in a whole number. No time restriction 
was applied to responses and participants were free to amend their predictions before 
submitting the response and moving to the next trial. At the half way point between the 
trials, a blank partition screen was presented informing respondents that the format 
would change for the remainder of the trials (e.g., if they had just completed trials in the 
percentage condition, they would now observe trials in the absolute condition and vice 
versa). The partition screen delivered the following instruction: 
“So far you have seen sales changes in absolute units [percentages]. Weekly sales 
changes will now be shown in percentages [absolute units], as will the response. Please 
press RETURN to continue.” 
On completion of all eight trials, employees were thanked for their participation 
and provided with a remuneration code for a free drink.  
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3.2.2   Results  
Outlier Removal  
To simplify the analysis, participants’ responses in the percentage condition were 
converted into absolute numbers to produce values which were all in the same format as 
the design function. The method used to convert the percentage condition trial stimuli 
and responses is shown in appendix 1. Next, outliers were removed by fitting human 
responses to the design function using absolute squared error per trial. Error per trial 
was then averaged per participant to give one data point each and the points were 
plotted. Six data points which fell over 1.5 standard deviations above the mean were 
removed, leaving 131 respondents in the dataset. 
Human Performance in Relation to the Design Function  
To determine an initial measure of performance in relation to the design function, 
participants mean predictions were compared to the design function fourth points 
represented by the broken lines. Figure 3.5 shows the mean human forecasts per trial 
and condition.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Human Performance in Relation to the Design Function in Exp 1 
Mean participant forecasts per trial and condition in relation to the design function 
fourth points (represented by the dotted lines) with 95% within-participant confidence 
intervals. Each of the four colours of the dotted lines representing the design function 
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correspond with the colours for the four different trial types. Overall, the largest 
differences in relation to the design function tended to occur for the mismatched trial 
types in both conditions (i.e., the trials in which observed absolutes increased and 
decreased exponentially, and observed percentages increased and decreased linearly). In 
both conditions, the pattern of responses indicated the general tendency to 
underestimate the increases and overestimate the decreases. This was particularly 
pronounced for the mismatched trial types. This suggested that prediction error was 
heightened when trend functions differed to the numerical format in which the points 
were observed.    
To statistically examine performance in relation to the design function, a repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted on the absolute forecasting error by trial type and 
condition. To test for the effects of condition order on prediction performance, 
percentage versus absolute condition stimuli order was also included as a predictor in 
the model. Figure 3.6 shows the absolute error per trial and condition. A significant 
main effect was found for trial type, F(3,1032) = 5.77, p<.001 and condition, F(1, 1032) 
= 8.39, p<.01 which indicated that increases were forecast with less accuracy compared 
to decreases (M=28.4 vs. M=16.8) and observed percentages were forecast with less 
accuracy compared to observed absolutes (M=19.2 vs. M=26.0). There was also a 
significant interaction between trial type and condition, F(3, 1032) = 46.50, p<.001 
which showed that performance was heightened when the observed formats matched the 
trend functions and reduced when observed formats mismatched the trend functions 
(M=9.3 vs. M=35.9). There was no effect of condition order on absolute forecasting 
error, F(1,1032) = 0.14, p=0.70, nor an interaction between condition order and trial 
type, F(3, 1032) = 0.31, p=0.81. It was therefore assumed that condition order had no 
effect on forecasting performance. Thus for simplicity, the analysis proceeds from this 
point excluding condition order as a factor.       
Post hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrected p values confirmed that 
across conditions, exponential decreases (M=10.40) were forecast with significantly 
greater accuracy compared to exponential increases (M=27.99), p<.001, linear increases 
(M=28.91), p<.001, and linear decreases (M=23.20), p<.05. Overall, absolute condition 
trials were forecast with greater accuracy (M=19.24) compared to percentage condition 
trials (M=26.01), p<.05. The significant interaction indicated that forecasting error was 
significantly higher for trials when they were observed in mismatched functions.   
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Figure 3.6 Absolute Error in Relation to the Design Function in Exp 1 
Absolute forecasting error in relation to the design function per trial with 95% 
within-participant confidence intervals. The higher bars in each condition confirm the 
results of the plots in figure 3.5, showing that performance was worst on the 
mismatched trials which supports the significant interaction between trial type and 
condition (i.e., accuracy depended on the observed formats being matched to the sales 
trend functions in both conditions). 
Performance in the Mismatched Trials   
Figure 3.7 shows the mean forecasting error for matched versus mismatched trial 
types. Paired t-tests indicated that there was significantly higher forecasting error in 
relation to the design function in the mismatched compared to the matched trial versions 
for the linear increases, t(130) = 7.21, p<.001, linear decreases, t(130) = 7.95, p<.001, 
exponential increases, t(130) = 5.48, p<.001, and exponential decreases, t(130) = 5.74, 
p<.001. In terms of directionality, error was negative in relation to the design function 
target point for the increasing trials (indicating an ‘under-forecast’ effect), and positive 
for the decreasing trials (indicating an ‘over-forecast’ effect). In accordance with the 
hypothesis, this pattern of human forecasting error indicates the propensity to form 
linear predictions when processing percentage information based on the tendency to 
forecast towards the mean. This results in estimates which act to under-forecast 
increasing and over-forecast decreasing trends.      
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Figure 3.7 Error in the Matched Vs Mismatched Trials in Exp 1 
Mean forecasting error for mismatched versus matched trial types in relation to 
the design function fourth points with 95% within-participant confidence intervals. The 
degree of error per trial relates to the extent of under-forecasting in the case of the 
increasing trials and over-forecasting in the case of the decreasing trials. Thus as shown, 
the greatest extent of underestimation occurred for the mismatched linear and 
exponential increase sequences. The higher overall error for all the mismatched trials 
compared to the matched, indicated that participants were less effective at predicting 
numerical outcomes when the necessary method of processing (i.e., additive or 
multiplicative) was incongruent with the expression of the observed units (i.e., 
percentage points or absolute units).  
Model-based Analysis of Forecasting Error    
In reference to the hypothesis, it is predicted that the linear extrapolation bias is 
robust to the extent that even trained and experienced expert retail forecasters will show 
a strong tendency to form predictions by projecting trends linearly. Regardless of 
whether percentage points or absolute numbers are observed, it is expected that experts 
will treat all numerical stimuli as absolute values which will lead to predictions which 
follow linear trends, irrespective of whether the actual growth functions are linear or 
exponential. In this view, the linear prediction bias is expected to be so pronounced that 
it will influence peoples’ interpretation of growth functions and override the ability to 
accurately distinguish between linear and non-linear trends (and thus make effective 
estimates of sales and stock values).  
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To test the propensity to project trends linearly, experts’ predictions were 
examined in relation to three formal models; two different linear models and one 
averaging model. This was done by fitting participants’ estimates to each model per trial 
and condition using absolute error. The first of the linear models was a ‘2-regression’ 
model, based on the last two observable data points per trial. This was generated by 
applying linear regression to the second and third onscreen points in each trial. The 
second linear model was a ‘3-regression’ model which incorporated all three observable 
stimuli and was generated by regressing on all three onscreen points per trial. The third 
model was a ‘3-mean’ model which was included as a measure of potential non-
linearity of forecasts. This was created by averaging all three observed stimuli per trial. 
Both the 3-regression and 3-mean models use all of the information disclosed per trial 
to formulate their predictions. They were therefore included in the analysis for 
completeness and to provide comparison to the hypothesised method of human 
forecasting which involved use of only the last two observed data points per trial. (Full 
details of how the models were generated can be viewed in appendix 2).  
The degree to which participants’ predictions fit the 2 and 3-regression models 
thus indicates the degree of forecast linearity as dependent on the use of either all three 
data points, or only the last two observable points per trial. Predictions which are 
reflective of the 3-mean model suggest people are forming judgments by linearly 
extrapolating using all the available data. However, predictions which are best fit to the 
2-regression model indicate that people are applying a more streamlined version of the 
linear heuristic strategy, based on use of minimum data points (i.e., only the last two 
observations of the three stimuli points per trial). 
Performance which aligns with the 3-mean model on the other hand, indicates the 
tendency to apply non-linear extrapolation, derived from averaging the three observed 
data points per trial. It may be appropriate to apply this strategy in noisy environments 
or where cyclical trends exist such as in seasonally varying data. In the context of the 
experimental trials, it may therefore be less rationale to adopt an averaging forecasting 
strategy, as the presentation of a short three-point sequence in the absence of additional 
cues does not indicate high variance or the presence of a cyclical trend. Thus, the 
likelihood is that people will be most inclined to make errors in processing the 
percentage data, leading them to extract and project linear trends. This will hinder the 
capability to correctly identify and project exponential growth.  
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It is therefore expected that participants will employ minimal cues and make 
predictions which will be best fit to the 2-regression model based on the fast, frugal 
arithmetic processing of the last two data points observed onscreen per trial. Treating 
percentage points as absolute numbers will lead to adding or subtracting values even 
when inappropriate which will promote the propensity to forecast linearly based on the 
arithmetic difference between the last two observations in each sequence. This method 
is more likely to occur that a 3-regression forecasting method which increases the 
cognitive demands associated with processing more data points, thus making for a less 
efficient strategy. The results of the model fits are shown in figure 3.8 which display 
participants’ forecasts in relation to each model prediction in the absolute condition 
trials (panels A - D), and in the percentage condition trials (panels E - H).  
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Figure 3.8 (A – D) The four panels below show the human and model predictions 
for absolute condition mismatched exponential increase (A) and exponential decrease 
trial (B), the matched linear increase (C) and linear decrease trial (D). 
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Figure 3.8 (E – H) The four panels below show the human and model predictions 
for the percentage condition mismatched linear increase (E) and linear decrease trial 
(F) and the matched exponential increase (G) and exponential decrease trial (H). 
        
E (Linear increase)    F (Linear decrease) 
             
 
G (Exponential increase)   H (Exponential decrease)                      
Figure 3.8 Human Performance in Relation to Formal Models in Exp 1 
 
101.56
50.39
33.51
25.01
21.85
-­20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 2 3 4
Percentage  condition  -­ Linear  
increase
Design  function 2-­reg
3-­reg 3-­mean
Human
-­20.06
-­25.01
-­33.51
-­50.39
-­41.16
-­55
-­50
-­45
-­40
-­35
-­30
-­25
-­20
-­15 1 2 3 4
Percentage  condition  -­ Linear  
decrease
Design  function 2-­reg
3-­reg 3-­mean
Human
50%
50%
50%
50%
48%
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1 2 3 4
Percentage  condition  -­ Exponential  
increase
Design  function  and  all  models
Human
-­33.3%
-­33.3%
-­33.3%
-­33.3%
-­32.65%
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1 2 3 4
Percentage  condition  -­ Exponential  
decrease
Design  function  and  all  models
Human
  
68 
Participants’ forecasts in relation to the 2-regression, 3-regression, 3-mean model 
and design function fourth point predictions per trial in the absolute condition (A) and 
percentage condition (B) with 95% within-participant confidence intervals. The first 
three data points marked on the design function in each plot are the stimuli points 
observed by participants in each trial. The data point marked on the dashed line in each 
plot is the participants mean fourth point forecast for that trial. In the mismatched trials 
in the absolute condition (i.e., the exponential increase and decrease trials) and the 
mismatched trials in the percentage condition (i.e., the linear increase and decrease 
trials), the design function reflects the actual stimuli observed in the trials. Whereas in 
the matched trials in both conditions, the design function reflects the hidden base rate 
changes in absolute values, and the values marked on the design function in these trials 
are the observed stimuli per trial. (Only the design function is shown in the matched 
trials because each observed stimuli value was the same per sequence which meant that 
each of the model fourth point predictions were also the same as the design function).  
As shown in figure 3.8, human accuracy in the matched trials was fairly high in 
both conditions, based on very similar predictions to the design function (and model) 
predictions in each case. In the mismatched trials however, human judgments were most 
similar to the 2-regression model in both conditions. This suggests that participants 
forecast trials across absolute and percentage format conditions using a method akin to 
linearly extrapolating based on the last two observed data points per trial.  
To determine whether the 2-regression model could account for participants’ 
method of prediction formation across all the trial types (i.e., in both matched and 
mismatched trials), the 2-regression, 3-regression and 3-mean model predictions were 
fit to human forecasts using absolute error per participant, per trial and condition. This 
yielded 24 individual error values per participant (i.e., 8 trials x 3 models). The errors 
were then averaged per participant, per condition to give 131 error values for each 
model per condition. Figure 3.9 shows the mean absolute error for all trials per model 
and condition.  
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the mean absolute 
forecasting error per model showed a significant main effect for condition, F(1,774) = 
66.89, p<.001, a main effect for model F(2,774) = 168.92, p<.001, and a significant 
interaction between condition and model F(2,774) = 14.91, p<.001 yielded by the 
significantly heightened mean error for the 3-regression and 3-mean models in the 
percentage condition. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections confirmed that 
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mean error was higher across all models in the percentage condition (M=63.52) 
compared to the absolute condition (M=41.70), p<.001, and across both conditions, 
mean error for the 2-regression model was significantly smaller (M=21.46) compared to 
the 3-regression (M=46.78) and 3-mean models (M=89.63), p<.001. Thus, based on 
least absolute error, the 2-regression model was shown to best describe participants’ 
predictions across each trial type.     
 
Figure 3.9 Mean Absolute Error in Relation to Formal Models in Exp 1 
Mean absolute forecasting error per participant per trial and condition for the 2-
regression, 3-regression and 3-mean model with 95% within-participant confidence 
intervals of the mean. Across trials in each condition, the smallest error occurred for the 
2-regression model which indicated that participants forecast in a way most akin to 
linearly extrapolating using the last two observed data points regardless of the 
numerical format or trend function.  
Further statistical verification of the best model fit across trials and conditions 
was provided by calculating the frequencies of least error counts for participants’ 
forecasts across trials for each model. (The results of the frequency counts are shown in 
figure 3.10). A chi-square analysis conducted on the frequencies per model indicated 
that the 2-regression model achieved the highest frequency of least error counts across 
conditions X2(2, 262) = 6.67, p<.05, confirming the expectation that estimates were 
formed in accordance with the tendency to predict linearly based on additively 
processing the last two data points observed onscreen in each trial.  
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Figure 3.10 Least Absolute Error Counts Per Model in Exp 1 
Least absolute error counts per participant, trial and condition for the 2-regression, 
3-regression and 3-mean model. As shown, the 2-regression model achieved a 
significantly higher frequency of east error counts across trials in both conditions, 
supporting the hypothesis that experts would display the propensity to form linear 
forecasts when making judgments based on data presented in numeric formats, 
regardless of whether the data are trending linearly or exponentially.  
Supplementary Analysis of Linearity 
Although the 2-regression model was shown to be the best characterization of 
human forecasting estimates in terms of formal models, it was also possible that 
peoples’ estimates may have followed a curve which was not completely linear, but 
involved a degree of non-linearity which was not undetected by the formal model fitting 
procedure. To explore this possibility, Shapiro-Wilks tests were conducted on the 
distribution of error in relation to the design function fourth point. The tests yielded 
significant results (p<.05) for each trial type which as suspected, indicated a degree of 
non-linearity in estimates across trials.  
It is thus concluded that people exhibit a strong linear tendency in forecasting 
estimates which is best explained in terms of a 2-regression based on the last two points 
observed per trial. However, on examination of performance in terms of the distribution 
or error in relation to the target fourth point, it is apparent that judgments may not be 
strictly linear in nature and that people are likely to show some sensitivity to the 
acceleration of the trend, even though it is underused. Follow up studies are thus 
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necessary to further explore the nature of the non-linearity in peoples’ estimates and the 
factors contributing to subtle differences in the degrees of judgment linearity which may 
not be accurately captured with formal prediction models. 
3.2.3   Discussion 
The findings confirmed expectations, showing that despite expert domain 
knowledge, professional retail forecasters were insensitive to differences in functions 
and exhibited a consistent tendency to form linear predictions when presented with 
percentage information and non-linear growth trends. The results support the robustness 
of the linear prediction heuristic based on the propensity to process numeric values 
simultaneously, using arithmetic operations to form estimates of future events whether 
appropriate or not. Retail forecasters were shown to predict future outcomes for 
numbers in both linear and exponential trends by using the absolute difference between 
the last two observations per trial. This suggests that the bias occurred in the 
interpretation of the numeric format. The observed values in each trial were processed 
as absolute numbers, hence the same 2-regression method was applied even when a 
percentage sign was shown.  
These results dovetail with wider literature relating to percentage format biases in 
which both experts and novices are shown to display a robust tendency to additively 
process percentage points where multiplicative operations are required. As outlined in 
review in chapter 2, this strong bias for arithmetic processing and linear trends is 
associated with inaccurate numerical estimates and predictions across many 
professional and consumer choice domains (e.g., Larrick & Soll, 2008; Stango & 
Zinman, 2009; Newall & Love, 2015). The results of experiment 1 therefore support the 
notion that the tendency to assume linearity in the environment is derived from the 
underlying bias to count and compute values in concrete terms, assuming absolute 
numbers with non-normalized base rates.  
Compared to multiplicative computations, adding and subtracting numbers 
arithmetically provides a quicker and easier method of processing and is thus favoured 
as a more efficient heuristic strategy, particularly in complex domains. In this view, on-
the-spot arithmetic calculations provide the premise for predictions which follow linear 
patterns when extrapolated into the future. The ability to perceive non-linear curves and 
accurately project exponential trends conversely, is dependent on comprehending 
sequential numerical processing. Thus, it is likely that people are primed to seek and 
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project linear trends in the environment because they are congruent with underlying 
cognitive propensities to apply heuristic strategies which align with intuitive cognitive 
processing methods.  
The reliance on a 2-point linear extrapolation strategy created a trend-damping 
and anti-damping effect in which increases were underestimated and decreases were 
overestimated. These effects were amplified in the trials in which the observed number 
format mismatched the trend function. This resulted in the judgments in the matched 
trials being significantly more accurate than those in the mismatched trials, because 
relying on the absolute difference between the last two observations when the values are 
the same will yield an accurate prediction of the fourth point. Conversely, applying this 
method to observed values which differ will lead to inaccurate judgments. Thus, it is 
apparent that the understanding of numerical functions in forecasting contexts of this 
kind is likely to be distinct or secondary to the interpretation of the numerical format. It 
is the biased interpretation of the format which is thus likely to be the key determinant 
of peoples’ judgment performance.  
This study highlights the importance of numerical format in forecasting judgment, 
indicating the problems which arise from the incongruence between the human 
propensity to additively process data and identify linear relations, and single point 
percentage data and non-linear extrapolations of statistical forecasting models in 
complex forecasting environments. These findings are salient in that they have been 
demonstrated among experts possessing specialist training, knowledge and experience 
in their field. It is therefore likely that the same tendencies and numerical format biases 
will also characterise the judgment processes of novices and consumers who do not 
possess any background knowledge or forecasting skill and experience.      
Although the task demands and level of complexity involved in the experiment 
were representative of the experts’ professional forecasting role, it is possible that the 
absence of additional contextual information impacted their judgmental performance. 
This possibility suggests that forecasting decision making in certain domains may be 
associated less with statistical rationality and ability to accurately interpret trends based 
on statistical models, and more with the application of tacit domain knowledge and un-
modelled data sources.  
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Due to economic and practical constrains associated with conducting research in 
the real-world commercial setting of the Supermarket headquarters, it was not possible 
to continue experimentation with this particular group of retail forecasters. Ideally, the 
study would have been extended with the examination of other factors relevant to expert 
performance in addition to the interpretation formats and functions. For example, 
assessing other aspects of knowledge and factors important to performance such as 
promotional and seasonal effects and supplier relations would increase our 
understanding of ‘expertise’ and how it develops in such settings. Furthering the 
analysis of how retailers synthesize these ‘unmodelled’ domain specific features with 
statistical model output would thus provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
‘expertise’ in human forecasting which would be relevant to other modern complex 
statistical environments.     
To continue with the investigation of expert judgment in complex real-world 
settings, chapter 4 extends exploration to the field of humanitarian aid by focusing on 
the importance of contextual information and the effects of additional cues on judgment 
performance. In experiment 2, experts in the aid field and novices without forecasting 
experience are assessed in their forecasting performance for real-world refugee camp 
data. The emphasis is on the effects of varied informational cues in rich data 
environments and how different levels of complexity influence patterns in peoples’ 
predictions and the propensity to extract linear trends in noise.  
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Chapter 4 
Rich Data Contexts & Phantom Trend 
Forecasting in Humanitarian Aid Experts  
In this chapter, humanitarian aid experts are compared to non-experts in their 
ability to forecast real-world refugee camp data. The effect of noise is tested by 
presenting target time series data in sparse versus rich contexts. Experts’ 
predictions are no more accurate than novices and both groups formed judgments 
by linearly extrapolating the data in both contexts. The tendency to linearly 
extrapolate increased in noise, particularly so among experts and correlated with 
forecasting error. Error in noise was found to be associated with projecting 
’common’ trends (i.e., when all cues trended in the same direction). This suggests 
that the linear prediction bias is reinforced in more varied conditions, based on 
visual heuristic strategies employed to identify trend congruencies. 
4.1   Background and Rationale 
In the previous chapter, the examination of expert judgment involved assessing 
professional retailers’ ability to interpret numeric data and compute estimates based on 
values presented in alternating frames and growth functions. From this perspective, 
performance was assessed in terms of participants’ numerical skill and ability to 
interpret the data made immediately available within the experimental setting. It could 
therefore be argued that the trial stimuli and design may have influenced participants’ 
responses, or yielded estimates which may not have accurately reflected the retailers’ 
true forecasting abilities or propensities.  
However, the nature of the data presented in the trials closely resembled that of 
the numeric information used by the retailers on a daily basis. Specifically, the task 
involved forming stock and sales forecasts by combining percentage points and absolute 
figures across multiple forecasting tools and systems. The trial stimuli therefore 
presented the same judgment task demands involved in the retailers’ every-day 
forecasting role, thus generating an accurate assessment of what characterized expertise 
in this particular environment.  
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To explore the characteristics and importance of ‘expertise’ in other professional 
contexts, experiment 2 examines the more ‘intuitive’ and naturalistic judgment 
processes involved in the field of humanitarian aid. The forecasting performance of 
expert aid workers and novices is assessed when presented with sparse context data 
versus rich context trials which involve additional non-causal morbidity indicators to 
test how experts react and what that may indicate regarding the application of domain 
knowledge and intuitive judgment processes. Judgement ‘rationality’ in the aid setting 
is thus assessed in terms of the aid workers’ ability to accurately interpret the cyclical 
nature of the widely recognized target data trend and to project the trend independently 
of the rich context cues which are known among aid workers to be non-causally related 
to the target series.  
In contrast to the professional retail domain in which the accurate interpretation of 
the effects of functions and formats is important to judgment performance, expertise in 
the aid setting is dependent on the ability to combine rich knowledge of unmodelled 
variables with statistical models of morbidity rates to formulate supply and demand 
estimates. Such tacit knowledge involves understanding how different indicators impact 
upon on one-another in refugee camp situations for example, and how seasonal factors 
can influence morbidity rates in specific regions.  
Thus, where the professional retailers’ judgment is dependent more on the 
numeric data in the immediate task environment, expert performance in the 
humanitarian aid environment is shaped to a larger extent by their application of 
knowledge and experience of wider factors beyond the data frame. The experiment 
examines how non-causality related morbidity cues are handled in ‘noisy’ context trials 
in contrast with sparse data trials to investigate how experts apply knowledge of cues 
and seasonal variability to data presented in particular formats and frames. For example, 
‘intuitive’ judgment processes or even optimistic tendencies may come into play which 
lead experts to make conservative estimates of morbidity rates or to assume that 
additional cues presented in the data environment are important to the target data in 
some way, despite the knowledge that they are unrelated in the real-world.  
In situations of uncertainty, experts are often relied upon to make critical 
judgments. For example, expert aid workers forecast refugee counts in order to match 
camp supplies with needs. In highly variable environments, one danger is that people 
may detect trends when in reality the fluctuations arise from noise. Forecasting based on 
these phantom trends (e.g., linearly extrapolating when noise governs the system), leads 
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to greater error than baseline models which forecast using the mean of past observations 
or the previous point. We evaluate whether aid workers show this pattern of linear bias 
within their expert domain. Expert aid workers’ forecasts were no better than novices, 
and experts showed stronger linear extrapolation biases in richer (i.e., more realistic) 
contexts. Findings suggest that the harmful tendency to find meaning in noise may be 
accentuated by expert domain knowledge.  
We rely on experts to accurately assess the status of real-world events and make 
consequential forecasts using rich, domain specific knowledge (Philips, Klein & Sieck, 
2004). Within their field, experts’ breadth and depth of knowledge and appreciation of 
contextual information can increase forecasting performance (Armstrong, 1985; 
Lawrence et al., 2006), facilitate integration of data cues (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975; 
Hoch & Schkade, 1996), and assist in understanding relationships among predictor 
variables (Seifert & Hadida, 2013). In a retail environment for example, the more 
familiar experts are with products and contextual factors (such as seasonal differences 
in demand), the better their forecasting accuracy (Edmundson, Lawrence & O’Connor, 
1988; Seifert et al., 2015) and adjustments to statistical forecasts (Goodwin & Fildes, 
1999; Sanders & Ritzman, 2001).  
Despite domain knowledge, there are however a number of settings in which 
experts’ judgmental forecasts are found to be no more accurate than novices 
(Armstrong, 1980, 1991; Lawrence & O’Connor, 1993). Indeed, those with greater 
expertise have been shown to perform worse in the financial sector (Önkal & 
Muradoǧlu, 1994; Wilkie-Thomson, Onkal-Atay, & Pollock, 1997). The high volatility 
of this domain is considered to make forecasting particularly difficult (Kasa, 1992; 
Makridakis & Taleb, 2009), potentially leading experts to chase trends which may 
simply be noise. 
What explains these contrasting results, wherein experts surpass novices in some 
situations but in others are no better?  There are likely multiple complementary 
explanations. Here, we test one hypothesis, namely that experts in noisy domains feel 
licensed by their rich contextual knowledge to extract patterns from time series that in 
reality are nothing more than noise. This possibility is consistent with prior work and 
makes an additional prediction: The richer the context, the stronger experts’ propensity 
to infer trends. To foreshadow, we test this hypothesis with expert aid workers 
forecasting morbidity indicators commonly encountered in refugee camps throughout 
the world. In this complex, highly variable domain, we found that experts’ forecasts 
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were no better than novices and their tendency to extract misleading trends was 
heightened by richer contexts (i.e., when they were provided with more information 
about the camp situation).  
Findings relating to how people learn predictive relationships between stimulus 
and response variables show that people possess a strong tendency to apply linear 
functions when forming judgments under uncertainty (DeLosh, Busemeyer, & 
McDaniel, 1997). For example, linear relations are assumed between everyday variables 
such as body weight and height, price and quantity, drinks consumed and blood alcohol 
level, etc. The tendency to extract linear patterns also commonly extends to domains 
where it is inappropriate such as retail forecasting (Love & Parker, in preparation), and 
in financial transactions where costs and benefits compound over time (McKenzie & 
Liersch, 2011).  
Another example of the strong human propensity to form linear inferences is 
shown by Hohle and Teigen (2015) who identify a ‘trend effect’ in which novices are 
shown to linearly project experts’ forecasts for natural events by extending the trend 
direction of past predictions based on two historical data points. The propensity to 
linearly extend current trends is shown to create significant over and underestimates of 
the risk of natural events compared to experts’ prognosis. Overall, the most successful 
models of how people learn and generalize functional relations have a strong bias to 
extract linear patterns from observations (DeLosh et al., 1997; Kalish, Lewandowsky & 
Kruschke, 2004). On this basis, we expect to see a tendency among experts and novices 
to detect and project linear trends in richer contexts (i.e., where camp data variability is 
increased).  
Finding linear trends in observations that arise from noise will lead to greater 
forecasting error. This conclusion readily follows from basic concepts in statistics and 
machine learning, such as overfitting and the bias-variance trade-off (e.g., Gemen, 
Bienenstock & Doursat, 1992). Consider a time series that is pure noise (i.e., 
observations are generated by a normal distribution). The best guess for the next 
observation is simply the mean of the past observations. If instead a linear trend model 
were fit to the time series, the idiosyncratic nature of the past observations (i.e., the 
training sample variance) would lead to poor prediction for the next observation 
because the inferred trend would diverge from the mean of the observed items (which is 
the best estimate of the next observation). 
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People’s tendency to treat randomness as signal and extract phantom trends from 
noise (Harvey, 1995; Harvey, Ewart & West, 1997; Lopes & Oden, 1987) leads to 
judgment inaccuracy in noisy environments (Brehmer, 1978; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1973) which increases with complexity (Lee & Yates, 1992). Our contention is that 
providing additional context (evoking a complex real-world scenario) will increase 
experts’ tendency to find trends in observations. In support of this notion, providing 
people with additional cues (akin to context) in complex prediction tasks reduces 
performance (Harvey, Bolger & McClelland, 1994). These observations dovetail with 
the view that unadjusted expert forecasts are least useful in domains that are rich, 
complex, and uncertain (Green & Armstrong, 2007a, 2007b; Tetlock, 2005). 
In sum, forecasting morbidities in a humanitarian crisis is a rich, complex, and 
uncertain domain. In this study, experts and novices forecasted rates of refugee camp 
morbidities after viewing a time series of real-world observations from refugee camps. 
It is necessary to note that traditional forecasting research tends to refer to ‘noise’ as 
random error around an observation in a time series. However, in the following 
experiment, we make reference to noise as additional time series cues which are non-
causally related to the target time series (i.e., added data points which act to increase the 
amount of data observed, but have no impact on the target series). We manipulated how 
much real-world context was supplied on each trial and predicted that rich (‘noisy’) 
contexts with additional non-causal cues (as opposed to sparse contexts) would increase 
experts’ tendency to infer linear trends, leading to forecasts no better than those of 
novices. 
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4.2   Experiment 2 
4.2.1   Method 
Participants 
Participants consisted of 30 expert humanitarian aid workers (mean age = 32.42 
years, SD = 8.53; 17 males, 13 females) and 36 novices (mean age = 27.31 years, SD = 
4.8; 25 males and 11 females) recruited using a random sampling technique via 
LinkedIn (an online networking site for professionals, groups and organizations to 
liaise, seek jobs and share content). The sample size was determined by the time frame 
available for data collection. A three-week period was set and within this window as 
much data as possible was collected. The expert humanitarian aid workers all possessed 
varying degrees of professional experience in monitoring and forecasting morbidity 
trends (mean = 6.8 years, SD = 7.5), and 18 of them had direct experience of working in 
refugee camps. The novices each possessed an undergraduate or postgraduate degree in 
fields unrelated to forecasting or humanitarian aid work. For compensation, participants 
chose between the chance to win a 25 Euro Amazon voucher, to make a 30 Euro 
donation to charity, or to select neither.  
Design 
Participants completed two blocks of 15 trials each involving an individual time 
series of three data points. Each data point related to the total number of refugee 
morbidities for one month, and the points were for three consecutive months. One block 
contained 15 trials in a sparse context and the other block contained 15 trials in a rich 
context and participants were tasked with forecasting the fourth month in every trial. 
The individual trials in each block were repeated across the sparse and rich context 
conditions, such that the same 15 individual time series of morbidity counts for three 
consecutive months were shown in both blocks. The order of blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants and the order of trials within each block was 
randomized for each participant.  
The three-month time series stimuli used in each of the 15 trial sequences, as well 
as the surrounding context time series for the rich context trials (see Procedure for 
details), were randomly drawn from a sample of Health Information Systems (HIS) 
Detailed Indicator Reports downloaded from the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) Twine Project website. The downloaded pdf reports and 
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exacted time series used in the study are included in the online repository of materials 
for this contribution, osf.io/dn3xy. 
Materials and Procedure 
On each trial, an individual time series consisting of three data points which 
represented total rates of ‘acute watery diarrhoea’ (AWD) per month for three 
consecutive months was shown. Participants forecast the value for the fourth month 
(i.e., the next data point) by entering an integer into a response box (see Figure 4.1). In 
the rich context condition, participants were also shown surrounding contextual 
information about other common camp indicators, namely ‘lower respiratory tract 
infection’ (LRTI) and ‘bloody diarrhoea’ (BD) (see Figure 4.1B). Each trial was 
response terminated and participants were given a brief break at the midway point in 
between the two trial blocks. 
 
Figure 4.1 (A) An example of the sparse context trial in which participants 
observed a single time series cue 
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Figure 4.1 (B) An example of a rich context trial in which the same time series 
observed in the sparse trial was shown but with the addition of two non-causal time 
series cues 
Figure 4.1 The Sparse and Rich Context Trials in Exp 2 
An example of a sparse context trial (A) and a rich context trial (B). Participants 
were shown a time series consisting of three points and predicted the fourth point. On 
rich context trials, additional surrounding context was provided, modelled on reports 
expert aid workers receive on refugee public health in camp situations.  
4.2.2   Results 
On each trial, participants observed a time series consisting of three points and 
made a forecast for the fourth point. The main dependent measure was scaled error, 
which was calculated per participant per condition as follows in Equation (1): 𝑌" −	  𝐹"&"'( 𝑌" −	  𝑌")&"'( 	  
(1) 
    where  𝑌" is the true value for the fourth point, 𝑌") is the third point, 𝐹"	  is the 
participant’s forecast for the fourth point, and 𝑛 is the number of trials, which was 15.   
The numerator in Equation (1) is the sum of absolute forecasting error across 
trials, which is normalized by the denominator that is the sum of absolute forecasting 
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error for a naïve model which uses the third point as the forecast for the fourth point. 
Scaled error is used because it is scale independent and easy to interpret (Hyndman & 
Koehler, 2006). In particular, a scaled error of less than 1 indicates that forecasts are 
more accurate than the naive model, whereas those greater than 1 are worse than the 
naive model’s forecasts. 
Analysis of Decision Environment 
To evaluate our characterization of the task environment, we applied two models 
to the AWD time series. A linear trend model, which uses the best linear fit to the first 
three points to forecast the fourth point, and an aggregation model, which uses the mean 
of the first three points to forecast the fourth, were applied to the AWD time series. We 
hypothesized that the environment is noisy, and therefore the linear trend model would 
perform worst. As predicted, the linear trend model had significantly more error 
(M=1.23) than the aggregation model (M=0.96), t(57.76) = 2.82, p<.01, Cohen’s 
d=0.73. Many trends detected by the linear trend model were likely phantom trends, 
whereas the aggregation model can average over noise.  
Human Forecasting Error 
The scaled forecasting error for novices and experts by trial type is shown in 
Figure 4.2 Forecasting error across groups was larger on rich context trials (M=1.30) 
compared to on sparse context trials (M=1.21), F(1, 64) = 5.68, p<.05, η2=0.85. There 
was no significant effect of group, F(1, 64) = 0.05, p=0.819, η2=0.03, nor a significant 
interaction between group and condition, F(1, 64) = 0.79, p=0.376, η2=0.12. Planned t-
tests indicated a significant difference in the forecasting error between the rich 
(M=1.33) and sparse contexts (M=1.20) for the experts, t(29) = 2.10, p<.05, d =0.4. 
However, for novices, no significant difference in error between rich and sparse 
contexts was found (M=1.28 vs. M=1.22), t(35) = 1.24, p=0.221, d =0.17.  
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Figure 4.2 Mean Forecasting Error Per Condition in Exp 2 
Forecasting error for the two populations and trial types are shown. As predicted, 
participants performed worse in rich contexts. Error bars are 95% within-participant 
confidence intervals of the mean. 
Model-Based Analyses 
The preceding analyses indicate that participants’ performance levels were more 
akin to the linear trend model than to the aggregation model. To evaluate whether 
participants’ forecasts were more congruent with the linear trend model than the 
aggregation model, we calculated the proportion of trials in which a participant’s 
forecasts were closer to that of the linear trend model than the aggregation model. As 
shown in Figure 4.3, the proportions of match were above 0.5 in both contexts. As this 
finding indicates, both experts’ and novices’ forecasts were significantly more akin to 
the linear trend model than the aggregation model in the sparse context (M=0.57), t(65) 
= 3.89, p<.001, d=0.95 and also the rich context (M =0.60), t(65) = 5.94, p<.001, 
d=1.46. No statistically significant differences were found in expert versus novice 
compliance with the linear trend model, F(1, 64) = 0.09, p=0.766, η2=0.07, nor a 
significant difference between sparse and rich contexts, F(1, 64) = 2.81, p=0.09, 
η2=0.69, nor a significant interaction between group and context, F(1, 64) = 0.99, 
p=0.32, η2=0.24.  
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Figure 4.3 Judgments Fit by the Linear and Aggregation Model in Exp 2 
Proportion of judgments which were better fit by the linear trend model compared 
to the aggregation model per group and trial type with 95% within-participant 
confidence intervals of the mean. 
One interesting possibility was that the tendency to chase linear trends led to 
increased forecasting error. Consistent with this notion, a regression model showed that 
the proportion of judgments best fit by the linear trend model was predictive of scaled 
forecasting error across conditions when condition and participant group were included 
as factors in the model, R2 = .06, F(3,128) = 3.03, p=.031, B = 0.54, t(128) = 2.58, 
p<0.05. 
Human Tendency to Trend-Damp 
In addition to the model-based analysis, participants’ tendency to trend-damp the 
real-world AWD trend (i.e., draw towards the series mean) was examined per group and 
condition by comparing forecasts to the AWD fourth point per trial and condition. 
Experts were shown to trend-damped the AWD sequences in 57% of trials. A one-
sampled t-test indicated that the proportion of experts’ underestimates was significantly 
greater than 0.5 across conditions, t(899) = 4.30, p<.001. Novices trend-damped the 
AWD sequence in 56% of all trials which was also shown to significantly differ to 0.5 
across conditions, t(1079), = 3.92, p<.001. Moreover, experts were found to trend-damp 
in a significantly larger proportion of trials in the sparse (59%) compared to the rich 
context (56%) t(407.68) = -21.57, p<.001. A higher rate of trend-damping in the sparse 
(57%) compared to the rich context (55%) was also shown for the novices t(501.42) = -
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28.44, p<.001. A repeated measures ANOVA indicated that there was no overall 
difference between experts and novices in the tendency to trend-damp, F(1,64) = 0.14, 
p=0.70, or between either group in either condition, F(1,65) = 3.54, p=0.06.  
It is important to note that the propensity to forecast towards the mean in this 
particular setting may have reflected an optimism bias whereby people tended to make 
more ‘hopeful’, and therefore more conservative estimates of morbidity rates.    
Rich Context Trend Directions   
Following completion of the above analysis, a potential limitation in the 
experimental design was identified which may have influenced the results. It was noted 
that the presentation of the data on different scales in each condition created a 
difference in the shapes of the curves of each stimuli sequence pairing between the 
sparse and rich context. For example, as shown in figure 4.1, the AWD sequence data 
presented on a scale of 0-700 in the rich context condition (B) generated a far flatter 
curve compared to that in the sparse context (A) in which the same data was presented 
on a scale of 0-180. Although the numerical data values for each month were shown on 
the time series in each trial, it was possible that this discrepancy in curve shape led 
people to make larger adjustments from the third point in the sparse context compared 
to the rich context.  
Therefore, due to these scale differences, a follow-up analysis was conducted on 
the predictions in the rich context condition separately to those in the sparse context 
condition. The aim was to determine whether the trend direction of the additional cues 
in the rich context impacted forecast judgments and error. Participants’ forecasts which 
increased from point 3 to 4 were coded as 1 and all else as 0 and entered into a logistic 
regression as the dependent variable. The predictor variables were entered as the 
number of cases in which all three additional cues (i.e., AWD, LRTI and BD) increased 
from point 2 to 3 (coded as 1 and 0 respectively), and participant type (humanitarian 
versus novice). 
The cases in which all additional cues were increasing was shown to be predictive 
of participants’ tendency to forecast an increase (B = 0.74, z = 2.96, p<.01, 95% CI 
[0.25, 1.24]), with no difference in the propensity between experts and novices (B = -
0.02, z = -0.15, p=0.87, 95% CI [-0.29, 0.25]). A second logistic regression with 
participants’ decreasing forecasts coded as 1 and all else as 0 also showed that the 
instances in which all three additional cues decreased from point 2 to 3 significantly 
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predicted both humanitarians and novices’ tendency to forecast decreases (B = 0.93, z = 
3.48, p<.000, 95% CI [0.41, 1.47]). Again, there was no difference in the effect between 
participant groups (B = -0.14, z = -1.02, p=0.30, 95% CI [-0.42, 0.13]).  
The propensity to project trends when all three were in alignment was then 
examined in relation to participants forecasting error. Absolute scaled error in the rich 
context trials was regressed on cases where all cues increased, all cues decreased, and 
participant type. The result showed that all cues increasing was significantly predictive 
of participants forecast error across rich context trials, R2 = .008, F(2,987) = 5.23, 
p<.01, B = 0.44, t(987) = 3.20, p<.01, with no difference in the effect between experts 
and novices (B = -0.05, t(987) = -0.46, p=0.63). This suggests that the linearly of 
participants’ forecasts may have been even more pronounced in the trials in which all 
cues were increasing, hence the significant effect on forecast error.  
In sum, the results from the sparse context condition showed a linear ‘trend’ 
extrapolation effect which, congruent with the findings of Hohle and Teigen (2015), 
indicated that people interpret data as trended when given absolutely minimal evidence 
of existent trends (i.e., they projected linearly based on only a single three-point time 
series). However, when considering the effect of the rich context shown in the above 
secondary analysis, a new finding is delivered. Congruity between the trend direction of 
the target time series and that of the two additional series (noise) is shown to reinforce 
the propensity to linearly project the target series by continuing the trend in the same 
direction as the other cues. Moreover, the propensity to extend congruous trends is 
associated with increased forecasting error. 
It is possible therefore, that rather than people over or under adjusting from point 
3 to 4 in the rich context trials (due to the size of the data scale), the error in the rich 
context is associated with people complying with the trends of the different series. This 
suggests that visual analysis of trend directions in multi cues contexts may be more 
important to forecasting performance than cue causality. Thus to conclude, despite 
domain expertise, the bias to extend trends linearly is shown to be reinforced in 
complex varied data, based on the ‘consensus’ between trend directionalities of the cues 
observed.  
  
  
87 
4.2.3   Discussion 
We trust in experts to deliver effective judgments under uncertainty using rich 
domain knowledge (Lawrence et al., 2006). In some situations, for example supply 
chain forecasting, experts’ contextual knowledge increases judgmental performance 
(Armstrong, 1985; Edmundson, Lawrence & O’Connor, 1988; Seifert et al., 2015). 
However, in other situations, expertise is not shown to enhance forecasting accuracy, 
indeed sometimes leading to a reversal in performance (Önkal & Muradoǧlu, 1994; 
Wilkie-Thomson, Önkal-Atay, & Pollock, 1997). Given the comprehensiveness of 
experts’ knowledge, why do such disparities exist in the effectiveness of experts across 
different environments? The present study sought to answer this question by assessing 
the effects of sparse versus rich context on expert forecasting accuracy in the complex 
arena of humanitarian aid.  
We predicted that experts would perform worse in rich contexts, which they did, 
mirroring novices. Similar to the results of Hohle and Teigen (2015), we found that 
participants showed a strong tendency to linearly extrapolate from past observations, 
which should lead to increased error in domains where there is a great deal of noise or 
there is no linear trend. As predicted, the strength of the tendency to linearly extrapolate 
positively predicted forecasting error across sparse and rich contexts among both 
experts and novices. The tendency to chase noise and linearly extrapolate was 
particularly strong among experts in richer contexts that are more akin to real-world 
environments. This tendency to linear extrapolate in noisy domains may partially 
explain why experts sometimes perform no better than novices. When examining the 
tendency to trend-damp, experts were significantly shown to underestimate increases in 
the target data fourth point (i.e., dampen the real-world trend). The proportion of the 
trials in which trend damping occurred was greater compared to those in which it did 
not and the tendency to trend-damp occurred to a significantly greater extent among 
experts compared to novices. 
Based on a follow-up analysis of the effect of the rich context series on prediction 
performance, we present a new finding which shows that people linearly extend the 
trend of cues when all three are pointing in the same direction. Moreover, the propensity 
for error is greater when all three series are increasing. This suggests error in the rich 
context was associated with the propensity to seek trend alignment in noise and linearly 
extend the aligned trends, particularly when all cues are increasing, rather than simply 
linearly extrapolating the target series regardless of the directions of the other cues. It is 
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likely therefore, that participants’ judgments of increase were more linear than 
predictions of decrease, which is why error was shown to be associated with cases when 
the trends of all observed series were increasing.        
There are several reasons for why experts showed a tendency to chase phantom 
trends despite domain knowledge. One hypothesis is that the linear prediction bias 
arises from experts’ attempting to make sense of more complex, variable environments 
by assimilating cues and seeking patters which don't exist. Why we find experts more 
effective in some settings compared to others, could therefore depend on the degree of 
contextual complexity and uncertainty of the forecasting environment. Further 
examination of experts’ judgmental processes in complex environments is necessary to 
determine the robustness of the linear prediction bias and how it may interact with 
domain knowledge. Future repetition of the study in a naturalistic camp setting would 
also further insights into experts’ processing of data in rich contexts, and allay issues of 
validity associated with artificially replicating field environments (Lipshitz, 1993; 
Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu & Salas, 2001).  
One practical recommendation based on our findings, is to use experts to identify 
key factors and variables in complex prediction domains which are then used to build 
statistical forecasting models and systems, as opposed to relying on experts to form 
unaided judgments. For example, experts have proven effective system builders and 
data interpreters in a new approach to forecasting humanitarian aid demands ahead of 
climate-related disasters. Based on experts’ interpretation of hazard data from previous 
aid responses, the approach is predicted to reduce response costs by up to 50% by 
releasing funds pre-event (Cousin, 2015).  
Experts are also shown to be good at identifying important variables in weather 
simulations (e.g., barometric pressure) which are weighted by models to make actual 
predictions. Experts increase the predictive accuracy of weather simulations based on 
models of climatology by 10 to 25% (Lynch, 2006, 2008). Moreover, the judgmental 
improvements are shown to hold, despite decades of statistical model enhancements. 
The heightened model performance is attributed to experts’ ability to better perform 
sanity checks than machine learning tools, and integrate historical experience and 
‘common sense’ factors into the forecasts (Silver, 2013). Using experts in the appraisal 
of model forecasts may therefore be effective in minimizing the harmful tendency to 
follow false trends, whilst retaining some of the advantages of their detailed tacit 
knowledge. 
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In sum, our findings show a robust linear prediction bias in expert humanitarian 
aid workers in rich informational contexts akin to noisy real-word settings which 
predicts a decline in forecasting performance. Our results suggest that the tendency to 
find signal or meaning in noise is a robust phenomenon that is impervious to expert 
knowledge. Indeed, richer contexts which should elicit knowledge appear to make 
experts more vulnerable to finding patterns in noise, not less.  
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Chapter 5 
Data Disclosures to De-Bias Optimistic Time-
Cost Evaluations in Financial Decision Making   
In this chapter, two experiments are conducted based on findings from chapters 
three and four to investigate the effects of financial information disclosures on 
loan product choices. Experiment 3a tests the effects of lessening informational 
cues and framing percentage data in absolute currency values in current versus 
future rates on judgment performance in an online price comparison environment. 
In chapter 3 the concept of framing data in absolute values was shown to lead to 
judgment improvements and is thus expected to increase financial choice in this 
setting. The Finding show that simultaneously displaying rate alternatives using a 
future rate default to anchor people on ‘realistic’ options increased the propensity 
to opt for more effective, high future rate choices (as opposed to low, ‘optimistic’ 
current rate choices).  
Experiment 3b is conducted to verify the robustness of this framing effect by 
adding a disclaimer (akin to a real-world financial industry disclaimer) to each 
condition to test whether choice performance can be improved when attention and 
effort applied in the task of comparative analysis is increased by making the risk 
of rate variability more salient. Applying the disclaimer in the context of the 
standard industry disclosure thus tests whether people are capable of effectively 
using percentage and rate information when encouraged to increase attention and 
cognitive effort.  
Results show that the framing manipulation identified in experiment 3a remains 
highly robust in 3b and that no difference was found in choice performance with 
the addition of the disclaimer in either the standard industry or framing 
manipulation conditions. These results held even when individual differences in 
optimism, financial literacy and numeracy were included as covariates. The fact 
that performance remained constant across conditions between experiments 3a 
and 3b indicates that the reframing of rates in absolute terms is key to judgment 
rationality, and that percentage format biases in complex environments cannot be 
overcome by increasing cognitive effort in comparative analysis tasks. 
5.1   Background and Rationale 
The findings from chapters 3 and 4 have shown that people are more capable of 
making accurate judgments when data is provided in concrete values with non-
normalized base rates. In chapter 3, experiment 1, retail forecasters were shown to 
exhibit strong format biases which led them to additively process percentage points as if 
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they were absolute values. The retailers’ decision making strategy involved them 
employing minimal data, using only two values when shown three data points with 
which to predict weekly product sales. This strategy involved additively combining the 
last two observations in each sequence, using the absolute difference between the two 
points to generate predictions which were akin to a two-point linear regression model. 
The inclination to use only two numbers and combine them using an arithmetic 
operation therefore gave rise to estimates which were consistently linear in nature. In 
the case of non-linear increasing and decreasing trends, this resulted in forecasts which 
systematically underestimated increases and overestimated decreases in sales for the 
fourth week. 
The same strong theme of a linear prediction heuristic was found to continue 
throughout chapter 4, in which humanitarian aid workers were shown to linearly extend 
trends in the context of real-world cyclical trends in refugee camp data. This robust 
linear prediction bias was evident in sparse data contexts (where no additional cues 
existed) and was shown to intensify in noisier data with additional cues akin to the real-
world environment. Thus, the more complex the situation, the more people tended to 
project trends linearly which also correlated with an increase in judgment error. The 
directionalities of the trends in noise were specifically found to influence the direction 
of peoples’ judgments. Although the contextual information had no relation to the target 
forecast data, the predisposition to seek linear patterns and extend trends linearly was 
shown to be influenced by a directional bias whereby people linearly extended the target 
data in accordance with the trends of other cues in noise when a consensus was detected 
between the directions of all observable data points.  
These results suggest that where numerical information is more complex or 
varied, people employ fast heuristic judgment strategies which involve applying linear 
functions regardless of the context or causality of the data, or whether the trend of the 
target data is linear or not. The fact that this tendency is more pronounced in richer 
contexts where there are multiple cues and greater variability suggests that people are 
particularly prone to use any added information in a way that reinforces linear judgment 
tendencies. Thus, rather than using additional data in a sematic capacity (i.e., to help 
contextualize the target data based on the meaning of the surrounding cues), people 
tended to incorporate context information by applying a form of a visual heuristic 
strategy, based on seeking commonalities between the trends in noise and the target 
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data. This leads to the detection of false relations and ‘meanings’ within the data 
environment.     
In sum, fast, frugal heuristic judgment strategies based on linear functions and 
additive processing were applied by the decision makers in both the professional 
domains investigated. Where data was presented in numerical values (as opposed to 
time series) with no additional context cues available, retail forecasters were shown to 
‘make sense’ of the information by applying a cognitively efficient arithmetic strategy 
to two cues to yield linear judgments akin to a 2-point regression model. Where context 
information was provided and data was presented in time series format, humanitarian 
aid workers employed a strategy which employed all available data in their judgments 
based on similarities in trend directions. Having visually identified congruence between 
trends, they then projected the target data linearly in the same direction. Thus, using the 
non-causally related cues to inform judgments combined with the strong propensity to 
apply a linear function in the context of cyclical data meant that prediction inaccuracy 
was high, and greater in the context of noise.  
When considering the domain of financial judgment, the ability to form an 
optimal decision is recognised as a notoriously complex and cognitively demanding 
task which involves marshalling and computing multiple sources of information 
conveyed to consumers predominantly in percentage and rate formats. Judgment 
‘rationality’ in the financial choice context is complex as it can be dependent on 
individual circumstances which may lead to unintuitive results. For example, an 
individual may opt to put off larger payments into the future in the knowledge that they 
are due some inheritance or an increase in income later on. In this circumstance, 
showing a propensity for delay discounting would not be considered ‘irrational’ in the 
context of the individuals’ wider life factors.  
 Due to the complexities involved in measuring individual life circumstances in 
the context of financial decision choice and behaviour, the ‘rationality’ of peoples’ 
judgments in experiments 3a and 3b was measured from the economic perspective. 
From this standpoint, choices which act to minimize total repayment costs over the full 
loan term are categorized as ‘rational’ or fully ‘optimal’ judgments, whereas other 
choices are classified as ‘irrational’ or ‘suboptimal’. An interval scale of measurement 
of choice optimality is also included in the analysis which provides further data relating 
to the degree of rationality of peoples’ judgments, as oppose to a strict correct/incorrect 
indicator.     
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Based on the robustness of judgment biases shown among the retail forecasters, 
there is a premise for assessing the tendency to additively processes percentages in 
financial decision making. It is possible that data manipulations designed to mitigate 
such biases in product choice situations will improve the effectiveness of consumer 
judgment. There are several mechanisms via which percentage format biases and the 
linear prediction heuristic could impact the rationality of peoples’ financial judgment. 
As previously discussed, the tendency to additively processes rate information leads to 
people underestimating the increasing costs associated with rising interest rates. This 
simple bias alone can have grave consequences when selecting between credit product 
options which are subject to base rate and individual lender rate hikes. The potential for 
erroneous financial choices is further increased when considering additional factors 
such as peoples’ limited attentional capacity, the nature of contextual cues and the 
complexity of the decision environment.  
It is likely that the type of context data and how people use additional information 
in the process of making comparisons and evaluating choice alternatives will be 
important to decision performance. For example, framing choice alternatives in terms of 
absolute costs and displaying them simultaneously in a joint presentation mode could 
help to communicate the effects of compound interest growth without depending on 
peoples’ ability to correctly extrapolate non-linear functions. This format could 
facilitate comprehension of the effects of rate changes over time and support the 
evaluative analysis of different cost options.  
Individual difference factors such financial literacy and levels of numeracy are 
also likely to influence the effectiveness of peoples’ financial judgments and 
behaviours. Both financial literacy and numeracy are associated with the accuracy of 
financial and medical risk assessments and thus warrant assessment. Interactions 
between framing manipulations and these individual difference factors could indicate 
for example that the framings are successful in mitigating negative effects of individual 
differences. Individual differences in trait optimism is also potentially relevant to 
financial judgment rationality.  
In comparison to intertemporal effects like delay discounting or a more general 
present bias, trait optimism it potentially more important to financial judgment and 
behaviour because it encompasses a broad range of behaviours and characteristics 
which are shown to be related to the effectiveness of peoples’ financial actions and 
judgments via indirect mechanisms. For example, at extreme levels, optimism is 
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associated with saving less, planning over shorter horizons, working fewer hours, and 
holding more individual stock (Puri & Robinson, 2007). Conversely, moderate levels of 
optimism are associated with more optimal financial behaviour via the mechanism of 
increases in self-control.  
Findings from the Competition and Markets Authority 2015 investigation into the 
Payday lending market provide further support for optimism as a key factor 
underpinning consumers’ suboptimal financial choices and behaviours. In the ‘shopping 
around’ working paper (https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/payday-lending-market-
investigation#working-papers), the CMA cites ‘over-optimism’ as the reason for people 
significantly underestimating the likelihood of not repaying a loan, or of needing to take 
out further loans to cover repayment costs. The findings were based on qualitative 
responses combined with the high frequencies of late loan repayments, and loans which 
were either rolled over or never repaid in full. This led the CMA to conclude that 
“Customers would pay greater attention to the fees and charges associated with 
repaying a loan late (or with future loans), if their expectations about their ability to 
repay were more accurate”.  
It is possible therefore, that in the context of financial choice, a high temporal 
preference (i.e., the propensity to opt for low current costs and delay repayments into 
the future) is reflective of an optimistic bias which leads people to underestimate future 
costs and downplay the risk of future rate hikes. The negative effects of such a bias may 
be further compounded by people overestimating their ability to make higher 
repayments in the future. Although delay discounting or general present bias measures 
may be used to elicit temporal preference, such measures commonly involve a one-shot 
response to an individual delay discounting question which cannot account for 
individual circumstances or other factors mediating intertemporal effects. Measures of 
trait optimism on the other hand, assess more stable propensities and characteristics 
such as impulsivity which in turn are shown to impact financial judgment. From this 
perspective, optimism is potentially a more comprehensive and reliable assessment of 
intertemporal effects in this particular context, capable of accounting for the 
complexities in the mediating effects involved in financial judgments.  
Anchoring is another mechanism which has the potential to significantly influence 
peoples’ financial rationality. The anchoring and adjustment heuristic typically involves 
the presentation of an initial value or piece of information, commonly a numeric value 
on a dimension, which influences peoples’ subsequent estimates and choices in a given 
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judgment domain (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The anchor creates an initial basis for 
an estimates and people then make adjustments away from the anchor in the context of 
additional information. The anchor therefore sets the premise for a decision or choice 
which is altered according to peoples’ interpretation and processing of the surrounding 
contextual data. In this sense, a numeric anchoring effect may be created by the 
presentation of default value in a numeric judgment environment such as online 
financial choice.  
When presented with a set of choice alternatives, the default option is often 
considered as the choice that is accepted if no action is taken (i.e., it is the option a 
decision maker will obtain without engaging in further informational processing). 
However, a default setting may be used which involves a particular informational 
content being disclosed to the decision maker on first viewing of a data environment.     
A decision maker is then free to incorporate the default information in the judgment 
process as opposed to forming a choice based on taking no action. In this sense, a 
default setting still requires the decision maker to process the information to create a 
choice by comparing to other data points in the environment, however, based on the 
saliency of the default information, is likely that it will influence judgments to yield 
estimates and choices which align with the default data.  
Default settings are commonly shown throughout behavioural science research to 
have a powerful effect on the decisions people subsequently make, increasing the 
likelihood that a particular selection is made. A default is commonly considered distinct 
from an anchor in that it provides an instantaneous choice in the absence of the 
comparative analysis of choice alternatives, whereas an anchor creates a bias in peoples’ 
judgment processing which leads them to make choices which are more congruent with 
the anchor than the other values or options in the data environment. Although they are 
not always considered synonymous with anchors, it may be possible however, to apply 
a numeric default to elicit an anchoring and adjustment effect in the context of relevant 
additional information.  
This is the case in the current experiment in which a default setting is used to 
create an anchoring and adjustment mechanism in the context of an online mortgage 
price comparison choice. It is expected that mortgage costs which are disclosed in rank 
order with a default view set to future interest rates will lead people to make more 
effective loan product choices compared to the disclosure of choices when the default 
view is set to current interest rates. Moreover, the effect of the future rate default is 
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predicted to be enhanced by the subsequent disclosure of the current versus future rate 
choice alternatives side-by-side. By anchoring people on the most optimal loan choice 
(in the future rate frame) followed by simultaneously presentation of the current and 
future rate cost alternatives, it may be possible to encourage the direction of peoples’ 
choices by facilitating the process of comparative analysis.  
It is possible therefore, that the size of the values in the default view in relation to 
the values in the non-default view (i.e., the extent of the range between the upper and 
lower bound), might influence the amount of adjustment people make away from the 
default (or ‘anchor’) information which could result in more optimal loan choices (i.e., a 
lesser downward adjustment from the default) where a larger absolute difference 
between the upper and lower range is perceived.  
In sum, the ideas postulated above suggest that removing percentage information 
and framing financial interest rates in absolute currency costs in easily comparable, 
simultaneous choice alternatives with a strategic default value could be effective in 
increasing mortgage choice optimality compared to data disclosed in standard industry 
formats. It is expected that current versus future rates framed in total cost alternatives 
will improve peoples’ mortgage choices by heightening awareness of the potential for 
future rates rises (i.e., financial risk) and the financial effects of those rate increases 
(i.e., how compound interest amounts over time). This framing manipulation is 
predicted to mitigate optimistic biases associated with opting for variable rate loans 
which have low rate costs in the present compared to fixed rate loans which have higher 
initial rates but are not subject to the same rate variability and therefore represent 
optimal choice over the full term.  
In the following review, each of these themes are discussed in turn, focusing on 
how each factor relates to financial rationality and how data frames utilizing these 
factors and mechanisms may by employed to enhance the effectiveness of financial 
judgment in an online price comparison context.  
Understanding APR’s and the effect of compound interest are key to making good 
financial decisions. Whether deciding to make a purchase on credit, how to manage 
savings, or judging which mortgage will work best in the long-term, the ability to 
correctly apply rate information is key to financial risk assessment and financial well-
being. Confusion and error in consumer financial choice is frequently associated with 
the overall opaqueness of financial data communications. Based primarily on APR and 
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percentage information, industry disclosures are shown to persistently create barriers to 
consumer decision making. Various findings point to how the reframing of finance 
industry data communications can be effective in reducing investor biases (Bateman, 
Dobrescu, Newell, Ortmann & Thorp, 2016; Beshears, Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 
2009; Choi et al., 2010; Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, 2014; Hung, Heinberg, & Yoong, 
2010; Koehler & Mercer, 2009; Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, 2010; Newall & Love, 2015). 
There is also a lack of evidence to support the effectiveness of standard finance 
industry disclaimer information on improving financial judgment and choice. For 
example, Newall (2016b) showed that adding a disclaimer manipulation in the form a 
social comparison ‘nudge’ (“Some people invest based on past performance, but funds 
with low fees have the highest future results”) significantly increased investor fee 
sensitivity compared to the standard industry disclaimer (“Past performance does not 
guarantee future results”). When considering the negative effects that financial advisers 
can have on client biases’ (Mullainathan, Noeth, & Schoar, 2012), these findings 
suggest that behaviourally-informed financial data frames and communications could be 
the most effective means of improving consumer financial judgment (Erta, Hunt, 
Iscenko, & Brambley, 2013).    
With reference to the effects of interest rate variability, interest on savings and 
mortgages costs are subject to fluctuations in the Bank of England base rate. Previous 
rate forecasts suggested an increase from the static 0.5%, observed since 2009, to 2.0% 
by 2019. However, slowing global economy and negative inflation in 2015 has meant 
that the first rate rise to 0.75% is now predicted for 2019, increasing to 3% by 2025. 
This is not without the possibility however, of two rate hikes to 1.25% by the end of 
2017 (Oxlade, 2016). Although the forecasts vary, it is indisputable that when the rate 
does incline, even the slightest of increases will dramatically effect credit repayments, 
translating into unmanageable monthly mortgage repayments for millions of UK 
homeowners (Wearden, 2015). Raising the saliency of compound interest and the 
impact of rate fluctuations on loan repayments is therefore highly important to the next 
generation of mortgage seekers.  
As discussed in chapter 2, the errors and irrationalities in judgments involving 
percentage and rate information are numerous and widespread, stemming from the 
propensity to additively process numerical information. It is commonly assumed for 
example, that +10%, -10% = 0, based on adding and subtracting values, whereas 
multiplicative computation is necessary to derive the correct answer (-1%) (Newall, 
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2016a). In the context of financial decisions, it is well recognised that consumers have 
difficulty understanding the cost of credit (e.g., Lee & Hogarth 1999) and interest 
compounding (Eisenstein & Hoch 2007; Stango & Zinman 2009). The tendency to 
linearly processes compound interest rates can thus lead to harmful underestimates of 
the cost of borrowing (Stango & Zinman, 2009; McKenzie & Liersch, 2011) and slow 
debt repayment, as well as the miscalculation of investment fees and downside financial 
risk (Newall & Love, 2015; Newall, 2016a).  
The tendency to additively process numbers and form linear predictions is likely 
to be associated with the cognitive ease and efficiency in relation to the demands of 
multiplicative processing and non-linear judgment (DeLosh, Busemeyer & McDaniel, 
1997). The propensity to reason more effectively using concrete (absolute) values, 
suggests that simplifying financial product data by removing rates and percentages 
could significantly increase decision effectiveness. Figure 5.1 below shows an example 
of the standard informational format adopted by the finance industry to convey loan 
product information to consumers. Price comparison tools such as this are designed for 
people to make judgments regarding the most cost effective loan option based on 
comparing the interest rates and individual product attributes across loan providers, 
amounts and borrowing terms. As displayed in figure 5.1, standard price comparison 
tools disclose the representative APR which is the overall cost for comparison (4.4% in 
this particular example), the interest rate for the initial fixed period (1.39%) and the 
remainder of the term (4.74%), a max loan to value (70%), and a monthly repayment 
cost based on the initial fixed period only (£355.31). This data is delivered in 
combination with the industry disclaimer; “Your home may be repossessed if you do 
not keep up repayments on your mortgage” which appears at the bottom of the 
calculator shown in figure 5.1.   
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Figure 5.1 Example of a Standard Industry Mortgage Price Comparison Site 
As figure 5.1 demonstrates, this format creates a highly complex decision 
environment, making it difficult for decision makers to synthesize the data points in the 
process of forming judgments of future costs. This format assumes an understanding of 
representative APR and compounding and requires decision makers to compute rate 
changes over the full term. The addition of the disclaimer does little to draw consumers’ 
attention to the risks of base rate increases, added fees and lender rate rises. Thus, 
online price comparison websites represent a complex task environment, in which the 
synthesis of multiple data points and comparison of choice alternatives is particularly 
difficult to achieving optimal choice. In addition to future rate hikes, the compounding 
of arrangement fees, mortgage alteration charges, or an increase in the term by taking a 
repayment holiday for example, could result in greater monthly and final repayment 
costs than estimated based on the data provided.  
One way to simplify the choice environment and de-bias judgments would be to 
present the total repayment cost of a mortgage over the full term in currency format in 
the current interest rates and future base rate increases. This would eliminate the need 
for multiplicative computation of interest rates over fixed and non-fixed horizons, and 
highlight the monthly and total cost differences between current and future rates. For 
example, a standard variable rate with a small initial fixed rate may seem like a more 
attractive choice at current rates compared to a fixed rate mortgage with a much higher 
rate for the initial period and full term. However, when factoring in base rate increases 
(separate from lender increases), the standard variable rate cost far exceeds that of the 
fixed rate over the full term, thus making it a far riskier option.  
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Reducing the quantity of loan attributes presented in the decision task is also 
likely to help alleviate the computational challenge associated with synthesizing 
multiple cues. The limitations in the amount of data that people are able to attain to at 
any one time are well recognised throughout Psychological literature (e.g., Broadbent, 
1958), associated with heuristic judgments, often excluding important information 
(Simon, 1955). Recent research into peoples’ limited attentional capacities have shown 
a neural basis for restrictions in the ability to prioritize information (e.g., Mecklinger et 
al., 2003), encode data into working memory (e.g., Todd & Marois, 2004; Scalf et al., 
2007, 2011b), and respond to task-relevant material (e.g., Dux et al., 2006; Erickson et 
al., 2007).  
The investigation of attentional capacity for multiple data points has thus focused 
on the limitations in cognitive resources (e.g., Intriligator & Cavanagh, 2001; Lavie & 
Robertson, 2001; Mitchell & Cusack, 2008; Xu & Chun, 2009), giving rise to  models 
from a ‘resource-limited’ perspective (e.g., Alvarez and Franconeri, 2007) based on 
evidence of peoples’ ability to individuate and identify single items, but failure to 
simultaneously perform these operations on multiple group members or individual 
items. Bounded attentional capacity in the context of financial choices means that 
peoples’ quick, heuristic judgments about how to allocate it can lead to the exclusion of 
important information from the decision process. Rich, complex decision environments 
with multiple cues are therefore likely to hinder judgments by using up attentional 
resources and distracting people from the important points.  
From the perspective of behavioural economics, increasing complexity by adding 
more choice alternatives has shown to reduce judgment performance in investment 
decision making (Benartzi & Thaler, 2002) and increasing the number of pension plan 
alternatives can lead to a decrease in the number of enrollers (Sethi-Iyengar, Huberman 
& Jiang, 2004). In general, probabilistic judgments are shown to be negatively affected 
by increases in informational cues (e.g., Harvey, Bolger & McClelland, 1994). 
Forecasting studies show that accuracy deteriorates as the environment becomes noisier 
because people tend to interpret the noise as signal, leading to erroneous predictions 
(Harvey, 1995; Harvey, Ewart & West, 1997; Lopes & Oden, 1987; Brehmer, 1978; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Lee & Yates, 1992). 
In consumer domains, ‘choice overload’ created by increasing choice alternatives 
is shown to demotivate decision makers, leading to choice dissatisfaction and regret 
(Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). The increased difficulty of evaluating multiple attributes in 
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richer choice domains is likely to create greater uncertainty and burden of responsibility 
for making an ‘optimal’ choice. In terms of mortgage choices, price comparison 
calculators represent noisy domains, as not all product attributes are necessary or useful 
to computation of total or monthly repayment costs. The removal therefore of redundant 
product attributes is likely to decrease the opaqueness of the data and increase consumer 
data comprehension, sense if control and judgment confidence. 
In addition to removing data cues to simplify the environment, presenting the rate 
alternatives simultaneously is also likely to increase the evaluability of attributes. 
Numerical decisions are shown to be more effective when data is presented and 
processed in joint rather than in separate evaluation mode (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount 
& Bazerman, 1999). Insights from user design indicate that people ascribe meaning and 
derive value from numerical data through making comparisons against a reference 
point, or within the context of defined upper and lower bounds (Roller, 2011). 
Judgments in many contexts are shown to vary significantly between data evaluated 
simultaneously versus independently, with preference reversal commonly occurring 
between the two formats (Hsee, 1998; Hsee et al., 1999). 
The ability to evaluate and contextualize data through comparison against 
reference information is shown to be important to statistical inference in many 
situations (Hsee & Zhang, 2010). For example, judgments of risk, sensitivity to scope, 
and the stability of preferences are all shown to be differentially effected by data framed 
and evaluated in joint decision mode (simultaneously) verses information framed and 
processed separately (e.g., Bateman, Dent, Peters, Slovic & Starmer, 2007; Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2002; Desvousges, Johnson, Dunford, Boyle & Wilson, 
1993; Hsee, 1998). In the context of financial judgment, the ability to easily compare 
choice alternatives is therefore very important to optimising choice. This suggests that 
side-by-side presentation of the current and future rate costs for each loan choice could 
be more effective in creating a comparative context and promoting evaluative 
processing than framing current versus future rates in isolation.  
Independent of framing manipulations however, the effectiveness of financial 
judgment and choice may be related to individual differences in financial literacy 
(Mitchell & Lusardi, 2011). For example, judgments of downside financial risk have 
been found to positively correlate with both financial literacy and numeracy (Newall, 
2016a), and lower levels of numeracy and risk literacy are shown to relate to poor 
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statistical inference and incomprehension of probability data in judgments of medical 
risk (e.g., Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal & Garcia-Retamero, 2012).  
In general, however, findings relating to the effects of financial literacy on 
financial behaviours are mixed. Evidence suggests that interventions to increase 
financial literacy have not led to improvements in financial behaviour, and that 
associations between literacy and behaviour may reflect other factors such as numeracy 
(Fernandes, Lynch & Netemeyer, 2014). In the context of credit card repayments for 
example, high numeracy is associated with the tendency to overestimate the repayment 
amount required to pay off a loan in three years, and vice versa for low numeracy 
consumers (Soll, Keeney & Larrick, 2013). Interestingly, a reverse effect of financial 
literacy has been found in investment decision making, with people higher in financial 
shown to be more prone to select mutual funds with higher fees rather than opting for 
more effective low fee alternatives (Newall, 2016a). Although the relation between 
financial literacy, numeracy and behaviour is unclear, it makes sense to include such 
measures when examining financial judgments as all result are useful in further 
distinguishing the mediators and moderators of financial behaviour in different financial 
decision contexts.  
Other potentially relevant individual difference variables shown to influence 
financial judgment and behaviour are optimism and temporal preference. From the 
dispositional perspective, optimism is regarded as generalized positive expectations 
about future events which remains constant across context (Scheier & Carver, 1985; 
Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994). Optimistic bias, conversely, can vary from one 
situation to another and involves overestimates of the probability of a favourable 
outcome or underestimates of a negative outcome (Weinstein, 1980). Over-optimism is 
thus shown to have negative effects, specifically with respect to personal risk 
miscalibrations for illness and mishap which can lead to neglect of precautionary 
measures (Weinstein, 1980; Weinstein & Klein, 1996). From an economic perspective, 
it is possible that optimism biases align with overconfidence in the likelihood of future 
financial events which can thus lead to suboptimal decisions based on decreases in the 
overall utility associated with a particular financial choice.  
Higher levels of unrealistic optimism measured in terms of ‘underestimated future 
borrowing behaviour and generalized wishful thinking’ (Vitaliano, Carr, Maiuro & 
Becker, 1985) are shown to associate with decreased sensitivity to APR’s and increased 
sensitivity to annual fees. In the context of consumer credit behaviours, these findings 
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suggested that higher unrealistic optimism may be predictive of selecting credit cards 
which are suboptimal in terms of an individual’s usage behaviours (Yang, Markoczy & 
Qi, 2007). Higher levels of optimism have also been found to relate to generally 
suboptimal financial behaviours when examined in a wider context of financial and 
demographic characteristics.  
Puri and Robinson (2007) developed a measure of optimism based on the 
miscalibration of life expectancy using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF) which collects data on subjective and actual life expectancy among many other 
demographic and financial features. The measure was validated based on strong 
correlations with the revised version of the Life Orientation Test (LOT-R; Scheier, 
Carver & Bridges, 1994), and generalized positive expectations about the economy and 
future income growth. Puri and Robinson (2007) found that moderate optimism was 
predictive of optimal financial habits and choices such as paying credit card balances on 
time, planning over longer horizons and saving more. However, extreme optimism was 
related to saving less, shorter planning horizons, fewer working hours, and holding 
more individual stock.   
The authors explain the apparent dichotomy between extreme and moderate 
optimism in terms of important differences in self-control. For example, extreme 
optimists were found to be more likely to smoke, work fewer hours and hold less liquid 
assets compared to moderate optimists who were more likely to work harder and less 
likely to be day traders. These results indicate that the link between optimism and 
financial temporal preference may be related to behavioural differences in self-control. 
For example, moderate levels of optimism are related to a better ability to plan long-
term and execute those plans which are both skills which correspond with higher levels 
of self-control. It is therefore possible that higher self-control instantiates a preference 
for higher future rewards based on the ability to delay gratification and forgo short-term 
rewards which do not ultimately maximise utility. In turn, these propensities create 
more prudent financial choices and behaviours. The increased self-control of moderate 
optimists also means that they have less need to rectify financial problems compared to 
extreme optimists who are more likely to overcome self-control problems by locking 
their money into illiquid assets (e.g., Laibson, 1997; Strotz, 1955).  
Optimism has also been explored in the context of credit card repayment 
behaviours, testing the effects of minimum required payment information. Navarro-
martinez, Salisbury, Lemon, Stewart, Matthews & Harris (2011) showed that presenting 
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minimum repayment information had a detrimental effect on decisions to pay, leading 
to lower monthly payments (Steward, 2009; Navarro-martinez et al., 2011). Disclosing 
future interest costs in addition to minimum repayment amount was found to increase 
consumers’ likelihood of paying the minimum. However, this improvement did not hold 
when time to pay off the balance was added. The only manipulation found to increase 
the likelihood of paying the minimum amount was increasing it from 2% to 5% of the 
balance. However, this was only effective among borrowers with a moderate to high 
propensity to pay minimum amounts in general.  
These results suggest that cost sensitivity, based on temporal preference (i.e., 
individual differences in the propensity to pay now versus in the future), is likely to 
interact with informational framings to generate differential financial behaviours. A low 
propensity to make minimum payments may therefore be viewed as a present-focus or 
optimistic bias regarding future ability to repay, characterized by people seeking to 
minimise losses in the short term by delaying payments into the future. Other studies 
have also shown that optimistic biases in the propensity to consider immediate concerns 
versus future concerns influence credit card debt (Joireman, Kees & Sprott 2010) and 
fiscal responsibility (Joireman, Sprott & Spangenberg 2005).  
As Stewart (2009) observed, presenting a minimum repayment requirement on a 
credit card statement is likely to create an anchor from which adjustments are made to 
form subsequent repayment decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Numerous 
findings in behavioural economics research show that default values can have a 
powerful anchoring effect which impacts subsequent decisions (Johnson & Goldstein, 
2003). Analysis of retirement planning decision making for example, showed that 
consumers interpreted a default set by the employer of 401k as an implicit 
recommendation, and were subsequently more likely to select it (McKenzie, Liersch & 
Finkelstein, 2006). Thus, it is likely that the propensity to focus on an initially observed 
value will vary with optimistic biases or differences in temporal preference to 
differentially influence financial choice and behaviour. For example, Haws, Bearden & 
Nenkov (2012) found that repayment amounts among consumers who were low in 
spending self-control were increased when supplemental information relating to 
minimum repayment amount was disclosed.  
Anchoring can also work adversely however, particularly where data is presented 
in isolation without a reference point for evaluation. Mussweiler, Strack & Pfeiffer 
(2000) demonstrated the importance of making an alternative repayment amount salient 
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as an alternative anchoring point. For example, in Navarro-martinez et al’s (2011) 
study, it is likely that the repayment value ($38.74) was interpreted as a loss and 
without another amount for comparison, participants subsequently adjusted down from 
the anchor when deciding how much to repay. As the minimum amount was increased 
from 2% to 5% of the balance, the increase in the propensity to pay the minimum thus 
reflected the downward adjustment from the 5% minimum towards the 2% minimum. 
The fact that this occurred in those more prone to make minimum payments suggests 
that the effects of anchoring may be stronger for those with a stronger optimistic bias, or 
who are less future-focused.  
A possible solution to the negative effects of minimum payment requirements on 
repayment decisions may be to consider the effects of percentage versus currency 
frames. For example, findings show that investors sensitivity to product fees is 
increased when costs are framed in currency rather than percentage, due to the tendency 
to down weight the smaller percentage values (Newall & Love, 2015). This so called 
‘peanuts effect’, in which people tend to discount smaller costs and rewards (Weber & 
Chapman, 2005), is found throughout many behaviours which involve incurring either a 
small loss or gain. When considering health behaviours, this bias explains the 
detrimental effects in repeat behaviours such as smoking (Loewenstein, Asch, 
Friedman, Melichar & Volpp, 2012) and other diet or exercise behaviours where small 
effects of repeated actions may be downplayed.  
Based on the general misinterpretation of percentage formats, reframing the 
minimum repayment cost ($38.74) in percentage may therefore be effective in leading 
consumers to perceive costs as ‘small’ in the context of the ‘large’ balance framed in 
currency (e.g., 2% of $1,937.28). The fee may now be evaluated differently in relation 
to the balance, thus increasing willingness to pay. Conversely, people may be more 
likely to avoid making payments when costs are framed in current (i.e., seemly large 
values in relation to the balance) compared to a percentage (i.e., seemingly ‘small’ 
values compared to the balance).  
The simultaneously display of the balance in currency costs and percentage 
formats could therefore be particularly effective in improving financial decisions by 
countering optimistic biases among those who are more prone to delay repayment or 
pay less than the minimum requirement. Other means of mitigating the negative effects 
of disclosing minimum repayment requirements may be to frame them in the context of 
alternative repayment options. For example, Salisbury (2014) showed that proving costs 
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and loan repayment duration information for an additional higher amount in conjunction 
with the minimum costs, proved successful in increasing monthly credit card 
repayments above the minimum required.  
Levering the psychological process involved in financial judgments is key to 
delivering disclosures which target the biases underpinning suboptimal choice 
(Loewenstein, Sunstein, & Golman, 2014). Behavioural “nudges” (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008) in the form of disclaimer manipulations are also shown to be effective in altering 
perceptions of cost in financial judgements. For example, Newall (2016b) compared the 
effects of three different disclaimers on choice optimality when selecting between 
mutual funds offering monotonic trade-offs between maximising past returns and 
minimizing fees. The three disclaimers were designed to increase sensitivity to fees 
utilizing mental accounting (Thaler, 1985), sensitivity to costs by evoking loss aversion 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and evaluation of own behaviours relative to others 
using social comparison (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007). When compared to the industry 
disclaimer, “Past performance does not guarantee future results”, the social comparison 
disclaimer, “Some people invest based on past performance, but funds with low fees 
have the highest future results”, was found to significantly increase sensitivity to 
investment fees, thus reducing the tendency to maximise past returns when selecting 
mutual funds.  
Standard financial industry disclaimers are found largely to be ineffective in 
improving financial judgment and behaviour. When assessing the optimality of 
investment decisions for example, Mercer, Palmiter and Taha (2010) found that “Past 
performance does not guarantee future results” was no more helpful in guiding 
investment decisions than providing no disclaimer at all. Among those which have 
shown to be effective, emphasizing the importance of fees is the key feature facilitating 
the improvements in investment decisions (Mercer et al., 2010; Fisch & Wilkinson-
Ryan, 2014). In the case of mortgage products, the industry disclaimer, “Your home 
may be repossessed if you do not keep up repayments on your mortgage” is also likely 
to little to draw attention to the risks associated with variable interest rates, or increase 
consumers’ consideration of the need for careful financial planning when entering a 
long-term credit agreement.  
Among other factors, several experimental manipulations show the importance of 
simplification when designing effective disclosure information. For example, uptake of 
Earned Income Tax Credit, retirement plans, and a reduction in interest payments, late 
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fees and over-limit fees have been attributed to simplification of mandatory disclosures 
(Bhargava & Manoli, 2013; Clark, Maki & Morrill, 2014; Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, 
Mahoney & Stroebel, 2013). As demonstrated by Salisbury (2011), the provision of 
comparison data is also fundamental to the effectiveness of disclosures. Being able to 
accurately assesses the cost trade-offs associated with different interest rates when 
selecting between different financial products can significantly enhance decision 
making. Standardized information formats (e.g., absolute currency costs) create a 
meaningful context and reduce the cognitive workload associated with comparing rates 
and costs over different time horizons independently (e.g., Hsee et al., 1999).  
Financial costs presented in currency as opposed to percentages are also made 
more salient when presented comparatively, as is the case for energy savings when 
framed in monetary values (Newell & Siikamäki, 2013). With respect to payday loans, 
presenting prospective borrowers with the monetary cost of loans across varying terms 
compared to the relatively lower costs of credit card debt, was shown to be effective in 
reducing loan amounts and decisions to take-up loans (Bertrand & Morse, 2011). This 
format was more effective than disclosures involving comparisons between the APR’s 
of payday and other loan types, thus exemplifying the importance of concrete (non-rate) 
formats to evaluative judgment processes. Choices of investment funds with fee 
alternatives framed in dollars is also shown to impact fund choice to a greater extent 
than with fee alternatives presented in percentage points (Hastings & Tejeda-Ashton, 
2008).        
In sum, financial judgments involving long-term credit agreements such as 
mortgage product choices are subject to cognitive and behavioural biases which limit 
judgment effectiveness. Strong evidence for the effects of numerical format biases 
based on additive processing, and the tendency to seek and apply linear trends in 
complex multi-cue environments were shown in experiments 1 and 2 in chapters 3 and 
4. Experiment 3a involves an application of these findings to a real world environment 
by testing the effects of framing manipulations designed to overcome percentage format 
biases and the linear prediction heuristic in the context of financial judgment. In 
experiment 3a, a comparison is made between data disclosed in a standard industry 
financial disclosure with a manipulation involving interest rates reframed in concrete 
currency costs over the full mortgage term. The rates disclosed in currency format are 
then shown in current versus future rate alternatives.  
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Compared to standard industry formats, it is predicted that mortgage choices will 
be most effective when current and future rates frames are displayed simultaneously 
with a default set view to future rates. It is expected that moderate improvement in 
choice effectiveness will be shown when rates are displayed sequentially (on separate 
screens) with a default set to current rates. These effects are based on mitigating the 
tendency to underestimate costs by arithmetically processing percentages and linearly 
extrapolating non-linear growth which is shown to lead to erroneous financial judgment.  
To test the robustness of the framing effect examined in 3a, experiment 3b is 
conducted as a replication study to assess the effect of a disclaimer manipulation, akin 
to a real-world financial industry disclaimer which is designed to increase attention and 
cognitive effort applied in the task of comparatively analysing the choice alternatives in 
each condition. The disclaimer aims to achieve increased attention and effort by making 
salient the effects of rate variability and the financial risks associated with selecting low 
current rate options. The purpose of experiment 3b therefore, is to identify whether 
simply prompting people to attend more carefully to financial data and apply greater 
cognitive effort when comparatively analysing multiple cues and attributes is sufficient 
to improve judgment performance when viewing data in standard industry rate and 
percentage formats. For example, if this were to be the case, we would expect to see 
greater choice effectiveness in the control condition in experiment 3b compared to 
experiment 3a, thus indicating that people possess the cognitive capacity to rationalise 
effectively using rate and percentage formats and that more complex judgment 
processes can be activated by sufficiently prompting or motivating people to do so.  
Based on the robustness of the linear prediction heuristic and the saliency of 
percentage format biases shown in chapter 3 and 4 it is expected however, that choice 
performance in experiment 3b (with the addition of the disclaimer) will not significantly 
differ to performance in experiment 3a. It is predicted that the positive effects of 
reframing current versus future rate data in absolute (concrete) currency costs on 
financial judgment will hold, showing that framing methods to overcome format biases 
and attentional limitations are necessary to human rationality and that people do not 
possess the cognitive capabilities to synthesize percentage data in complex probabilistic 
domains. Thus, warning people about the risks of rate variability to prompt engagement 
in deeper comparative analysis of rate data will not be sufficient to yield judgment 
improvements.  
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As explained in the above review, measures of financial literacy, numeracy and 
trait optimism are also included in experiment 3b to assess possible interactions 
between relevant individual difference variables and the framing manipulations. The 
findings relating to the influence of individual differences on financial rationality and 
behaviour are somewhat mixed. Therefore, no specific predictions are made regarding 
the direction of the effect of financial literacy and numeracy on judgment performance 
and the measures are included for investigative purposes to further examine the possible 
mechanisms underpinning the effectiveness of the framing manipulation in the context 
of online financial choice.  
With regard to the effects of trait optimism, it is expected, based on Puri and 
Robinson’s (2007) findings, that higher trait optimism will be predictive of lower 
choice effectiveness and interact with frame preference within the two framing 
manipulation conditions (i.e., the rate frame in which people choose to make a 
selection). This prediction is derived from the view that lower temporal preference (or 
greater ‘self-control’ from Puri and Robinson’s perspective) will instantiate a preference 
for higher future rewards (at the expense of lower costs in the present) which is shown 
to be associated with more prudent financial choices and behaviours that act to increase 
utility. In this sense, lower trait optimism may be associated with a tendency to delay 
gratification and forgo short-term rewards (in the form of lower present loan costs) and 
opt for higher cost, fixed rate loans based on future rates options which yield higher 
overall utility when considered over the full loan term in the context of increasing 
interest rates. 
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5.2   Experiment 3a Current Vs Future Interest Rate 
Disclosure Effects on Financial Choice 
In this initial experiment, a mortgage price comparison calculator was built which 
resembled a standard industry mortgage price comparison tool displaying real-world 
loan product data (see figure 5.1 below for a screenshot of the tool). Just as in real-
world comparison websites, the tool presented key information to the consumer relating 
to APR, initial and subsequent interest rates, and estimated monthly costs based on 
initial fixed rate periods. Each row corresponded to a lender and the columns provided 
the different attributes which could be used to ranked and order the product alternatives. 
Although this standard disclosure provides all the necessary information to make a 
mortgage decision based on a given term and borrowing amount, the ability to make an 
effective choice is dependent on correctly processing percentages, understanding 
compounding and synthesizing multiple data points whilst controlling for risk 
associated with additional charges and future rate variability.  
Decision making performance in the standard disclosure condition is thus 
compared to choice effectiveness when data is framed in an interactive/optimistic and 
an interactive/realistic framing condition in which currency costs are framed in current 
versus future interest rates with differential default views.  
It is important at this point to delineate the use of the term ‘framing’ to describe 
the data manipulations tested in experiments 3a and 3b, and how the test of framing is 
distinct from the examination of informational presentation undertaken in experiment 4, 
chapter 6. Specifically, a framing effect typically refers to the impact a piece of 
information has on peoples’ preferences, judgments and choices when the same 
information is presented in different ways. For example, when given the same data, 
creating a positive informational frame is shown to increase peoples’ propensity to 
avoid risk, whereas a negative frame is associated with an inclination to seek risk 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The data presented in each condition in experiment 3a 
and 3b is exactly the same - i.e., the loan attributes used to populate each trial were 
extracted from the same set of mortgage products selected from those available on the 
market in 2015. Thus, the examination of the alternative informational formats in the 
three conditions in experiments 3a and 3b are tests of framing effects in the traditional 
sense.  
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In experiment 4, chapter 6 however, the data presented in condition 2 differs to 
that show in condition 1 with respect to the future rate information. Both conditions 1 
and 2 disclose full and reduced term repayment information in current interest rates, 
whereas only condition 2 involves the full and reduced term repayment information in 
future rates. In this sense, experiment 4 involves the examination of the impact of two 
different data manipulations on repayment judgments as opposed to a ‘framing effect’ 
based on the alternative presentation of the same information in each condition.  
The current rates are those set by the mortgage lenders during April 2015 (at the 
time of writing) and the future rates are set at a +1.5% increase applied in 0.5% 
increments over three consecutive years from the second year of the loan term. This 
+1.5% rate increase was designed to reflect the Bank of England base rate increase 
forecast in early 2015 to rise to 2% by 2016. Thus, simulating a rise of +1.5% between 
2016 and 2018 represented a realistic and conservative estimate of future repayment 
costs at the time of study design. 
Combined with the disclosure of current versus future rate costs, the optimistic 
and realistic framing conditions also greatly simplified the decision environment by 
making APR and rate information viewable only on demand, thus reducing 
computational barriers and helping to counteract attentional limitations. To recap, the 
findings reviewed in the above section indicate that people tend to treat percentages as 
absolute values and compute future outcomes by adding and subtracting percentage 
points as if they were whole numbers. When extrapolated into the future, computations 
based on arithmetic numerical processing thus lead to the linear projection of growth, 
which in the case of exponentially increasing compound interest rates can lead to 
significant underestimations of future repayment costs. When considered in the context 
of financial judgment therefore, the tendency to linearly extrapolate translates into a 
form of optimistic bias, leading people to assume lower future costs and thus less risk 
associated with potential rate increases.  
It is possible that judgments based on arithmetic processing are a key factor 
underpinning peoples’ optimistic (‘unrealistic’) financial estimates. Applying additive 
methods to rate and percentage information will lead people to make underestimates of 
costs, and thus predict ‘manageable’ future repayments. This is likely to result in people 
discounting higher future costs and opting for the most favourable choice in the present 
(i.e., lowest current costs). An alternative view is that people approach financial 
decision making with a pre-existing optimistic bias, leading them to assume that rates 
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are unlikely to rise and that if they do, they will somehow be able to meet the increased 
financial demands in the future. From this perspective, the way optimism may impact 
financial judgment could be multifaceted. However, based on the strength of evidence 
for processing inaccuracies stemming from format biases, it is probable that the former 
viewpoint is the main precursor to peoples’ optimistically biased financial judgments 
and choices. 
The use of rate and percentage data in a complex decision domain involving 
multiple cues and data points such as financial price comparison, therefore places 
demand on attentional resources which exceeds peoples’ cognitive capacities. Hence, it 
is predicted that the important manipulations of reducing the quantity of data points 
necessary for decision making and replacing rate formats with absolute currency costs 
framed in current and future rates will significantly increase the effectiveness of 
financial choices compared to the standard format condition. Specifically, the 
simultaneous display of rate alternatives combined with a default set to future rates in 
the realistic framing condition is expected to be the most effective overall by overriding 
the optimistic tendency to discount higher future costs (or unfavourable outcomes) in 
preference for smaller (more favourable) present costs.  
5.2.1   Method  
Participants 
One-hundred and seventy-nine participants aged over 18 years were recruited via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid $2.00. The average age was 36.8 years (SD = 10.02, 
range = 21 to 67 years), 40.40% were female and 40% were educated to a minimum 
level of a college degree. The sample size was determined by a power calculation which 
showed 159 participants necessary for 80% power based on a one-way ANOVA (α = 
0.05, d = 0.25, 1-β = 0.8). The budget was set accordingly and data collection 
proceeded until the budget was reached.  
Design  
The experiment was conducted as a randomized controlled trial using an 
independent groups single factor design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions: 1) standard disclosure (control); 2) interactive/optimistic framing; and 
3) interactive/realistic framing. In each condition, participants underwent eight trials 
(two of which were attention checkers) in which they selected what they believed to be 
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the best mortgage from five alternatives for a given loan amount and term. Trials were 
randomized per participant in each condition.  
Materials  
There were eight unique trials per condition in which five mortgage choices for 
different term and amount combinations were presented. All trial stimuli were extracted 
from real-world mortgages available on the UK mortgage market at the time the 
experiment was designed during April 2015.  
Each trial in all three conditions involved a choice between one or more standard 
variable rate (SVR), discounted variable rate (DVR), and fixed rate mortgages. Each 
condition differed in the presentation and framing of the mortgage data across all eight 
trials. Figure 5.2a shows a screenshot of the control condition 1 (standard industry 
disclosure) in which the five loan options were presented in an interactive price 
comparison tool resembling a traditional, real-world mortgage price comparison 
website. The tool design, user interface and the specific product attributes presented 
were exactly the same as the attributes provided on commercial websites available in 
2015. 
 
Figure 5.2a The Standard Industry Disclosure Cond 1 (Control) in Exp 3a 
The standard industry disclosure condition (control) in which all the loan product 
attributes and the design and layout of the information directly matched real-world 
mortgage price comparison websites. As in the real-world context, loans could be 
ordered by the individual attributes using toggle keys in the header. Although all the 
product attributes are made available, making an optimal decision depends on 
synthesizing multiple variable rate data and is thus particularly difficult.   
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The optimistic framing condition 2 in current rate frame (default view) 
 
The optimistic framing condition 2 in future rate frame (non-default view) 
Figure 5.2b The Optimisic Framing Condition 2 in Exp 3a 
The optimistic framing condition 2 showing the default frame set to total 
repayment costs in current rates (the default view) and the alternative frame showing 
total repayment costs in future rates (the non-default view). Participants were free to 
click backwards and forwards between the rate frames in the two separate screens 
before making a mortgage choice in either screen. Loans in both frames were rank 
ordered by total loan cost over the full term, thus dramatically simplifying the 
comparison problem compared to the standard disclosure. Participants could click to see 
individual loan interest rates and APR’s if desired (otherwise, all rate and APR data was 
removed to simplify the decision process). The default set to current rates is predicted to 
exacerbate the optimism bias, anchoring participants on best option in current rates, thus 
making it moderately more effective compared to the control. 
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The realistic framing condition 3 in future rate frame (default view) 
 
The realistic framing condition 3 in current rate frame (non-default view) 
Figure 5.2c The Realistic Framing Condition 3 In Exp 3a 
The realistic framing condition in which the default was set to total repayment 
costs in future rates (the default view). When participants clicked to see costs in current 
rates (the non-default view), the two repayment alternatives were displayed onscreen 
side-by-side as opposed to on separate screens (as in the optimistic framing condition). 
This was designed to facilitate evaluative judgment processes by increasing sensitivity 
to the effects of rate changes over the loan term, and how these variances differentially 
effected costs depending on mortgage type. This framing is predicted to be the most 
effective by anchoring participants on the most realistic cost scenario, and facilitating 
the comparative analysis of the different mortgage types and in the context of the rate 
alternatives to a greater extent than the sequential disclosure in the optimistic framing 
condition.    
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In the optimistic framing condition 2 shown in figure 5.2b, participants viewed an 
interactive and simplified version of the traditional loan price comparison tool in the 
control condition. Unlike the traditional disclosure, the optimistic framing condition had 
all rate information removed and total loan repayment costs over the full term (in UK 
currency) were displayed in price rank order. The default screen (i.e., the view that 
participants viewed first in each trial) was set to the rank ordered prices in current rates 
(the first screenshot), hence the ‘optimistic’ framing. In the header, a tab labelled ‘show 
future rates’ enabled participants to click to a new screen where they viewed loans rank 
ordered in future rates (the second screenshot). They could then alternate between the 
two screens to view the current and future rates separately by clicking on the tab in the 
header.  
The same as in control condition, the loans could also be ordered by individual 
attributes using toggle keys in the header. However, in contrast to the control condition, 
computation of APR information was not necessary for decision making and was 
therefore not displayed in either rate frame. To replicate the legal data disclosure 
requirements of standard websites, the interest rate and APR data for each loan was 
viewable if desired, made accessible by clicking on the ‘?’ icon next to each mortgage 
choice. The message “click to see individual rates and APR’s” displayed at the bottom 
of the tool was provided to prompt this action. Figure 5.2b default and non-default 
views show examples of what happened when the ‘?’ icon was clicked. In this instance, 
the green bar at the bottom of the tool displayed the individual data for the selected 
loan.  
In the realistic framing condition 3 shown in figure 5.2c, the informational 
framing in the optimistic framing condition 2 was repeated, except that the default view 
was set to total loan costs in future rates (hence the ‘realistic’ framing) and the 
alternative rate frames were disclosed simultaneously (i.e., side-by-side on the same 
screen), as opposed to sequentially on separate screens. 
Generation of the Trial Stimuli  
All trial stimuli were constructed using data from real-world mortgages available 
on the UK mortgage market during April 2015. Across eight trials involving different 
duration and amount combinations, participants selected what they believed to be the 
best loan from five mortgage options with various current rate terms (see table 5.1 for 
the trial stimuli details).  
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Table 5.1 Loan Term, Amount and Rate Combinations Per Trial in Exp 3a 
The mortgage term, borrowing amount and current interest rate combinations 
presented per trial in each condition. 
 
Trial 1 and 2 Trial 3 and 4 Trial 5 and 6 Trial 7 and 8 
10 year term 15 year term 20 year term 25 year term 
£110,000 £150,000 £220,000 £400,000 £95,000 £275,000 £185,000 £375,000 
1.89% for 
lifetime 
4.45% for 
lifetime 
1.50% for 
2 yrs then 
4.99% 
3.69% for 
lifetime 
1.99% for 
2 yrs then 
4.75% 
2.22% for 
2 yrs then 
4.99% 
1.99% for 
2 yrs then 
3.94% 
3.65% for 
3 yrs then 
4.95% 
1.79% for 
2 yrs then 
3.99% 
3.95% for 
3 yrs then 
4.99% 
1.69% for 
2 yrs then 
4.75% 
1.69% for 
2 yrs then 
3.99% 
1.85% for 
2 yrs the 
4.99% 
2.69% for 
2 yrs then 
4.99% 
1.79% for 
2 yrs then 
3.99% 
2.95% for 
3 yrs then 
4.99% 
1.89% for 
2 yrs then 
4.49% 
3.49% for 
2 yrs then 
5.64% 
1.15% for 
2 yrs then 
5.54% 
3.14% for 
5 yrs then 
4.99% 
1.69% for 
2 yrs then 
5.95% 
1.95% for 
2 yrs then 
5.69% 
3.65% for 
5 yrs then 
4.15% 
2.29% for 
2 yrs then 
4.99% 
1.70% for 
2 yrs then 
4.99% 
4.99% for 
2 yrs then 
5.49% 
1.84% for 
2 yrs then 
5.79% 
5.04% for 
2 yrs then 
4.74% 
5.58% for 
5 yrs then 
5.73% 
4.99% for 
5 yrs then 
5.95% 
4.29% for 
5 yrs then 
5.79% 
5.99% for 
3 yrs then 
5.73% 
5.59% for 
2 yrs then 
5.69% 
5.69% for 
5 yrs then 
4.99% 
4.99% for 
2 yrs then 
5.49% 
5.45% for 
4 yrs then 
4.49% 
6.09% for 
2 yrs then 
5.73% 
5.25% for 
5 yrs then 
5.99% 
6.09% for 
5 yrs then 
5.73% 
5.24% for 
5 yrs then 
5.79% 
 
The interest rates presented per trial shown in table 5.1 were exactly as advertised 
by the individual mortgage lenders. When these rates were applied to the borrowing 
amounts and loan terms selected for each trial, the fixed rate options consistently 
yielded higher total repayment costs over the full term compared to the standard 
variable (SV) and discounted variable (DV) rate options. Thus, in current rate frames, 
the SVR/DVR options always yielded the most favourable choice (i.e., the lowest total 
costs). However, the optimality of the SVR/DVR choices only remained so if there was 
no variability in the fixed and subsequent rates of the mortgages over the full term.  
Typically, fixed rate mortgages offered a higher initial rate period and subsequent 
term rate comparted to SVR and DVR alternatives. This creates the perception that 
fixed rate mortgage represented the worst choice (i.e., was the most expensive in the 
long-term). Most lenders offered an initial fixed period in which the interest rate would 
not alter. However, following the fixed period, the SVR/DVR options were subject to 
rate increases at the individual lenders discretion increases in rates in addition to 
predicted base rate rises. The fixed rate options conversely, were not subject to future 
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rate fluctuations following the initial period because the subsequent rate was fixed for 
the remainder of the term. Thus, when computing the effects of projected base rate 
increases combined with the probability of lender rate increases, fixed rate options can 
represent the most optimal choice over the full term. The effects of compound interest 
rates mean that even slight increases can result in significantly greater monthly and total 
costs over longer horizons.     
Thus, to facilitate optimal choice by creating realistic repayment scenarios, 
projected base rate growth was built into the future cost framings in condition 2 and 3. 
This was achieved by increasing the SVR/DVR options by +1.5% in 0.5% increments 
over three consecutive years beginning in the second year of the mortgage term. The 
experiment was designed in 2015, which meant that the simulated rate increase took 
effect from 2016 (hypothetically year two of the loan) through to 2018 (year four) 
which was in accordance with predicted increases at the time of writing. It is relevant to 
note that the following future cost estimates were particularly conservative as they were 
based on the smallest predicted base rate rises in 2015 and did not include any 
additional rate increases applied by lenders. 
For example, figure 5.3 shows that in current rates (with no rate manipulations), a 
SVR mortgage for £220,00 over 15 years at a fixed rate of 1.69% for 2 years then 
4.75% yielded a total repayment cost of £301,951. In future rates however, the total cost 
increased to £332,219. Following the lenders fixed period of two years at 1.69%, this 
was generated by adding 1.0% (0.5% + 0.5%) to the subsequent rate of 4.75% in year 
three of the loan to generate a rate of 5.75% for one year, followed by another increase 
of 0.5% in year 4 to generate a rate of 6.25% for the remainder of the term. In contrast, 
a fixed rate mortgage alternative at 1.84% for 2 years, then 5.79% yielded a total cost of 
£323,973 regardless of rate fluctuations. As this example shows therefore, when 
considered over the short term, a fixed rate loan with a higher initial monthly cost is 
suboptimal compared to a SVR with a lower initial fixed rate period. However, when 
framed over the full term the reverse is shown, with the higher initial rate fixed version 
being the most effective long-term choice.  
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Figure 5.3 Costs for Different Mortgages in Current Vs Future Rates 
This example shows the yearly repayment costs for a £220,000 mortgage over a 
15-year term at current versus future interest rates for a standard variable (SVR) versus 
fixed rate mortgage option. In current rates, the SVR option represents the best choice 
(lowest total repayment cost). However, when accounting for the most realistic future 
scenario of a minimum base rate increase of +1.5%, the fixed rate options represents the 
optimal decision, coming in at a lower total repayment cost compared to the SVR.  
Two of the trials were designed as ‘attention checkers’ to measure participants 
level of focus on the task. In these trials, the total loan costs for each of the five 
mortgage choices remained the same across the current and future rate frames in 
condition 2 and 3. I.e., the SVR and DVR options were the cheapest, and the fixed rate 
options were the most expensive in both the current and future rate frames. Thus, the 
best loan choice did not change making it very easy to detect. Any participant who 
failed to answer these trials correctly were removed from the dataset.  
Procedure  
After providing demographic information for age, education and gender, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions in which they 
underwent the eight unique trials (two of which were attention checkers designed to 
filter out non-attentive respondents). On the landing page of the experiment participants 
were given the following instruction: 
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“In this experiment you will be asked to select the best mortgage you can for a 
given property price and loan term. There are 8 trials in total and some brief 
questionnaires at the end. In each trial you will be shown a mortgage price comparison 
tool with different loan choices. You can toggle the mortgages by different features and 
screens to help you choose.” 
In each trial, the following instruction was provided at the top of the screen with 
the relevant loan amount and term information inserted: 
“Imagine you want to buy a house that costs £340,000. You need to get a 
mortgage for £220,000 over 15 years. Please use the loan calculator below to find the 
best mortgage you can. To help you make your choice, you can use the toggle keys in 
the header to switch the order of the mortgages according to each attribute.  
You can click on ‘current rates’ and ‘future rates’ to compare the repayment costs 
over time. By clicking on the ‘?’ you can see the APR and interest rate information for 
each individual mortgage. When you are ready, click on your chosen mortgage in the 
‘SELECT MORTGAGE’ column on the right-hand side to submit your choice.” 
The instruction remained at the top of the screen for the full duration of each trial 
with the price comparison tool positioned in the lower half of the screen and no time 
limit was applied to participants’ responses. After submitting a choice, participants were 
asked to cancel or confirm their choice in order to move to the next trial. Each new trial 
followed exactly the same format, with the loan amount and term differing in the 
instruction section at the top of the screen and the information changing within the tool.  
After completing all eight trials, a new screen was shown asking participants to 
indicate which information they used to make their loan choices. Using drop-down 
menus, participants then indicated whether they used “current rates only”, “future rates 
only” or “both current and future rates” to make their loan choices, and whether “total 
repayment cost” or “monthly cost” was more important to their choice. After submitting 
responses to each question, participants were thanked for their participation and 
provided with instructions for remuneration.   
5.2.2   Results 
 Analysis of Choice Effectiveness Per Condition 
Thirteen participants who did not complete all eight trials were removed from the 
data set, leaving 166 remaining (54, 57 and 55 in condition 1, 2 and 3 respectively). Of 
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the remaining 166 participants, each correctly answered both of the attention checker 
trials. For the purposes of the experiment, judgments were categorized as either 
‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ based on the minimization of total repayment costs over the full 
loan term. Participants choices in each condition were coded as ‘correct’ (1) if the target 
loan was selected in each trial (i.e., the choice which yielded the minimum total 
repayment cost over the full term) and ‘incorrect’ (0) if any other choice was made. 
Performance was thus measured from the standpoint of economic ‘rationality’, 
whereby choices which acted to maximize utility based on the minimization of total 
repayment costs, were considered ‘correct’. Judgments which yielded repayment costs 
anywhere above the minimum failed to maximise utility are were thus regarded as 
‘incorrect’ in this context. However, an additional, less stringent measure of judgment 
performance was also computed to account for the fact that a binary ‘correct/incorrect’ 
classification may not be entirely relevant in the context of the real-world factors which 
impact peoples’ financial judgment and behaviour.   
To gain an indication of the degree of choice optimality (as opposed to correct vs. 
incorrect), an interval scale was formed by individually scoring the best choice per trial 
as 1.0 and the worst was as 0.2 according to the rank order in the future rate frame. This 
created a monotonic scale of choice effectiveness ranging from 0.2 to 1.0 across both 
frames. Figure 5.4 shows both the proportions of correct choices and the mean choice 
scores per condition. This interval scale of judgment performance showed differences in 
the degrees of choice optimization per condition. For the purposes of analysis, this 
provided more information regarding the effectiveness of the information manipulations 
in relation to the control.  
It is necessary to note however, that ‘rationality’ in the context of financial 
choices and behaviour are likely to be influenced by individual circumstance factors 
which were unaccounted for in the experiment. For example, it may be considered a 
‘rational’ judgment for a person to avoid higher costs in the present (and choose to pay 
more over the long term) in the knowledge that (although currently unable to meet the 
higher financial demands), they would be financially better off in the future. Thus, in 
situations such as this, delay discounting may not always be irrational. This may be the 
case for someone due to acquire income through future inheritance, or a pending job 
contract or career move, etc. In this sense, more complex mechanisms are likely to 
underpin the relation between intertemporal choice and the ‘rationality’ of real-life 
financial decisions than factors related to informational format alone.  
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Figure 5.4 Correct Choices and Choice Scores Per Condition in Exp 3a 
Proportions of correct choices and choice scores per condition with standard error 
bars. As expected, the proportions of correct (best) choices and the mean choice scores 
were significantly greater in the realistic framing condition 3 compared to the control 
condition 1 and the optimistic framing condition 2. The similarities in the mean choice 
scores and the proportion of 100% correct choices in condition 2 and 3, and the degree 
of difference between these two measures indicated that condition 2 and 3 were 
similarly effective in yielding both fully optimized choices and increasing choice 
effectiveness in relation to the traditional disclosure condition.  
A logistic regression analysis was conducted to predict the proportions of correct 
choices (1/0) per condition. As expected, condition level (1 to 3) significantly predicted 
the proportion of correct choices made, (B = 0.94, z = 12.28, p<.001, 95% CI [0.78, 
1.08]). Post hoc analyses with Bonferroni adjusted p values showed an increase in the 
proportions of correct responses from condition 1 through condition 3. Proportions of 
correct responses in condition 1 (M=0.17) were significantly lower than those in 
condition and 2 (M=0.52), p<.001, which were significantly lower than those in 
condition 3 (M=0.6), p<.05.  
A one-way ANOVA conducted on the choice scores per condition reflected the 
results of the logistic regression, showing a significant main effect for condition, 
F(1,1325) = 179.9, p<.001; 95% CI = [.0948, 0.1273].  Post hoc analysis confirmed that 
choice scores in the realistic framing condition (M=0.83) were significantly higher than 
those in the optimistic framing condition (M=0.79), p<.05., which were significantly 
greater than those in the control condition (M=0.61), p<.001. Figure 5.5 shows the 
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proportion of choice scores per condition to illustrate the distribution of total choice 
effectiveness across the range from 0.2 (worst) to 1.0 (best). In addition to the 
proportion of correct choices, the choice score dependent variable is useful in showing 
the dissemination or distribution of choice effectiveness per condition compared to the 
binary correct/incorrect outcome. This measure of performance is important because it 
shows the degree of choice effectiveness which is not indicated when responses are 
assessed in terms of ‘correct’ (fully optimized) versus ‘incorrect’ (i.e., all other options). 
Assessing choice performance on a continuum in this way therefore reveals more 
information regarding the effects of each manipulation.  
  
 
Figure 5.5 Proportion of Choices Per Score and Condition in Exp 3a 
The proportions of choices displayed per score in each condition with standard 
error bars. The majority of choices in the control condition achieved a score of 0.6. This 
indicates that when presented with the standard industry data format, participants tended 
to make choices which were at a 50% level of effectiveness. However, when presented 
with rate frames in the optimistic framing condition 2 and the realistic framing 
condition 3, the majority of choices were made at a 100% level of effectiveness, 
reflected by a choice score of 1.0. Overall, the realistic framing condition (3) yielded the 
highest proportion of fully effective choices within and between conditions. 
The significantly higher choice scores in condition 2 and 3 therefore suggest that 
the framing manipulation positively impacted choice optimality. To explore the 
difference in choice effectiveness between the current and future rate frames in 
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condition 2 and 3, a logistic regression was conducted firstly on the proportions of 
choices made per frame per condition (results are shown in figure 5.6). 
Current Vs Future Frame Choice Proportions  
 
Figure 5.6 Proportion of Choices in Current Vs Future Frame in Exp 3a 
The proportion of choices made in the current and future frame in the optimistic 
framing condition 2 and the realistic framing condition 3 with standard error bars. 
Significantly more choices were made in the opposite frame to the default in both 
conditions, indicating that participants in each condition tended to click through to the 
alternative frame before making a choice. In condition 2, 30% more choices were made 
in the future frame compared to the default current frame, and in condition 3, 22% more 
choices were made in the current frame compared to the default future frame.  
Results of a logistic regression to predict proportions of choices made in the 
current (0) and future frame (1) per condition showed that the proportion of choices 
made in the future frame significantly differed between conditions, (B = -1.06, z = -
7.71, p<.001, 95% CI [-1.34, -0.79]). Post hoc analysis confirmed that a significantly 
higher proportion of choices were made in the future frame in the optimistic framing 
condition (2) (M=0.65) compared to in the future frame in the realistic framing 
condition (3) (M=0.39), t(891.11) = 8.07, p<.001, and a significantly higher proportion 
of choices were made in the current frame in condition 3 (M=0.61) compared to in the 
current frame in condition 2 (M=0.35), t(891.75) = -4.63, p<.001.   
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Choice Scores Per Rate Frame 
Figure 5.7 shows the mean choice scores per frame and condition. A linear 
regression model with choice score as the dependent variable and condition and the 
frame in which the choice was made as factors in the model showed that choice scores 
were significantly higher in the realistic framing condition 3, R2 = .05, F(3,892) = 16.47, 
p<.001, B = -0.061, t(892) = -2.58, p<.01; 95% CI = [-0.10, -0.01] and significantly 
differed between the chosen frame per condition, with higher scores yielded in the 
current frame across conditions, B = -0.461, t(892) = -5.52, p<.001; 95% CI = [-0.6254, 
-0.2973]. The interaction term was found to be significant due to an overall higher mean 
choice score in the current rate frame in the optimistic framing condition 2, B = 0.15, 
t(892) = 4.71, p<.001. 
Planned t-tests showed that mean choice scores were significantly higher in the 
realistic framing condition 3 (M=0.83 vs M=0.79), t(891.94) = -2.40, p<.05. Between 
conditions, future frame choice scores were significantly higher in condition 3 
(M=0.83) compared to the optimistic framing condition 2 (M=0.74), t(366.44) = -
3.8375, p<.001, whereas current frame choice scores were significantly higher in 
condition 2 (M=0.90) compared to condition 3 (M=0.83), t(355.53) = 2.9194, p<.01. 
Within conditions, choice scores were significantly greater in the current frame in 
condition 2 (M=0.89 vs M=0.74), t(396.93) = 6.94, p<.001, in condition 3 however, no 
difference in choice scores was found between the future (M=0.83) and current frame 
(M=0.83), t(328.53) = -0.06, p=0.95. This indicated that despite there being more 
choices made in the non-default frame in condition 3, there was no significant 
difference in the effectiveness of the choices made in either frame. In contrast, condition 
2 yielded a higher proportion of more effective choices in the non-default frame, 
underpinning the significant interaction term in the regression model. 
  
126 
 
Figure 5.7 Mean Choice Score Per Frame in Exp 3a 
The mean choice score per frame for each condition with standard error bars. 
Although there was a larger proportion of choices made in the alternative frame to the 
default in both conditions (figure 5.6), the effectiveness of the choices in the optimistic 
framing condition 2 was greater in the default (current) frame. This suggests that when 
two comparisons of the rate frames were made (i.e., by clicking to view rates in the non-
default frame, then back again), the resulting choices were more effective compared to 
when only one comparison between the current and future rates was made (i.e., clicking 
to view the non-default then making a choice). In the realistic framing condition 3, 
choice scores were significantly higher than those in the optimistic framing condition 2, 
however, within condition 3, there was no significant difference between choice scores 
in either frame. This indicates that the number of comparisons made in condition 3 
might have been less important to choice effectiveness than in condition 2.  
Correct Choices Per Rate Frame 
A logistic regression was conducted to predict the proportions of correct (1) and 
incorrect (0) choices made per chosen frame in each condition. Results (displayed in 
figure 5.9) showed a significant effect of condition (B = -0.64, z = -2.99, p<.01, 95% CI 
[-1.07, -0.22]) and frame (B = -4.39, z = -5.82, p<.001, 95% CI [-5.88, -2.92]) on the 
proportion of correct choices made, and a significant interaction term, (B = 1.51, z = 
5.19, p<.001, 95% CI [0.95, 2.09]). As expected, these results reflect the pattern of 
choice scores shown in figure 5.7, with post hoc analysis indicating that a significantly 
higher proportion of correct choices were made in condition 3 (M=0.60) compared to 
condition 2 (M=0.52), t(893.72) = -2.35, p<.05, with more correct choices made in the 
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current frame (M=0.63) compared to the future frame (M=0.48) across conditions, 
t(891.9) = 4.57, p<.001. 
Between conditions, there were significantly more correct choices made in the 
future frame in the realistic framing condition 3 (M=0.62) compared to the optimistic 
framing condition 2 (M=0.41), t(357.85) = -4.57, p<.001, and significantly more correct 
choices in the current frame in condition 2 (M=0.73) compared to condition 3 
(M=0.58), t(360.64) = 3.12, p<.01. Moreover, current frame correct choice proportions 
in condition 2 (M=0.73) significantly exceed future frame proportions in condition 3 
(M=0.62), t(328.91) = 2.05, p<.05, and vice versa for condition 3 current frame 
proportions (M=0.58) versus condition 2 future frame (M=0.41), t(557.28) = 4.20, 
p<.001. Within conditions, correct choice proportions were significantly higher in the 
current frame in condition 2 (M=0.73 vs. M=0.41), t(352.96) = 7.0, p<.001, however, 
no difference was found in the proportions of correct choices between the current 
(M=0.58) and future frame (M=0.62) in condition 3, t(366.19) = -0.83, p=.40.  
          
 
Figure 5.8 Proportion of Correct Choices Per Frame in Exp 3a 
The proportion of correct choices made per chosen frame in each condition with 
standard error bars. Overall, a higher proportion of correct choices were made in the 
realistic framing condition 3 and there was no difference in choice effectiveness 
between the frames in which the choices were made in condition 3. In the optimistic 
framing condition 2, a higher proportion of 100% optimal choices were made in the 
default frame, suggesting that making two (or more) comparisons of the data by 
clicking back to the default frame again before making a decision (i.e., current-future-
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current viewings), increased the propensity to make 100% optimal choices. The 
difference between the proportions of 100% optimal choices in the default and non-
default frame in condition 2 was also greater than the difference in choice scores 
between the frames. This indicated that making more than one comparison of rates 
increased the propensity to make a choice that was 100% optimal compared to a choice 
which was more effective only to some extent. In condition 3, the lack of difference in 
proportions of correct choices between frames indicated that both frames were equally 
effective, thus choice optimality was less dependent on making multiple alternations 
between screen rate frames.    
Analysis of Rate Frame and Repayment Data Usages  
Analysis of the information participants provided at the end of the trials indicated 
that there was no difference between their use of “total repayment cost” or “monthly 
cost” when making loan choices in the optimistic framing condition 2, t(57) = 0.52, 
p=.60, or in the realistic framing condition 3, t(55) = 0.79, p=.43. Moreover, the use of 
“both current and future rates” was significantly greater compared to use of “current 
rates only” in condition 2, t(57) = 10.30, p<.001 and 3, t(55) = 13.70, p<.001, and use of 
“future rates only” in condition 2, t(57) = 6.55, p<.001 and 3, t(55) = 9.89, p<.001. 
 These results indicated that the majority of participants in both conditions 
viewed the loan information in both the current and future frame before making a 
choice. Combined with the above results, this supports the view that the most effective 
choices per condition were made when participants made two or more comparisons of 
the data before making a selection. I.e., after clicking to view the alternative frame to 
the default view in each condition, they then clicked back to the default frame before 
making a decision.  
This process of comparison between data frames might have occurred multiple 
times (the data relating to the number of screen transitions was not collected). However, 
consistent with the responses to the final questions, it seems likely that an increase in 
the number of screen transitions (i.e., multiple data comparisons) was associated with 
increased choice effectiveness. If it were the case that the higher proportion of correct 
choices in the default frames resulted from participants making a choice based on 
viewing the data in that frame only without clicking to view the alternative frame, we 
would expect to have found higher proportions of “current rates only” and “future rates 
only” responses compared to “both current and future rates” when prompted to indicate 
which data frames people used to form their decisions.  
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5.2.3   Discussion 
As expected, mortgage rates framed in concrete currency costs presented in 
current versus future rates over the full term significantly increased choice effectiveness 
compared to mortgage data presented in a standard industry price comparison format. 
The framing manipulations in both the optimistic framing condition 2 and the realistic 
framing condition 3 yielded a higher proportion of correct choices and higher choice 
scores compared to the standard industry disclosure which involved the information 
presented in APR and rate format.   
Overall, choice scores were highest in condition 3 and a larger proportion of fully 
optimal choices were yielded compared to condition 2. This result supports the 
predicted effectiveness of condition 3 based on the simultaneous presentation of the rate 
alternatives combined with the future rate frame default view. In both conditions, a 
higher proportion of choices were made in the non-default frames which suggests that 
the data formats encouraged participants to view the alternative frames once or multiple 
times before making a choice. In condition 3, there was no difference between the 
current and future rate frame in either choice scores or the proportions of correct 
choices, whereas in condition 2, choice scores and proportions of correct choices were 
greater in the default (current rate) frame.  
Whilst the number of transitions participants made between screens was not 
recorded, the results suggest that, rather than simply selecting the first (lowest) total cost 
viewed when clicking to see the future rates (in the non-default view) in condition 2, the 
best choices were made by people when they returned to the current rate frame (the 
default view) before making a selection. Although it is likely that the best decisions 
were based on multiple current versus future rate comparisons, it is clear that returning 
to the default frame was important to choice effectiveness in the optimistic framing 
condition 2. It is likely that the sequential presentation of the rate alternatives (i.e., the 
separate screen views) is what underpinned the increase in rate frame comparisons, 
leading to higher rate of optimal decisions being made in the default view.  
The sequential presentation of the data frames in condition 2 meant that less 
information was provided per screen which potentially simplified the process of data 
synthesis. However, it also required successive alternations between screens to perform 
the comparative analysis of the choice alternatives. When using the toggles to rank 
loans by different attributes and in different frames, it may have been more difficult to 
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identify how the costs changed in relation to the rate frames in the sequential display in 
condition 2 compared to in condition 3 where the cost and rate changes were viewed 
simultaneously. Thus, despite less data being shown per frame in condition 2, the effort 
necessary to place the data in context and effectively evaluate the alternatives (i.e., the 
necessity to switch screens multiple times) is likely to have increased task demands, 
leading to increased attentional load and resulting in a reduction in judgment 
performance.  
The increased effectiveness of condition 3 indicated that the ability to view and 
compare the rate alternatives side-by-side (i.e., in the simultaneous presentation format) 
was likely to have facilitated evaluative judgment to a greater extent than in condition 2 
where the alternatives could only be compared by clicking to access the current and 
future rates on separate screens. It is also possible that the future rate default set in 
condition 3 was effective in anchoring participants on the best choice prior to them 
making any comparisons between rates and product types. In this respect, the default 
would have acted to enhance the facilitative effect of displaying the rates and product 
information simultaneous. Within the context of the less effective (current rate) options, 
presenting people with the highest ranking (most optimal selections) first is likely to 
have effectively communicated how the costs for fixed versus variable rate product 
types altered and re-ordered within each rate frame and how this impacted the rank 
order of product effectiveness. Disclosing the re-ordering of the loans based on rate 
differences side-by-side is thus likely to have facilitated comprehension of how and 
why different product types significantly altered in their level of optimality when 
considered over the full loan term.  
In addition to the use of defaults to create anchors, simultaneous data 
presentations and disclosing percentages and rates in absolute terms, there is also 
evident to suggest that disclaimers can be effective in improving peoples’ choice of 
investment options in percentage formats by increasing peoples’ sensitivity to fees 
(Newall, 2016b). This suggests that a disclaimer could also be effective in improving 
mortgage product choices when the data is presented in standard industry APR and rate 
formats. In particular, disclosure manipulations are shown to be more effective in aiding 
consumer financial judgment when they are delivered in short, simplified formats (e.g., 
Bhargava & Manoli, 2013), and are aimed specifically at encouraging people to 
compare different options and individual attributes (e.g., Salisbury, 2011).  
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From this perspective, it is possible that simply heightening peoples’ awareness of 
rate variability using a disclaimer may be sufficient to improve judgment performance 
by motivating greater cognitive effort and attentional resources. Increasing peoples’ 
sensitivity to financial risk may therefore activate more complex judgment processing 
involving a higher cognitive load and the application of attentional resources which 
could leading to more comprehensive and effective comparative analysis of individual 
cues and attributes. One possible explanation for the results shown in the standard 
industry format condition therefore, is that when presented with complex data in 
percentage formats, people tend to default to frugal judgment strategies which minimize 
cognitive effort and resources to yield quick decisions. These strategies thus result in 
format biases, additive processing techniques and the tendency to assume linear relation 
which can result in poor judgments and choices. However, when provided with a 
stimulus to evoke increased effort and attentional resources, such as being explicitly 
warned about the implications of future rate increases, peoples’ judgment may improve 
in complex environments, even where information is framed in percentages.    
It may be the case therefore, that format biases and the tendency to arithmetically 
compute values are not the primary factor underpinning poor financial judgment in all 
contexts. For example, people may possess sufficient attentional capacities and may be 
capable of accurately processing and comparing percentage data in complex 
environments if there is a strong motivating factor for increasing the cognitive effort 
and time people invest in the judgment process. It is therefore necessary to test whether 
prompting people to consider future rate costs using a short, informational disclaimer 
can be effective in increasing judgment performance when data is disclosed in both 
absolute currency costs (i.e., using the same data framing manipulations tested in the 
current experiment) and in standard industry formats. This would provide evidence for 
whether format biases and inherent limitations in attentional capacities underpin poor 
performance, or whether it may be possible in some contexts to improve judgment 
effectiveness based on increasing attention and cognitive effort, despite percentage and 
rate information.  
For example, if it is the case that judgment performance is not characterized 
entirely by format biases, we may see an increase in judgment performance in the 
standard industry format condition with the addition of a disclaimer which warns people 
to carefully consider their choices based on the financial implications of future rate 
increases. Thus, despite percentage and rate formats, drawing peoples’ attention to the 
  
132 
risks associated with low rate choices may be successful in motivating them to apply 
more cognitive effort and manage a greater attentional load leading to a more optimal 
decision than in the absence of a motivational prompt. People may therefore be capable 
of undertaking a higher cognitive load, but are predisposed to engage in low effort 
cognitive processes to increase judgment speed and efficiency in complex environments 
where there are multiple attributes and it is difficult to weight the importance of 
individual cues in the judgment task.  
Before discussing other factors which may shape peoples’ financial choice and 
behaviour, it is important to identify potential limitations in design which could have 
impacted results. The purpose of the experiment was to examine the impact of different 
informational manipulations on peoples’ propensity to make economically rational 
financial choices (i.e., those which act to maximize utility over the long-term), based on 
the particular data and scenario presented. From this perspective, it is probable that 
people would have processed the data in accordance with the aim of minimizing total 
repayment costs. However, with respect to real-world interest rate variability, peoples’ 
decisions may have been influenced by the knowledge that (although predicted to rise) 
the base rate has historically remained low and predictions for increases have not 
actualized to date. It is therefore possible that people will base financial decisions on the 
belief that interest rates are unlikely to rise, or to an extent great enough to create 
negative financial impacts. Although this perspective does reflect an optimism bias, it 
may represent an adaptive response to historical trends in interest rates.  
Similarly, people may have processed the information in accordance with the 
knowledge that it is possible to switch between mortgages following initial fixed rate 
periods. This could enable the extension of a lower borrowing rate and would thus lead 
people to opt for the lowest cost option in current rates (which would represent the least 
effective choice in the experiment) in the belief that they could change products or 
providers once the low rate period ceased. This strategy may therefore be perceived as a 
‘rational’ strategy for some individuals in a real-world setting. However, it is still the 
case that many borrowers do still take out long-term mortgages and are subject to the 
rate increases following the fixed rate periods.  
As emphasized above, the aim of the experiment was to elicit the effects of data 
manipulations on the economic rationality of choices (i.e., those which act to maximize 
utility over the long-term), based on the hypothetical base rate increases applied to the 
lenders rates following the fixed periods. Although there was the potential to yield 
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ineffective choices in the context of the experiment which may be otherwise be 
considered ‘rational’ in the context of individual circumstances, knowledge and beliefs 
etc., it was not possible within the confines of the experiment to capture the impact of 
individual knowledge etc. Future work focusing on these variables would thus provide 
useful insights into how such factors influence financial behaviour and how financial 
‘rationality’ may be determined and defined from an individual perspective within a 
given context or real-life setting.   
Other factors which could impact financial choice performance are individual 
differences in abilities such as financial literacy and numeracy which could interact with 
the framing manipulations tested in experiment 3a in particular ways. Findings show for 
example, that downside financial risk judgments positively correlate with financial 
literacy and numeracy (Newall, 2016a). Numeracy and risk literacy are found to relate 
to poor statistical inference and incomprehension of probability formats in tasks 
assessing peoples’ judgments of medical risk (e.g., Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal & 
Garcia-Retamero, 2012). High and low numeracy is also associated with over and 
underestimates of loan repayment amounts (Soll, Keeney & Larrick, 2013) and people 
higher in financial literacy are shown to be more likely to select less optimal, high fee 
mutual funds (Newall, 2016a). It is apparent therefore that the findings relating to the 
effects of financial literacy and numeracy are somewhat mixed. Some evidence suggests 
that increasing financial literacy is not effective in improving financial behaviour as it is 
likely that factors such as numeracy mediate the relation between literacy and behaviour 
(Fernandes, Lynch & Netemeyer, 2014). In light of these findings, it is thus important to 
include these individual difference measures when examining the possible mechanisms 
involved in how the framing effect identified in experiment 3a is effective in promoting 
judgment performance.  
Another potentially relevant individual difference variable is temporal preference 
in the form of optimism. At extreme levels, trait optimism is associated with suboptimal 
financial judgment and behaviour, however, moderate levels are positively associated 
with more optimal financial behaviours, mediated by increases in self-control (Puri & 
Robinson, 2007). It is therefore possible that in this particular financial choice context, a 
high temporal preference (or lower ‘self-control’), exhibited as the propensity to opt for 
low current costs and thus favor the present based on delaying higher costs into the 
future, reflects a harmful optimism bias.  
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In this view, higher optimism may correlate with lower choice performance based 
not only on the tendency to opt for low current costs, but also on percentage format 
biases and the tendency to linearly extrapolate rates, leading people to underestimate 
future costs. Thus, combined with format biases leading to linear judgments, optimism 
could be a strong factor involved in suboptimal financial choice, underpinning peoples’ 
propensity to downplay the risks associated with future rate increases, and overestimate 
their ability to meet increased financial demands in the future. It is therefore a 
possibility that an interaction between the framing effect in experiment 3a and optimism 
exists. For example, if a significant relation between optimism and choice performance 
exists in the realistic framing condition 3 whilst the framing effect remains robust (i.e., 
choice performance remains high in condition 3 compared to the control), this may 
suggest that the framing manipulation is effective in counteracting harmful optimistic 
tendencies. 
To test possible interactions between the framing manipulations and individual 
difference factors, and whether choice performance is related to inherent format biases 
(as opposed to attention and cognitive effort) in this particular context, experiment 3b is 
conducted as a replication study to test the robustness of the framing effect identified in 
experiment 3a. Alongside measures of financial literacy, numeracy and trait optimism, 
experiment 3b involves the repetition of conditions 1, 2 and 3 with the addition of a 
disclaimer akin to a real-world disclaimer. The financial services industry provides 
disclaimers on product websites to warn consumers of potential financial risks, 
presumable with the purpose of guiding people towards more optimal choices. The 
manipulation in experiment 3b is designed to replicate such disclaimers, warning about 
the effects of future rate variability and to carefully consider choice alternatives.  
As described above, the mechanisms by which the disclaimer may promote more 
optimal choice could be based on evoking more effective comparative analysis of the 
individual product rates for the fixed versus variable rate alternatives. If sufficiently 
motivated to expend more cognitive effort and attentional resources, people may be 
capable of synthesizing data effectively, even in percentage and rate formats. From this 
perspective, percentage format biases and the inability to extrapolate compound interest 
rates might not underpin poor financial judgment in all contexts, or to the extent that the 
results of experiment 3a indicate. (I.e., it is possible that effort as opposed to format 
biases underpin poor choice in some domains). Adding the disclaimer to all three 
conditions in experiment 3b examines this possibility by enabling the assessment of 
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changes in choice effectiveness in the control (standard industry format) compared to 
the optimistic framing condition 2 and the realistic framing condition 3. Improvements 
in decision making in the control would thus indicate that increasing the propensity to 
evaluate choice alternatives by simply reminding people of the risk associated with 
overly optimistic choices (i.e., those based on the lowest rate options in the present), 
could be enough to improve financial decision making in online price comparison 
environments.  
5.3   Experiment 3b Behavioural Disclaimer Vs Interest Rate 
Framing Effects on Financial Choice  
Experiment 3b is conducted as a replication study to test the robustness of the 
framing effect identified in experiment 3a in the context of a disclaimer and measures of 
relevant individual difference factors. Although experiment 3a showed that the framing 
manipulation was effective in improving peoples’ financial judgment compared to 
information disclosed in standard industry APR and rate formats, it was unclear what 
the mechanisms were that underpinned the effectiveness of the framing manipulation. 
The premise for reframing rate data in concrete (currency) values and displaying them 
in current versus future rate alternatives was based on the body of evidence relating to 
percentage formats biases and the strength of the linear judgment heuristic shown to be 
particularly prevalent throughout financial judgment and choice domains.  
This rationale assumes that limited attentional capacity coupled with the tendency 
to additively process percentages, apply linear functions and possess and an implicit and 
explicit optimistic bias, are what lead people to form ineffective judgments in financial 
contexts. It is important however, to determine that these biases and processing 
strategies are accurately describing peoples’ cognitive characteristics and that 
manipulations designed to mitigate these tendencies are thus promoting human 
rationality via the most relevant and effective mechanisms. It is possible for example, 
that other judgment strategies, or decision making motives and drivers may be involved 
in complex financial judgment contexts which were not explored in experiment 3a. To 
address these shortcomings, experiment 3b investigates the potential that people may in 
fact possess the necessary computational and attentional capacities to form effective 
judgments in complex numerical data settings, if provided with a stimuli sufficient to 
motivate increased cognitive effort and activation of more comprehensive processing 
strategies.  
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From this perspective, it is possible that the nature of informational framings and 
communications are important to judgment performance by providing the motivational 
factors necessary to evoke activation of more complex and resource heavy cognitive 
processing. In this respect, suboptimal judgments which are shown to stem from fast 
frugal heuristic strategies (e.g., the tendency to assume linear relations) may be 
associated with limitations in effort based on low motivation as opposed to strict 
cognitive limitations and computational problems related to numerical formats. 
Furthering our understanding of the cognitive biases in numerical judgment is thus 
necessary to determine the mechanisms underpinning human rationality in different 
groups and settings where different motivational and behavioural factors are involved.    
To examine this possibility, experiment 3b repeats the trials from experiment 3a 
with the addition of a disclaimer designed to increase the attention and effort people 
apply to the selection task by warning them about the risk of future rate variability and 
the significant impact that rate increases will have on their repayments. If peoples’ 
judgment effectiveness increases in the standard industry format condition (involving 
data framed in percentages and rates) when presented with the disclaimer, this would 
provide evidence that peoples’ judgmental abilities may not limited entirely in the way 
that findings suggest, i.e., shaped by format biases, over-optimism and restricted 
attentional capacities.  
One possibility for example, is that people apply default processing strategies in 
everyday choice situations which are perceived as having non-critical outcomes. Such 
default strategies are likely to be based on cognitively frugal heuristics involving 
arithmetic processing and the application of linear functions as an efficient means of 
yielding fast, ‘satisfactory’ judgments. However, behavioural or social comparison 
prompts (e.g., Newall, 2016b) could be effective in improving judgment performance in 
contexts involving percentage and rate information. When rationale for deeper level 
processing is provided (e.g., by heightening peoples’ sensitivity to financial risk), the 
motivation to avoid losses may stimulate engagement in more detailed comparative 
analysis of the available data, requiring greater activation of attentional resources in an 
effort to increase choice optimality. 
If, on the other hand, no difference in choice performance is identified with the 
presence of the disclaimer in the standard industry format condition, this would support 
the rationale for the framing manipulation, indicating that format biases and limited 
computational and attentional capacities are likely to be the key factors underpinning 
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poor performance in financial choice. The aim is therefore to examine whether choice 
performance remains constant between experiment 3a and 3b, thus indicating whether 
judgment effectiveness is related specifically to the framing effect and thus percentage 
format biases. Finding no difference in choice effectiveness between experiment 3a and 
3b would demonstrate the robustness of the framing effect in targeting and mitigating 
biases which impact human probabilistic inference in complex numerical data fields.    
The standard industry disclaimer, “Your home may be repossessed if you do not 
keep up repayments on your mortgage” found on all mortgage lender websites is 
presumably designed to draw borrowers attention to the importance of being able to 
meet monthly repayment costs. The ability to meet future costs is dependent however, 
on effectively controlling for risk by forming rational financial judgments and choices 
in the present which account for future eventualities. Findings suggest however, that 
such disclaimers are no more effective in improving financial judgment than excluding 
disclaimer information altogether.  
In the cases where behavioural disclaimers have proven effective, psychologically 
informed disclosures conveyed in short, simplified informational formats are shown to 
facilitate improved judgment and behaviour (Loewenstein, Cass, Sunstein & Golman, 
2014). Based on this effect, the following disclaimer information was added to each 
condition in experiment 3b with the aim of increasing choice effectiveness through 
promoting the propensity to consider the potential impact of future rate hikes: 
“When choosing a mortgage, bear in mind that rates can rise considerably, fall, or 
remain the same as today. Fluctuations can significantly affect your repayments”. 
Comparing the effect of the disclaimer on choice performance in each condition 
with the results of experiment 3a tests the robustness of the framing effect by examining 
whether it is necessary for performance enhancement, or if choice effectiveness can be 
increased behaviourally using a disclaimer to increase consideration of the risk 
associated with low rate choices. This is of specific interest in the control condition 
where the data is disclosed in percentage and rate formats. Encouraging more detailed 
comparative analysis of rates and product types in standard formats could mitigate the 
optimistic tendency to heuristically select loans based on the lowest current rate, 
disregarding rate variability over the long term and the costs differences between 
product types.   
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Like the framing effect identified in experiment 3a, it is likely that any positive 
effect of the disclaimer on judgment performance will be associated with minimizing 
optimistic biases in peoples’ financial choice. For example, the framing manipulation in 
experiment 3a was designed to impact percentage format biases and the inability to 
extrapolate compound interest rates which leads people to make optimistic (suboptimal) 
financial choices based underestimation of future repayment costs. The tendency to 
linearly project rates, therefore indicates an insensitivity to rate variability and the 
financial consequences of future rate rises. Although the mechanism used by the 
disclaimer to impact choice performance differs to the framing effect, it is still designed 
to improve choice by decreasing optimism based on drawing attention to the potential 
for high future costs, specifically for product options which have the lowest costs in 
current rates.  
Experiment 3b therefore addresses the research question of whether the disclaimer 
manipulation can also be effective in improving financial choice via mitigating 
optimistic biases which lead people to downplay the risk of future rate variability and 
overestimate their capability to make higher repayments in the future. If the disclaimer 
is found to be effective in increasing choice performance in the control condition for 
example, this would suggest that poor financial judgment may be related more to 
optimistic biases in judgments of rate variability, rather than to format biases and the 
tendency to linearly extrapolate rates. The alternative view therefore, (based on the 
results from experiment 3a), is that optimism in this particular context is associated with 
percentage format biases which are successfully mitigated by the framing effect, shown 
to be robust when compared to the effects of the disclaimer.  
Based on the saliency of percentage format biases and the strength of the tendency 
to linearly extrapolate non-linear trends identified in chapters 3 and 4, it is predicted that 
the results from experiment 3a will hold. Specifically, there is expected to be no 
difference in choice effectiveness in the standard industry format condition in 
experiment 3b with the addition of the disclaimer compared to experiment 3a, and 
choice performance is predicted to remain the least effective in the standard industry 
format and the most effective in the realistic framing condition 3 with the addition of 
the disclaimer.  
With respect to individual difference factors, it is expected that there will be a 
significant association between trait optimism and choice performance, with higher 
optimism relating to lower performance in accordance with Puri and Robinson’s (2007) 
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findings relating to the effects of optimism on financial habits and choice. Optimism is 
also predicted to interact with frame preference in the framing manipulation conditions. 
This prediction is derived from the view that higher self-control instantiates a 
preference for higher future rewards (or a lower temporal preference) which is 
associated with more prudent financial choices and behaviours leading to increases in 
financial utility. In this sense, lower optimism may be associated with a tendency to 
delay gratification and forgo short-term rewards in the form of lower loan costs in the 
present and opt for higher cost choices based on future rates which represent the most 
effective options in the long term.  
To assess trait optimism in experiment 3b, the Life Orientation Test - Revised 
(LOT-R) (Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994) is used as a means of differentiating 
between an optimistic bias which can vary from one setting to the next (Weinstein, 
1980) and dispositional optimism which characterizes an individual’s general 
propensity to assume positive outcomes. When applied to financial risk judgment, 
optimism is viewed as an indicator of temporal preference, indicative of the propensity 
to assume positive future outcomes and discount future costs based on individual 
differences in self-control (Puri & Robinson, 2007). Temporal preference in financial 
decision making has also been examined using measures such as the CFC 
(Consideration of Future Consequences; Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger & Edwards, 
1994) designed to assess predisposition toward consideration of future consequences. 
However, the CFC scale has not been shown to significantly correlate with financial 
behaviours in studies assessing credit repayment decisions (e.g., Navarro-martinez et 
al., 2011; Salisbury, 2014). In accordance with Puri and Robinson (2007), the LOT-R 
was therefore applied in experiment 3b to address the question of whether higher levels 
of optimism relate to lower choice performance and how optimism may interact with 
the disclaimer and framing manipulations.  
To consolidate the rationale for experiment 3b, it is useful to recap the findings 
thus far. The previous chapters have shown that the linear prediction bias underpins 
poor financial decision making (e.g., misjudgement of borrowing costs) based on 
underestimating (i.e., arithmetically processing) non-linear compound interest rates 
(Stango & Zinman, 2009). The human propensity to apply fast, efficient heuristic 
strategies when forming numerical decisions results in the simultaneous (additive) 
mental processing of percentage and rate information. This generates the bias to treat all 
numerical data as absolute values and to assume linear relations in the world around us 
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which can lead to probabilistic judgments based on linearly projecting trends. In the 
case of compound interest rates and other behavioural outcomes which follow non-
linear functions (e.g., smoking cessation or exercise behaviour), the propensity to form 
linear judgments and predictions is therefore likely to limit rationality, creating a 
negative impact on choices and behaviours based on people making erroneous 
underestimations of future costs and rewards.   
In the case of financial judgement, this tendency to process additively and assume 
linearity is expressed as a bias to make optimistic choices which underestimate interest 
costs and do not effectively account for the risk associated with future rate rises and 
variable rate loan product choices. It is therefore important to assess optimistic 
tendencies in this context because it will indicate whether the biases in financial 
judgment are associated with explicit, general optimistic biases, or whether erroneous 
financial judgments are implicitly optimistic, i.e., stemming from numerical format 
processing errors as opposed to formal trait optimistic biases. Whether optimism effects 
judgment directly as a behavioural propensity, or whether it impacts choice 
performance indirectly via percentage format biases, the influence on financial 
behaviour is likely to be negative. Thus, in both cases, the framing of rates in concrete 
values, disclosed in current versus future alternatives is likely to remain a robust 
corrective measure, benefitting judgement rationality.   
In sum, experiment 3b is conducted to evaluate the replicability of the framing 
effect identified in experiment 3b to assess the judgmental mechanisms underpinning 
performance in financial choice domains. By adding a stimulus in the form of a 
disclaimer to motivate cognitive effort and increase attentional resources, experiment 3b 
assesses whether limitations in performance where percentages and rates are concerned 
are associated directly with format biases, or whether people do possess the necessary 
computational abilities to formulate effective judgments where rates are concerned, if 
sufficiently motivated. It is expected that the framing effect will remain robust based on 
no difference in choice performance with the disclaimer, thus supporting the rationale 
for format biases, judgment linearity and the inability to synthesize multiple cues as the 
key mechanisms underpinning poor performance in complex financial choice contexts. 
  
141 
5.3.1   Method  
Participants and Design 
One-hundred and eighty-three participants aged over 18 years were recruited 
again via Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid $2.00. All participants were unique in 
each experiment, no respondent from experiment 3a repeated the trials in experiment 
3b. The average age was 36.05 years (SD = 10.36, range = 2 to 62 years), 46.4% were 
female and 34% were educated to a minimum level of a Bachelor’s degree. The same 
randomized controlled trial design was employed as in experiment 3a, with participants 
randomly assigned to either the standard disclosure condition (control), 
interactive/optimistic framing (condition 2), or interactive/realistic framing (condition 
3) and trials were randomized per participant in each condition.  
Materials and Procedure 
After providing demographic information for age, gender and education, 
participants were then directed to the eight mortgage choice trials. In each trial in all 
three conditions, the instructions remained the same as they were in experiment 3a, 
except with the addition of the following behavioural disclaimer manipulation to 
encourage closer consideration of rate changes over time. As shown in figure 5.15, the 
following disclaimer information was shown in red, bolded 12- point font and 
positioned onscreen just below the trial instruction and just above the mortgage 
calculator tool in every trial:  
“When choosing mortgages, bear in mind that rates can rise considerably, fall or 
remain the same as today. These fluctuations can significantly affect your future 
repayments.” 
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Figure 5.9 The Behavioural Disclaimer Manipulation in Exp 3b 
An example of the disclaimer manipulation, demonstrated in condition 2. The 
same disclaimer information was applied to all three conditions, and the positioning 
onscreen remained constant and visible for the full duration of each trial. There was no 
time restriction applied to responses so participnats were free to analyse the loan data 
points in as much depth as desired by toggling individual attributues and comparing 
current and future rate frames in conditions 2 and 3.   
Following completion of all eight trials, participants were then directed to the 
individual difference measures. Firstly, they answered the 10-item Life Orientation Test 
- Revised (LOT-R) (Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994) which is a robust and valid 
psychometric indictor of optimism, used extensively throughout psychology literature1 
(e.g., Puri & Robinson, 2007). This was followed by a 13-part financial literacy scale 
(Fernandes, Lynch, & Netemeyer, 2014) and the multiple-choice format of the Berlin 
numeracy test (Cokely,Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal & Garcia-Retamero, 2012), each of 
which have robust psychometric features. The final experiment questions relating to use 
of repayment and rate information were then answered using the drop-down menus as 
displayed previously in experiment 3a. Participants were then provided with the 
reimbursement information.    
 
1 For a list of references to articles in which the LOT-R has been used, see 
http://www.psy.miami.edu/faculty/ccarver/sclLOT-R.html 
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5.3.2   Results 
Analysis of Choice Effectiveness Per Condition 
Choice scores and the proportions of correct choices made per condition with the 
addition of the disclaimer were almost identical to those found in experiment 3a with 
the framing manipulations only (see figure 5.11). Table 5.2 displays the differences in 
the mean choice scores, proportions of correct choices, and choice frames between the 
experiment 3a (non-disclaimer) trials and those with the addition of the disclaimer 
(experiment 3b). 
 
Figure 5.10 Choice Scores and Correct Choices Per Condition in Exp 3b 
Mean choice scores and proportions of correct choices per condition with the 
addition of the disclaimer manipulation (experiment 3b) with standard error bars. As 
shown in table 5.4, these values did not significantly differ to the results in experiment 
3a, indicating that the disclaimer had no additive impact on judgmental performance in 
any condition. The ineffectiveness of the disclaimer in the control condition thus 
indicates that the higher performance in condition 2 and 3 is associated with the framing 
manipulations and not simply encouraging people to more carefully consider their 
decision based on future rate variability.  
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Experiment 3a and 3b Comparison of Choice Performance  
Table 5.2 Mean Choice Scores and Correct Choices in Exp 3a Vs Exp 3b 
Mean differences in choice scores and proportions of correct choices made per 
condition with the addition of the disclaimer manipulation (experiment 3b) and without 
the disclaimer (experiment 3a). 
 
 Framing manipulation only (exp 3a) 
Framing manipulation with 
disclaimer added (exp 3b) 
Choice score 
Cond 1   0.61 
Cond 2   0.79 
Cond 3   0.83 
Cond 1   0.61 
Cond 2   0.78 
Cond 3   0.82 
Proportion of correct choices 
Cond 1   17% 
Cond 2   52% 
Cond 3   60% 
Cond 1   16% 
Cond 2   50% 
Cond 3   58% 
Proportion of choices in 
current frame 
Cond 2   35% 
Cond 3   61% 
Cond 2   63% 
Cond 3   38% 
Proportion of choices in 
future frame 
Cond 2   65% 
Cond 3   39% 
Cond 2   37% 
Cond 3   62% 
Choice score in current frame Cond 2   0.89 Cond 3   0.83 
Cond 2   0.73 
Cond 3   0.88 
Choice score in future frame Cond 2   0.74 Cond 3   0.83 
Cond 2   0.87 
Cond 3   0.78 
Proportion of correct choices 
in current frame 
Cond 2   73% 
Cond 3   58% 
Cond 2   40% 
Cond 3   65% 
Proportion of correct choices 
in future frame 
Cond 2   41% 
Cond 3   62% 
Cond 2   66% 
Cond 3   53% 
 
The results displayed in table 5.2 show a reversal in the pattern of responses found 
in experiment 3a for the proportion of choices made per frame. In experiment 3a, a 
higher proportion of choices were made in the non-default frame in both the optimistic 
framing condition 2 and the realistic framing condition 3. With the addition of the 
disclaimer manipulation however, a significantly higher proportion of choices were 
made in the current (default) frame in condition 2 compared to with the framing 
manipulation only (M=0.63 vs M=0.35), t(892.19) = 8.83, p<.001 and in the future 
(default) frame in condition 3 (M=0.62 vs M=0.39), t(830.87) = 6.80, p<.001. 
The distribution of choice scores and proportions of correct choices also altered 
by frame with the disclaimer information. While the overall means across frames per 
condition were almost identical between experiments, choice scores in condition 2 were 
significantly higher with the disclaimer in the future frame compared to without the 
disclaimer (M=0.87 vs M=0.74), t(400.8) = 6.15, p<.001 and lower in the current frame 
  
145 
(M=0.73) compared to without (M=0.89), t(395.57) = -7.17, p<.001. The same pattern 
was observed in condition 3 with significantly higher choice scores in the current frame 
with the disclaimer (M=0.88 vs M=0.83), t(344.43) = 2.31, p<.001, however, the choice 
scores in the future frame were not significantly lower than those with the framing 
manipulation only (M=0.78 vs M=0.83), t(380.65) = -1.83, p=.07. Previously, no 
difference was found between choice scores per frame in condition 3, however, the 
disclaimer yielded a significant increase in choice scores in the current frame compared 
to the future frame in condition 3 (M=0.88 vs M=78), t(385.27) = 4.01, p<.001  
Congruent with the results of experiment 3a, experiment 3b also yielded an 
overall higher proportion of correct choices in the realistic framing condition 3 
compared to the optimistic framing condition 2 (M=0.58 vs M=0.50), t(832.09) = 2.31, 
p<.05. Moreover, the proportions of correct choices per frame reflected the pattern 
shown with the choice scores, with significantly larger proportions in the non-default 
compared to the default frame in condition 2 (M=0.66 vs M=0.40), t(343.51) = 5.62, 
p<.001 and in condition 3 (M=0.65 vs M=0.53), t(332.57) = 2.33, p<.05. Again, this 
was the reverse to what was found in experiment 3a without the disclaimer 
manipulation. In condition 2 and 3, 80% and 84% of participants reported using both 
current and future rates to make their choices indicating that choices were made by 
making one or more comparisons between rate frames in both conditions (as opposed to 
using current or future rate information). This suggests that choice performance was 
influenced by the comparisons being made between the different rate frames (i.e., the 
degree of comparative evaluation of choice alternatives undertaken) and not simply 
selections based on the default frame with no comparisons made. 
Analysis of Individual Differences and Choice Performance  
With regard to the measures of individual differences, the original results were 
shown to hold when these variables were factored in which supports the robustness of 
the framing effect in facilitating financial judgment across individual differences. 
Participants on average possessed moderate levels of optimism, financial literacy and 
numeracy. Table 5.3 displays the mean individual difference scores for each condition. 
A significant positive correlation between choice scores across current and future 
frames and financial literacy was found in condition 2, R2 = .11, F(1,53) = 7.66, p<.01, 
B = .043, t(53) = 2.77, p<.001. Aside from this result, no other significant relation was 
identified between the individual difference variables in any of the conditions. The 
inclusion of optimism, financial literacy, numeracy, education and gender as covariates 
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in regression models to predict choices scores and proportions of correct choices across 
and between conditions showed no significant main effects or interactions terms. 
Regressing each of the individual difference variables on choice scores and proportions 
of correct choices made in current versus future frames in the optimistic framing 
condition 2 and the realistic framing condition 3 also showed no significant impact of 
these factors on choice effectiveness. 
Table 5.3 Mean Individual Difference Scores Per Condition in Exp 3b 
Mean individual difference scores per condition. 
 
Condition Optimism Max score 24 
Financial literacy 
Max score 13 
Numeracy 
Max score 4 
1 (control) 14.05 9.59 1.69 
2 16.45 8.85 1.71 
3 15.52 8.74 1.62 
 
The variation in the individual difference scores between conditions is not 
specifically of interest because participants were randomly assigned to each condition in 
an independent groups design. However, table 5.3 is given for illustrative purposes to 
show that participants in the control condition possessed the same financial decision 
making capabilities based on financial literacy and numeracy scores as those in the 
experimental conditions and were thus able to achieve the same levels of choice 
performance. The fact that the individual difference scores across conditions are almost 
identical therefore indicates that the differences in choice effectiveness between 
conditions (see figure 5.10) were associated with the effects of the framing 
manipulations.  
In accordance with Puri and Robinson (2007), moderate optimism scores indicate 
more optimal financial judgment and behaviour based on heightened levels of self-
control and better long-term financial planning capabilities. These behavioural 
tendencies suggest a ‘future’ temporal preference where delaying gratification to 
achieve long-term rewards which maximize utility is favoured over short-term payoffs 
which minimize costs in the present but act to reduce overall utility. The mean scores in 
table 5.3 show no difference in levels of optimism between the conditions, which 
suggests that the framing manipulations were effective in increasing judgmental 
performance when trait optimism (‘temporal preference’ or self-control in this context) 
was included as a covariate in a model to predict choice performance. However, the 
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lack of significance of optimism prevents any conclusion regarding the importance of 
optimism to financial choice behaviour in this particular context. Other measures may 
be more relevance to assessing temporal preference (i.e., the tendency to focus on long-
term rewards/maximize utility versus immediate gains/delayed costs) in online financial 
decision making situations.   
5.3.3   Discussion  
As expected, the effects of the framing manipulations in the optimistic framing 
condition 2 and the realistic framing condition 3 were shown to be robust, with 
experiment 3b yielding almost identical choice scores and proportions of correct choices 
to those in experiment 3a. The effectiveness of the framing was consistent when the 
individual difference measures of financial literacy, numeracy and trait optimism were 
included as covariates in the model to predict choice performance. Although this result 
is unexpected with regard to the measure of trait optimism, the effect of the other 
individual factors is congruent with previous research which shows that financial 
decision making performance is likely to be independent of the impact of individual 
differences in numeracy and financial literacy (Fernandes et al., 2014).  
It is therefore concluded that the manipulation applied in the realistic framing 
condition 3 (i.e., current versus future rates framed simultaneously in absolute currency 
costs with a default set to future rates) is more effective in optimizing financial choice 
compared to both standard industry formats and a sequential display of rate alternatives 
with a default set to current rates.  
To summarise the details of the format manipulation in experiment 3b, a 
disclaimer was added to increase sensitivity to rate variability in an attempt to stimulate 
increased attentional resources in the process of comparing product type alternatives. As 
expected, this manipulation was shown to have no impact on overall choice 
effectiveness in either the control or the framing manipulation conditions. The lack of 
difference in choice effectiveness in the control condition indicated that even when 
provided with a stimulus to evoke more comprehensive decision making strategies, it 
was not possible to improve peoples’ judgment processes when data was presented in 
standard industry disclosures (i.e., in percentage and rate formats). These results suggest 
that the judgment irrationalities in complex numerical environments are likely to stem 
from the tendency to erroneously process and interpret percentages and non-linear 
relations between variables. 
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In this respect, the findings support the robustness of the framing effect in 
mitigating the biases impacting rationality, which in turn provides support for format 
biases as one of the primary mechanism underpinning poor judgment in complex non-
linear environments. It is possible that in some contexts and among some groups, 
people may possess the attentional capacities, or be capable of applying the 
computations necessary to produce rationale inferences based on extrapolating and 
comparing percentage information. It is also possible that particular informational 
framings and communications may be effective in eliciting better judgments by 
providing the stimuli necessary to motivate decision makers to invest the time and 
cognitive resources required for optimal choice. In this scenario for example, the 
problems associated with numerical format may be overcome if the context or potential 
consequences of the judgment are perceived as important enough to warrant the time 
and effort. Based on the current findings however, it is likely that in the majority of 
contexts and groups, peoples’ judgmental processes will be hindered by the inability to 
interpret and synthesize multiple cues when disclosed in percentage and rate formats.  
As with investigations of other measures of temporal preference in financial 
judgment, we too found no association between choice effectiveness and trait optimism 
in this particular context. Despite this, it is possible that optimism is important to 
financial choice in other situations which involve shorter term judgments and choices. It 
is possible for example, that budgeting behaviour or consumer purchase decision 
making is impacted more by optimistic biases where impulsivity or impatience play a 
stronger role, motivated by other factors such as marketing, digital and social media. 
Whether or not the disclaimer was useful in decreasing optimistic biases in peoples’ 
judgment processes by drawing attention to the financial risks associated with current 
low rate choices, the lack of change in choice performance in the control condition in 
experiment 3b clearly suggests that even when prompted to carefully evaluate choices 
based on rate differences, people are still unable to effectively perform the necessary 
numerical computations.  
Despite all the information being present for effective choice in the standard 
industry disclosure, the data format and cue complexity of the decision making domain 
created a strong barrier to judgment rationality. This finding supports the limited 
attentional capacity perspective, indicating that peoples’ cognitive capabilities are not 
geared for data synthesis in complex non-linear environments which involve comparing 
and computing rates and percentages. There were however, changes in the proportions 
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of choices made per frame in experiment 3b which suggest that the disclaimer was 
effective in increasing the propensity to evaluate the choice alternatives more 
thoroughly by repeatedly comparing rate frames.  
Depending on the task objective, promoting comparative analysis in situations 
where choice effectiveness and satisfaction is based on subjective measures could be 
beneficial. For example, choosing between houses, cars or restaurants are possible 
situations in which an effective choice is based on computing data in accordance with 
individual goals and requirements rather than objective performance parameters.  
With respect to the study limitations, the inability to track the screen alternations 
and time spent viewing each screen per participant and condition are important 
shortcomings in both experiments 3a and 3b. Replication as eye-tracking experiments 
would address this problem and provide richer data relating to the effects of the framing 
manipulations. As opposed to relying on the measure of numeracy employed, it could 
also be beneficial to devise a bespoke metric for assessing the propensity to additively 
process percentages, leading to judgments and choices based on linear projections, 
which would be more applicable to determining the impact of percentage biases and 
how they relate to ‘optimistic’ financial judgment in this particular context. Moreover, 
recruitment of participants specifically seeking mortgages would also provide richer 
data relating to the motivations and decision making processes of people evaluating 
financial product attributes in complex, real-world online settings.        
The results of experiment 3a and 3b therefore demonstrate the validity of framing 
data to influence choice behaviour using clearly defined, easily comparable concrete 
values rather than expecting people to perform more cognitively demanding 
comparative analysis of rate data. This suggests that regardless of individual 
differences, lessening the cognitive load in complex decision environments will yield 
better results compared to encouraging more cognitively involved evaluative analysis of 
individual attributes and alternatives. The ability to make quick comparisons of the 
effects of rate changes over time in concrete values (currency costs) is cognitively 
efficient and ‘intuitive’. From the perspectives of bounded rationality and adaptive 
heuristics, the conversion of numerical data into absolutes values (particularly in 
complex, multi-cue environments) is logical, because concrete values with non-
normalized base rates are congruous with cognitive methods of sampling, hence the 
effectiveness of frequency data formats in facilitating statistical reasoning.  
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In sum, the replication experiment 3b verifies the robustness of the framing effect 
identified in experiment 3a by showing that with the addition of the disclaimer and 
inclusion of individual difference factors as covariates, the effects of the original 
framing manipulation on choice performance remained constant. The results thus 
indicate the potential for numerical data frames which facilitate human decision making 
based on minimizing the biases associated with percentage and rate formats. An 
approached focused on delivering numerical values in concrete, absolute terms 
presented within a contextual framework of minimal data points involving the use of 
default values to create anchoring effects is likely to improve judgment rationality to a 
greater extent than focusing on behavioural manipulations aimed at motivating people 
to engage in more complex cognitive processing strategies. The results therefore 
suggest that the affective and behavioural factors motivating people in real-world 
numerical choice contexts may be less important to judgmental performance than 
peoples’ interpretation of the numerical values within the data environment itself. I.e., 
the semantics of the situation and how the data assimilates within the wider context may 
be outweighed by the focus on the data in a minimal capacity, assessing a limited 
number of points in relation to one another rather than synthesizing the data with other 
cues and knowledge to construct meaning and deduce the wider implications.  
It is likely that in most cases, the tendency to use numerical information in this 
way to form probabilistic judgments stems from limited attentional capacities and biases 
in the computation of percentage points and extrapolation of and non-linear trends, as 
opposed to a lack of motivation to apply greater cognitive effort and resources. In this 
sense, peoples’ judgmental strategies reflect their processing and computational 
constraints which cannot be overcome, even when the judgement context is made more 
salient to motivate greater effort in achieving optimal choice. Although the judgment 
context may be particularly important or meaningful, and the perceived choice 
consequences are great, the findings suggest that applying behavioural manipulations to 
motivate people to make better choices (e.g., by evoking loss aversion in a financial 
setting) cannot offset the biases generated by the underlying cognitive mechanisms 
which shape peoples’ interpretation of numerical information, and consequently the 
rationality of human judgment. These results are contrary to previous studies which 
have shown behaviourally informed disclaimers designed to increase sensitivity to 
mutual funds investment fees by utilizing social comparison are effective in improving 
choice when information is disclosed to investors in percentage formats (Newall, 
2016b).  
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Although the robustness of the framing manipulation across experiments 3a and 
3b establishes the importance of delivering data in concrete (absolute) terms using 
minimal cues, is it not clear whether effectiveness was related specifically to the 
framing of rates in absolute terms or to the use of the future rate default in the realistic 
framing condition 3 which acted to anchor people on the most optimal choice prior to 
assessing the rate frame alternatives. Further examination is therefore necessary to 
distinguish the effects of simultaneously displaying rate alternatives in absolute values 
to encourage comparative analytic processes from the effects of using a default setting 
to influence judgment by anchoring people on a specific value within a contextual 
framework constructed within the data environment. 
To address this question, chapter 6 extends the investigation of the framing effect 
in experiments 3a and 3b by testing the components of the effect in two individual data 
disclosures. Experiment 4 explores the impact of a default manipulation separately from 
the effect of a default with the addition of future rate context data on monthly loan 
repayment judgments. In conditions 1 and 2, a minimum suggested repayment amount 
for the full loan term in current rates is disclosed with a default repayment figure in the 
form of a higher monthly repayment option for the loan at a 50% term reduction. In the 
second condition, the same default is presented, except that repayment information for 
future rates are presented simultaneously with the current rate information. The addition 
of the future rates context data thus acts to increase the value of the default and widen 
the range between the minimum (full term) and the default repayment figures. The aim 
is to identify whether the saliency of the added context data combined with the 
increased range between the repayment figures in condition 2 is more effective in 
heightening peoples’ monthly repayment choices above the minimum compared to 
when viewing the default in the absence of future rate context data. 
  
  
152 
Chapter 6 
Framing Interest Rates and Loan Term 
Information to Influence Repayment Behaviour  
In this chapter, the effectiveness of a default setting is explored in relation to the 
framing effect which was established in chapter 5 as robust in improving financial 
judgment based on mitigating percentage data format biases. Experiment 4 tests 
the additive effects of the framing manipulation in conjunction with an anchoring 
effect created by providing a higher repayment option in relation to a minimum 
suggested amount. The default is generated by disclosing the costs to repay a loan 
over a 20-year vs. a 10-year term. By creating an upper bound in the context of 
the minimum amount over the 20-year term, the default was shown to increase the 
inclination to make a monthly loan repayment significantly greater than the 
minimum suggested amount. This effect was amplified when costs were disclosed 
simultaneously in current vs. future rate frames based on a larger absolute 
difference between the upper and lower bound generated by the data for future 
rates.  
Akin to the findings from the retail setting, people were shown to combine the 
data points additively, forming a judgment based on the arithmetic mean of the 
highest and lowest observed values per condition. Repayment judgments were 
slightly greater than the mean of the upper and lower bound in the combination 
condition, indicating an anchoring effect based on the size of the absolute 
difference between the minimum and maximum options. Findings indicate that 
judgments are formed by additively combining higher and lower values in 
multiple cue environments, and that the larger the upper bound in relation to the 
lower bound, the greater the tendency to anchor on the higher figure, thus 
creating a lesser adjustment towards to mean.      
6.1   Background and Rationale 
In terms of the findings across all chapters thus far, experiment 1, chapter 3 has 
shown that when predicting product sales based on individual numeric values, retail 
forecasters employed only two data points to form probabilistic judgments. The 
judgment strategy involved treating all numbers as absolute values and applying 
arithmetic operations to yield the absolute difference between the last two data points 
per trial. They then added or subtracted the absolute difference from the last observation 
to predict sales for the fourth week. This method acted to yield judgments which 
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linearly project the trends, even though some data were percentages, displayed with ‘%’ 
signs, and trended exponentially rather than linearly.  
The same strong tendency to form predictions by linearly extending trends was 
shown again among humanitarian aid workers in experiment 2, chapter 4. When 
presented with data in time series formats, the tendency to seek and apply linear 
functions increased in noise and correlated with performance decline. Noisier data (i.e., 
increases in the number of cues) was shown to impact judgments by promoting the 
inclination to extend the direction of the trends when congruity was observed. This 
‘trend effect’ occurred regardless of the non-causality of the additional cues or the fact 
that the real-world data trended cyclically and not linearly. Thus, whether data was 
framed in numeric or time series formats, both retailers and humanitarians applied 
methods which consistently yielded linear judgments. Moreover, the linear tendency 
persisted with the addition of context data in the time series format, with people 
showing a strong bias to visually incorporate the cues in a process of guiding judgment 
formation based on the same additive/linear methods.  
Examining the tendency to interpret numeric data in concrete terms and apply 
additive methods in the context of financial choice in experiment 3a and 3b in chapter 5 
confirmed the robustness of the format bias, suggesting these tendencies characterize 
decision processes across contexts, levels of expertise and environmental complexity. 
Whether making a formal probabilistic judgment (i.e., in a retail or humanitarian aid 
forecasting context), or implicitly forming probabilistic inferences when choosing 
between financial product alternatives, people are shown consistently to utilize minimal 
data and arithmetically process numbers resulting in linear inferences. Reframing 
interest rates in current versus future alternatives in absolute costs, combined with a 
future rate default demonstrated the robustness of the framing effect in facilitating 
performance by removing the barriers created by these biases in percentage information 
domains.  
The framing effect was shown to hold when individual difference covariates were 
included in models to predict judgment performance, and when the framing 
manipulation was tested in relation to a behavioural disclaimer to increase activation of 
attentional resources in standard percentage formats. It is a possibility that the saliency 
of the context was not sufficiently heightened by the disclaimer to motivate people to 
increase cognitive effort. However, based on the widespread evidence of percentage 
format biases in financial judgment contexts, it is concluded that the consistently poor 
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performance in the control condition in experiment 3b was related to limitations in the 
processing of data in percentage and rate formats. This therefore indicates that rather 
than a lack of cognitive effort, format biases are the primary mechanism underpinning 
erroneous judgment in complex percentage format domains. For example, even in real-
world contexts where there is motivation for high performance, the findings across all 
chapters indicate that people do not possess the cognitive capacity to synthesize cues 
and execute the appropriate operations to compute and extrapolate percentages and rates 
in complex settings. 
The results of experiment 3b indicate the framing effect to be highly robust which 
in turn supports the rationale for the linear prediction heuristic as underpinning 
percentage format biases. However, the mechanism via which the framing effect 
facilitates performance may be related more to the use of the default setting in the 
realistic framing condition 3 which anchored people  on the most optimal choice than to 
the side-by-side disclosure of current versus future rate cost alternatives There is 
substantial evidence both for the use of defaults in creating anchoring effects which lead 
to improvements in judgment and choice as well as for the presentation of choice 
information in simultaneous displays. It would therefore be useful to follow up the 
results from experiments 3a and 3b with an experiment to test whether the default may 
be the key factor contributing to the judgment effect, or whether the additive effects of 
combining the default and future rate frame manipulations creates improvements over 
the default alone.  
To further the investigation of the effects of defaults and future event context 
information on financial judgment, experiment 4 examines the impact of the two 
mechanisms on monthly mortgage repayment judgments by separating the 
informational content between two experimental conditions. Experiments 3a and 3b 
involved the testing of a framing effect in which the information presented in each 
condition remained the same, with the presentational format altering between them. 
However, in experiment 4 the mechanisms involved in the framing effect are further 
explored in separate data manipulations which involve two conditions disclosing 
different information. By examining the components of the framing effect in isolation, it 
may be possible to identify how the mechanisms involved in financial data frames and 
formats influence peoples’ interpretations and judgments.  
Akin to selecting a mortgage, making a monthly loan repayment decision is also 
an example of an important real-world financial judgment in which an individuals’ 
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interpretation of the information can be significantly influenced by the way in which the 
data is framed and disclosed. There are various advantages to testing the effects of 
defaults and future rate context information in a mortgage loan monthly repayment 
situation. Based on the findings, it may be possible to make recommendations for 
increasing the amount people opt to repay on a long-term loan per month. This can be 
financially advantageous by both reducing the loan term and thus the total repayment 
cost, and also by helping people to restructure peoples’ budgeting behaviours in 
preparedness for rate increases. In the context of experiment 4, a higher repayment 
choice thus reflects a lower discounting rate which in turn indicates a less optimistic and 
more effective financial judgment.  
It is necessary to note however, that there are complexities involved in the 
assessment of the rationality of financial judgment which extend beyond the scope of 
experiment 4. For the purpose of the experiment, judgment ‘rationality’ is measured 
from the economic perspective, in terms of the inclination to make higher monthly 
repayments in the present which act to reduce total repayment costs when factoring in 
interest rates over the course of the loan terms. As discussed in chapter 5, however, 
there are cases in which delay discounting, or the decision to make a smaller monthly 
repayment which leads to a larger cost overall, may not be irrational when considering a 
persons’ individual circumstances. For example, showing a tendency for delay 
discounting by opting for low monthly costs in the present despite higher overall costs 
in the future could be a rational strategy in the context of an expected inheritance, or 
future change in employment circumstances. In fact, delay discounting in such 
circumstances could actually indicate increased judgment rationality, based on more 
effective long-term financial planning and management skills.  
Previous studies which have tested financial data manipulations similar to real-
world credit card statements have yielded positive effects on consumer financial 
judgments. For example, based on the format of the Credit Card Accountability and 
Responsibility Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, Salisbury (2014) for example, showed 
that proving costs and loan repayment duration information for an additional higher 
amount in conjunction with the minimum costs increased monthly credit card 
repayments from the minimum required. The CARD Act of 2009 introduced the 
“minimum payment warning” which involves the following text prompt: “Minimum 
Payment Warning: If you make only the minimum payment each period, you will pay 
more in interest and it will take you longer to pay off your balance”. This is combined 
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with information about how much borrowers need to pay per month to clear the balance 
in three years in relation to the costs associated with making the minimum repayment 
only. To test the effects of this disclosure format, Salisbury (2014) presented consumers 
with the credit card balance, APR, time it would take to repay the loan based on the 
minimum repayment, and also the interest costs and time it would take to clear the 
balance over a three-year period.  
Results showed that minimum repayment cost and time information had no effect 
on propensity to repay any amount. However, providing additional three-year 
information for either time or cost, or both time and cost was effective in increasing the 
propensity to repay between $60-$70 per month rather than the minimum amount of 
$38.74. The probability of repaying less than $60-$70 was found to decrease with the 
presence of the three-year cost information. However, the probability of actually paying 
more than the three-year repayment amount ($66.21) decreased with presence of the 
three-year time information, particularly among those with a low knowledge of 
compound interest. Moderation analyses further indicated that the three-year time 
information increased the probability of repaying less than the three-year amount among 
consumers with six or more credit cards (16% of the sample).  
These results have important implications for regulatory financial policies and 
lender practices, suggesting that nudges in the form of alterative repayment choices are 
necessary for improving repayment behaviours. Rather than simply indicating that 
slower repayment incurs greater costs, it is necessary to understand the psychological 
factors underpinning the propensity to repay among different consumer groups. As 
demonstrated, cost and time information effected consumers differentially. Cost 
information was shown to increase repayment amount in some cases, whereas time 
information decreased repayment in others and had a stronger effect on consumers with 
multiple credit cards or less knowledge of interest compounding. It is likely that the 
three-year time information negatively impacted the propensity to pay more than the 
three-year interest amount because presentation of the two values created the perception 
of an upper and lower bound ($38.74 and $66.21). This may have led consumers to 
adjust downwards from the $66.21 towards the midway point (e.g., Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters & MacGregor, 2002; Roller, 2011).  
Experiment 4 involves a similar informational format to that used by Salisbury 
(2014) with a default manipulation in the form of cost information for the mortgage at a 
reduced term of 10-years. In both conditions 1 and 2 this default information is applied 
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in the presence of the full term, 20-year repayment information. In condition 1, both 
these suggested monthly repayment figures are presented in current interest rates only. 
The presentation of the minimum monthly repayment cost for the half versus the full 
term thus acts to create a numeric range in the data environment within which a 
judgment can fall. Based on the saliency of the default information (i.e., it being 
associated with lower interest and overall loan costs) and peoples’ propensity to derive 
meaning through comparison against a referent point within an upper and lower 
numerical bound (Roller, 2011), it is expected that the default will create an anchoring 
effect. This will lead people to focus more on the 10-year repayment figure than the 20-
year figure and adjust downwards from 10-year value towards the minimum suggested 
amount.  
In condition 2, the same data points are disclosed as above, except that the data 
presentation also includes the information for the full and reduced term costs in future 
interest rates. This future rate context data thus increases the absolute difference 
between the default (i.e., the 10-year term data which is now observable in future rates) 
and the minimum suggested amount (i.e., the 20-year data which is still observable in 
current rates). It is expected that by increasing the value of the default repayment figure 
in the context of the future rate information, the saliency of the default will heighten and 
increase its anchoring effect by increasing peoples’ awareness of risk and activating 
greater loss aversion.  
Similar judgment mechanisms to those shown in experiment 1 with the retail 
forecasters are likely to be observed among people making loan repayment decisions. It 
is expected that people will make judgments based on two numeric referents (i.e., the 
minimum and maximum suggested repayment values) and additively combine the 
values in each condition to yield a decision which reflects the arithmetic mean of the 
two figures. The anchoring effect of the default is expected to impact this process, 
leading people to make further adjustments to the additive computation based on the 
size of the absolute numeric difference between the minimum and maximum values. In 
this view, the larger the data range, the more the default will influence peoples’ 
repayment judgments based on the increased importance of the default which is inferred 
when positioned in the future rate context.  
The proposed mechanism therefore involves levering additive processing 
propensities applied in the presence of a numeric continuum, combined with creating an 
anchoring effect using a numeric default which is made more effective when disclosed 
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in highly salient context information. In condition 1, it is therefore predicted that people 
will show a propensity to make repayment decisions which are significantly above the 
minimum suggested 20-year term value, and that judgments will fall around the mean of 
the 10-year default figure and the 20-year amount. In condition 2 however, it is 
expected that positioning the default in the added future rate context information will 
increase the anchoring effect of the default and lead people to make lesser adjustments 
away from it, thus generating more economically optimal judgments. The effect is 
based on the increase sensitivity to the default which is created by the saliency of the 
future rate context, and the magnitude of the absolute difference perceived between the 
default and minimum suggested repayment figures. Thus, compared to condition 1, 
repayment decisions in condition 2 are expected to be significantly higher and to fall 
within in a range which is higher above the mean of the 20-year and 10-year figures.  
In sum, the informational manipulations tested in experiment 4 further explore the 
mechanisms involved in the data framing which was shown to facilitate judgment 
performance in experiment 3a and 3b. Specifically, experiment 4 assess the impact of a 
default value in the form of a reduced term repayment suggestion versus a full term 
repayment suggestion on peoples’ loan repayment judgments in condition 1. In 
condition 2, future rate context is added to the data disclosure which acts to increase the 
value of the default figure and increase the absolute difference between the minimum 
and maximum values in the data environment. The aim is to examine whether the 
addition of highly salient future rate information is more effective in promoting optimal 
loan repayment judgments and behaviours compared to applying a default without the 
added saliency generated by providing future event information. As with experiments 
3a and 3b, judgment ‘rationality’ in experiment 4 is determined from an economic 
perspective, whereby judgments which act to minimize total repayment costs are 
regarded as optimal.    
Greater choice effectiveness in condition 2 would thus indicate the importance of 
future event information to peoples’ judgment processes where compound interest is 
involved. From this perspective, the use of salient future event information to amplify 
the anchoring effects of defaults and highlight intertemporal cost implications, may be 
an effective means of counteracting biases and optimistic tendencies involved in 
ineffective financial judgments and other judgment situations which involve non-linear 
relations between variables such as health behaviours. 
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6.2   Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 further examines the mechanisms underpinning the effectiveness of 
the framing manipulation in experiment 3a and 3b by testing the anchoring effects of a 
default value compared to the effects of the default when disclosed in the context of 
future rate information on mortgage repayment judgments. In condition 1, the default 
(in the form of the monthly repayment cost for the loan over a reduced term) is 
presented simultaneously with the minimum monthly repayment figure for the loan over 
the full term in current rates. In condition 2, the same data is presented but with the 
addition of the repayment figures in the context of future interest rates. Using a design 
similar to that employed by Salisbury (2014), participants in both conditions are 
presented with a ‘mortgage repayment statement’ in which the monthly mortgage 
repayment costs are broken down into interest and total value amounts akin to a 
monthly credit card statement. 
 In the term default only framing condition 1, the total balance, interest rate and 
term information is given, together with the current balance, monthly repayment amount 
and interest costs and for clearing the balance over the full term of the loan (20 years) in 
current rates. The same information is also shown for the loan at a reduced term (10 
years) which creates the default repayment figure. In the term default plus future rate 
framing condition 2, the information and repayment options disclosed in condition 1 are 
repeated but with the addition of the full and reduced term data (i.e., the default figure) 
framed in future interest rates. The data manipulation in condition 2 thus involves the 
repayment information framed in both current versus future rates, plus the default figure 
which acts to further increase the size of the default in relation to the full term monthly 
repayment figure compared to condition 1. By disclosing different repayment 
information in separate data manipulations it is possible to compare the effects of the 
default to the effects of the added future rate information between the conditions.  
The heightened default value combined with simultaneous current and future rate 
disclosure in condition 2 is expected to be particularly effective in increasing 
repayments above the minimum based on past findings which have shown that warnings 
about higher costs and repayment horizons associated with minimum repayments were 
effective in increasing willingness to pay more via the increased saliency of the 
consequences that decisions can have on future outcomes (Haws, Bearden & Nenkov, 
2012). Simultaneously framing three-year and minimum repayment data is also shown 
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to be effective in increasing the salience of the trade-off between current and future 
costs and time horizons, facilitating borrowers in evaluating the differences between 
making minimum versus larger repayments (Soil, Keeney & Larrick, 2013). Moreover, 
Soil, Keeney and Larrick also found that the dual presentation of minimum and three-
year repayment data significantly reduced the tendency to overestimate and 
underestimate the three-year repayment costs which was associated with high and low 
levels of numeracy, respectively.  
These findings suggest that the effects of defaults may depend on the absolute 
difference between the default value and the data available for comparison (e.g., a 
minimum suggested repayment amount). Thus, the theoretical question relates to the 
perceived size of the default in relation to other relevant data points in the judgment 
context. As explained above, it is likely that the larger the difference between the 
default and the minimum suggested amount (and thus the perceived range between the 
upper and lower bound), the more the default is likely to influence the judgement 
process. I.e., the greater the absolute difference, the stronger the anchoring effect is 
likely to be, leading people to adjust less from the upper bound towards the mean.  
These effects may also be context dependent. For example, in this particular 
scenario, the use of the default acts to increase the saliency of loan costs in future rates, 
making people aware of the optimality of a higher repayment choice compared to the 
minimum suggested amount, which over the long term, represents a far less effective 
decision. Optimistic tendencies are therefore likely to come into play when making 
decisions about how much to repay per month. However, presenting a default value of a 
reduced term in a future rate frame is likely to heighten the saliency of compound 
interest rates and communicate the costs associated with rate variability, thus 
counteracting optimism by anchoring people on the most effective option. From this 
perspective, downwards adjustments towards the mean are likely to be influenced by the 
size of the default in relation to minimum presented values, with larger absolute 
differences dictating lesser adjustments, leading to more effective (less optimistic) 
repayment decisions.  
In sum, experiment 4 involves the further investigation of the framing 
manipulation applied in experiments 3a and 3b in the arena of loan repayment decision 
making. The aim is to assess whether the propensity to make monthly mortgage 
repayments above a minimum suggested figure can be impacted by using a default to 
elicit anchoring effects, and whether adding future event context increases the 
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effectiveness of the default. Increasing monthly loan repayments has the benefit of 
minimizing total mortgage costs by reducing the loan term and interest payments. There 
is also the added advantage of making higher monthly repayments in facilitating 
financial preparedness ahead of interest rate rises.  
It is expected that the default in the form of the cost to pay off the balance over 
half the loan term (in condition 1) will be moderately effective in increasing the 
tendency to repay an amount above the minimum suggested amount (i.e., the figure 
necessary to clear the loan over the full term). The dual effects of presenting the default 
figure in the context of future interest rates (in condition 2) is expected to be even more 
effective in yielding repayments closer the optimal amount. The increased effectiveness 
of the combined manipulation is based on creating a larger absolute difference between 
the default and the minimum suggested amount which works advantageously with the 
propensity to additively process the two values (thus yielding a higher mean value 
compared to condition 1). Increasing the range between the minimum and maximum 
suggested amounts raises data saliency in the context of loan costs and interest rates 
which is likely anchor people more firmly on the default and increase its anchoring 
effect. People in condition 2 are therefore expected to make lesser adjustments away 
from the default figure and towards the minimum suggested amount. This manipulation 
has the potential to be particularly effective in counteracting the harmful effects of 
optimistic or present biases, which involve the tendency to minimise present costs and 
discount the impact of rate rises in the future. 
6.2.1   Method 
Participants  
Another 160 participants aged over 18 years were recruited via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk and paid $2.00 (again, no participants from experiment 3b repeated 
the trials in experiment 4). The average age was 33.82 years (SD = 10.75, range = 20 to 
69 years), 40% were female and 36% were educated to a minimum level of a Bachelor’s 
degree.  
Design  
A single factor independent groups design was used in which participants were 
randomly assigned to the repayment term default only condition 1 which involved a 
default setting of costs for the full versus half the loan term, and the repayment term 
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default plus rate framing condition 2 which involved the costs framed in current versus 
future rates for the loan term in full versus half.  
Materials and Procedure 
After providing demographic information for age, gender and education, 
participants were then directed to the main choice task which involved answering one 
question relating to their repayment decision. On a blank screen, they were first 
provided with the following information: 
“Imagine you are taking out a mortgage for a value of $275,000 over a term of 20 
years for an apartment costing $325,000. On the next screen you will see information 
relating to your repayment options for clearing the balance. You will be asked to choose 
how much you would like to repay per month.” 
After clicking to go to the main task, they were provided with the following 
instruction:  
“Please use the information below to carefully consider how much you would 
prefer to repay per month on your mortgage of $275,000 and enter a figure into the box 
at the bottom. The information is there as a guide you can choose any amount to repay. 
Please treat your payment decision as you would in your everyday life.” 
This text was presented at the top of the screen with the mortgage information 
displayed in a tabulated format in the lower section of the screen, as shown in figure 
6.1. The above instruction remained onscreen for the full duration of the trial and there 
was no restriction placed on response time. After examining the information provided in 
the ‘Mortgage repayment statement’ in each condition, participants then entered a 
monetary amount into the response box at the bottom of the statement. Values of less 
than $1.00 were disallowed, and the following prompt was used to ask participants to 
confirm their decision before being able to submit their answer to encourage more 
careful consideration of responses: 
“You have chosen to repay $2000. To confirm your answer and move to the next 
section please click OK.” 
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Figure 6.1 (A) The term default only framing condition 1  
                  
Figure 6.1 (B) The term default plus and rate framing condition 2 
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Figure 6.1 Screenshot of the stimuli presented in condition 1 and 2 
Based on the disclosure format for credit card statements introduced by the 
CARD Act of 2009, both conditions provided the basic mortgage information relating 
to the cost of the loan, the current interest rates and the loan term (presented in the 
upper section of the mortgage repayment statement). In both conditions, this 
information was then presented in the context of the total cost of the mortgage over the 
full term, further broken down into the interest cost and the monthly repayment amount 
necessary to clear the balance over the full term (shown in the mid-section of the 
statement in both conditions). This repayment data was then placed in the context of the 
total, monthly and interest cost alternatives for repaying the full balance over half the 
loan term, i.e., in 10 years as opposed to in 20 which was displayed in the bottom 
section of the statement in both conditions.  
In condition 2, another layer of contextual information was provided for 
evaluative purposes by framing both the 20 and 10-year cost alternatives in current 
versus future interest rates. The future rate costs were computed using the same method 
applied in experiment 3a, in which +0.5% was added to the rate each year for three 
consecutive years following the 2-year fixed period. Over the 20-year term for example, 
this generated a rate of 5.99% in year three and 6.49% in year four which continued 
through to year 20. This additional future rate information was predicted to be more 
effective in increasing the propensity to repay more than the minimum suggested 
amount to clear the balance over the full term ($1,841.83) compared to the disclosure of 
costs over the 20 versus 10-year term only in condition 1. The aim therefore, is to 
examine the effectiveness of these framing alternatives in counteracting over-optimistic 
tendencies associated with choosing to delay costs/repay smaller amounts in the short 
term.  
After submitting a monthly mortgage repayment decision, participants were 
directed to a new screen where they answered questions relating to potentially relevant 
individual differences in repayment behaviour, again using the LOT-R measure of 
dispositional optimism (Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994), the financial literacy scale 
(Fernandes, Lynch, & Netemeyer, 2014) and the Berlin numeracy test (Cokely,Galesic, 
Schulz, Ghazal & Garcia-Retamero, 2012). Prior to completing the inventories, an 
additional question was also included as an alternative means of assessing temporal 
preference for gains. Using a dropdown menu, participants were asked to respond to the 
following question:  
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“Would you rather win US$10,000 now or win US$13,000 a year from now?” 
If a participant chose to win US$10,000 today, they would be categorized as being 
impatient (or possessing a high temporal preference for gains/low temporal preference 
for losses), based on an implicit discount rate of more than 30% (e.g., Loewenstein, 
Read & Baumeister, 2003). This measure therefore indicates a preference for immediate 
gains (indicating a preference for delayed higher repayment costs) versus delayed gains 
(indicating a preference for higher immediate costs), and was thus included as an 
additional measure to the LOT-R to examine decision performance based on underlying 
behavioural propensities related to self-control (Puri & Robinson, 2007). Following 
completion of the inventories, participants were provided with the reimbursement 
information.    
6.2.2   Results  
Of the 160 participants who completed the experiment, four were removed from 
the data set due to incomplete responses. This yielded 79 participants in condition 1 and 
77 in condition 2. 
Figure 6.2 shows participants mean repayment judgments per condition in relation 
to the minimum suggested repayment amount in both conditions (i.e., the necessary 
amount to clear the loan balance over the full term based on current interest rates with 
no rate variability over the full term), the maximum suggested amount (i.e., the default), 
and the average of these two values. As expected, one-sample t-tests conducted on the 
mean repayment amount per condition in relation to the minimum suggested amount 
($1,841.83) showed that repayment decisions were significantly greater than the 
minimum in condition 1, t(78.96) = 45.77, p<.001 and in condition 2, t(76.96) = 61.28, 
p<.001. A one-way ANOVA conducted on the repayment amount per condition 
confirmed hypotheses, showing that participants decided to repay a significantly larger 
amount per month on average in condition 2 (M=$2,492.18) with the loan term default 
manipulation in the context of the future rate data, compared to in condition 1 
(M=$2,297.67) with the loan term default manipulation only, F(526.29) = 178.9, 
p<.001. 
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Figure 6.2 Mean Monthly Repayment Decisions Per Condition in Exp 4 
The mean monthly repayment judgments with standard error bars in the reduced 
term default only framing condition 1 and the reduced term default plus future rate data 
in condition 2. Repayment judgments in both conditions are represented by the green 
bars and shown in relation to the minimum suggested repayment amount ($1,841.83), 
the maximum suggested repayment amount (default) in condition 1 and 2, and the 
average of these upper and lower bound values. The participants’ judgment is 
positioned next to the mean of the minimum and maximum values in condition 1 and 2 
to illustrate the proximity to the arithmetic average each judgment fell.  
This finding confirmed expectations regarding the effects of the default, showing 
that disclosing repayment costs in 10-year terms in the context of the full term 
repayment data (condition 1) resulted in repayment amounts which were greater than 
the minimum suggested amount. In the absence of a baseline condition, the possibility 
cannot be excluded that people may have made repayments which exceeded the 
minimum suggested amount without the presence of the default in condition 1. Based 
on past findings however (Salisbury, 2014), it is very probable the observed effect was 
related to the disclosure of the default repayment figure. In future extensions of the 
research, comparisons to baseline measures are necessary to fully isolate the effects of 
default settings.  
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Disclosing the same information in condition 2 with the addition of costs frames 
in future rates (thus enabling comparison with the minimum suggested amount in 
current rates) significantly increased the mean repayment judgment in condition 2 
further above the minimum suggested amount compared to condition 1.  
On average, participants’ repayment judgments in condition 1 ($2,297.67) 
represented an 124.7% increase from the minimum suggested amount, which equated to 
80.2% of the maximum suggested amount (i.e., the default of $2,811.12 based on the 
cost to clear the balance in current rates over the reduced 10-year term). This resulted in 
a mean repayment choice which fell marginally below the average ($2,326.47) of the 
minimum and maximum suggested repayment values presented in condition 1. In 
condition 2, the mean repayment judgment ($2,492.18) rose to 135.3% of the minimum 
suggested amount, equating to 84% of the maximum suggested amount which resulted 
in repayment judgments falling marginally above the mean of the minimum and 
maximum values ($2,403.145) presented in condition 2. This reflected in an absolute 
difference of $28.80 in condition 1, and $89.03 in condition 2 between the mean of the 
upper and lower bound and participants’ repayment judgments. 
This indicates an anchoring effect in combination with additive processing of the 
upper and lower bound values. The fact that judgments in both conditions were so close 
to the average of the minimum and maximum suggested amounts indicates that people 
combined the values using the arithmetic mean as the computational strategy for 
yielding a judgment in this context. The fact that the judgment was in excess of the 
mean in condition 2 corresponds with the increase in absolute difference between the 
minimum and maximum suggested amounts (i.e., the extent of the range between the 
upper and lower bounds). In this respect, the greater the absolute difference between the 
maximum and minimum values presented, the greater the anchoring influence of the 
upper bound on peoples’ decisions.  
It is necessary to further test the possible effect of the size differentials between 
upper and lower bounds in other financial decision making contexts as well as domains 
such as health behaviour change consumer purchasing behaviours. It is necessary to 
examine the extent to which judgments deviate from the mean, and the direction in 
which they increase and decrease based on smaller and larger absolute differences 
between minimum and maximum values. It is also necessary to assess the impact of 
increases and decreases in the numbers of informational cues provided in decision 
environments such as these to determine parameters for the tendency to arithmetically 
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combine only two data points under condition of varying complexity. It is possible that 
the greater the degree of noise (i.e., the number of non-causal or low causally-related 
cues) in the environment, the more people are inclined to use minimal cues in the 
attempt to simplify the judgment task. This may hold for example, in online consumer 
contexts where multiple conflicting promotional data create high variance which can 
impact cue selection.  
In sum, it is evident that the anchoring effect of the default setting used in this 
setting had a stronger impact on repayment decision making when applied in the context 
of the current versus future rate repayment data. In relation to chapter 5, this suggests 
that anchors in the form of higher repayment options created by future rate information 
can increase peoples' propensity to make financial choices which act to offset the 
optimistic tendency to delay costs and select products or make repayments based on the 
lowest possible amounts in the present. Thus defaults applied in presence of relevant, 
complex context information (future rate data) may be useful in facilitating comparisons 
which guide judgments towards more optimal, less optimistic financial choice and 
behaviour.       
Table 6.1 displays a breakdown of data relating to the repayment decisions made 
in each condition. Descriptive statistics are provided including the percentages of 
repayment amounts which fell below, above and in between the minimum and 
maximum suggested amounts. The minimum ($1,841.83) is the least effective 
repayment decision, based on the amount necessary to clear the loan balance over the 
full term in the most optimistic (unrealistic) circumstance (i.e., current interest rates 
with no variability over the full term). Whereas the maximum ($2,964.46) is the most 
effective repayment decision, based on halving the loan repayment period to minimise 
the impact of interest rate variability over the full term. A moderate incline in rates is 
the most realistic scenario, thus this repayment choice is the least optimistic and the 
most likely to maximise utility over the full time horizon. 
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Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics for Repayment Choices in Exp 4 
Descriptive statistics for the repayment choices in each condition and percentages 
in relation to the minimum and maximum suggested amounts. 
 
 
Condition 1 
term default only 
framing 
Condition 2 
term default plus rate 
framing 
Mean repayment amount $2,297.67 $2,492.18 
Range $1,000 - $3,400 $1,150 - $3,500 
Mode $2,811 $3,000 
Median $2,200 $2,700 
Low range: Percentage of repayments 
below the min ($1,841.83) 10.13% 5.19% 
Mid-range: Percentage in between the min 
and max ($2,964.46) 86.08% 75.32% 
High range: Percentage above the max 3.80% 19.48% 
 
As shown in table 6.1 above, the overall mean repayment amount in condition 2 
was higher compared to condition 1 which, as expected, indicates that the addition of 
the rate frame manipulation in condition 2 was more effective in increasing the 
propensity to make a higher monthly mortgage repayment compared to the term only 
manipulation in condition 1. Three individual logistic regressions were conducted in 
which the proportions of repayments in the low, mid and high range were entered as the 
dependent variable and condition was entered as the predictor (displayed in figure 6.3 
below). The results indicated that the framing manipulation in condition 2 was 
significantly predictive of both the propensity to make less repayment choices below the 
minimum (B = -0.72, z = -5.903, p<.001, 95% CI [-0.96, -0.48]) and more repayment 
choices above the maximum suggested amount (B = 1.81, z = 14.38, p<.001, 95% CI 
[1.57,  2.06]) and condition 1 was significantly predictive of the propensity to make a 
repayment which fell in between the minimum and maximum suggested amounts (B = -
0.70, z = -8.752, p<.001, 95% CI [-0.86, -0.55]).  
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Figure 6.3 Proportions of Decisions Per Repayment Range in Exp 4 
The proportions of repayment decisions which fell into each range with standard 
error bars. This information is the same as the percentages breakdown presented in table 
6.1, but displayed graphically for illustrative purposes. As is shown, the largest 
proportion of repayment choices were in the mid-range (i.e., above the minimum but 
below the maximum suggested amounts) in both conditions. Although condition 1 
yielded a significantly higher proportion of repayment decision in the mid-range where 
the majority of repayment amounts fell in both conditions, condition 2 was still more 
effective overall, generating a larger proportion of decisions across both the mid and 
high range categories combined.  
The distribution of repayment decisions across the ranges indicates that condition 
1 was more effective than condition 2 in nudging a larger proportion of people towards 
a repayment amount higher than the minimum (i.e., creating a moderate improvement in 
loan repayment behaviour). However, condition 2 was more effective in moving 
peoples’ repayment decisions into the high range, i.e., the most effective bracket above 
the maximum suggested amount. When assessing the overall proportions of repayment 
decisions which exceeded the minimum (including both mid and high range repayment 
decisions), condition 2 yielded 95% whereas condition 1 generated a 90% rate of 
heightened decision performance. Thus, it can be concluded that condition 2 was the 
more effective manipulation in terms of overall improved repayment choice behaviour. 
One possibility is that the variation in repayment decisions between conditions 
could be due to individual differences interacting with the framing manipulations in 
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each condition. Table 6.2 shows the demographic information and the mean scores for 
each of the individual difference inventories per condition. As shown, participants in 
both conditions exhibited similar, moderate levels of financial literacy, numeracy and 
trait optimism. A larger proportion of participants in condition 2 possessed a temporal 
preference for gains, based on choosing to receive “$10,000 now” as opposed to 
“$13,000 in one year.” This preference for smaller immediate gains indicates a higher 
level of financial optimism which could be associated with choosing to repay less per 
month, based on the bias to believe that financial adversity will not occur, or that one 
will have the capability to cope with future financial adversity. 
Table 6.2 Individual Difference Scores and Demographics in Exp 4 
Mean individual difference scores and demographic information per condition. 
 
 
Condition 1 
term default only 
framing  
Condition 2 
term default plus rate 
framing 
Mean age 33.77 years (range 20-69, SD=9.91) 
33.86 years 
(range 20-69, SD=11.55) 
Gender 40.51% female 38.96% female 
Education 
(Bachelor’s degree or higher) 58.23% 38.96% 
Optimism 
(Max score 24) 16.54 17.30 
High temporal preference 
for gains (10k now) 45.57% 57.14% 
Financial literacy 
(Max score 13) 9.35 8.74 
Numeracy 
(Max score 4) 1.70 1.66 
 
Additional Analysis of Relevant Individual Difference Variables  
This subsection of the results involves the analysis of individual difference 
variables which are shown in previous studies to impact of financial judgment and 
behaviour. Findings regarding the effects of these variables are mixed, and have often 
yielded unexpected and contradictory outcomes. Thus the purpose of their inclusion in 
this experiment is to assess the potential relevance of such factors in the context of this 
particular framing manipulation and task objective. Identifying significant relations 
between performance and individual differences, or interactions between the framing 
conditions and individual factors, would provide useful data relating to underlying 
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mechanisms involved in the effectiveness of the manipulations. Increasing the 
understanding of how difference variables may interact with data disclosures is 
therefore important to further studies aimed at improving financial behaviour based on 
data framings.  
To test for the impact of individual differences on repayment decisions and their 
potential interactions with the framing manipulations, a regression model was 
constructed with repayment amount as the dependent variable. The responses to the 
surveys for financial literacy, numeracy and optimism were converted into standard 
normal variables and entered into the model as predictors along with the temporal 
preference indicator, age, education and condition (framing manipulation).  
The inclusion of all these factors in the model indicated that the framing 
manipulation in condition 2 significantly predicted the propensity to make higher 
monthly repayments, R2 = .122, F(8,147) = 3.714, p<.001, B = 235.806, t(147) = 3.169, 
p<.01. Being female, B = 172.406 t(147) = 2.289, p<.05 and possessing higher financial 
literacy, B = 89.152, t(147) = 2.098, p<.05 were also significant predictors of higher 
repayment decisions across conditions. As expected, a significant negative relationship 
was also found between the temporal preference indicator and repayment amount, 
indicating that increases in the preference for smaller short term gains (i.e., the tendency 
to delay costs into the future) was predictive of smaller monthly repayment choices, B = 
-171.974 t(147) = -2.179, p<.05.  
To examine the effects of these individual differences between the framing 
manipulations, separate regression models were then conducted per condition. In each 
model, the dependent variable was repayment amount and the individual difference 
parameters were entered as predictors one by one. In condition 1, significant positive 
associations were found between chosen repayment amount and financial literacy, R2 = 
.036, F(1,77) = 3.955, p=.05, B = 102.29, t(77) = 1.989, p=.05, and education, R2 = .11, 
F(1,77) = 11.49, p<.01, B = 335.99, t(77) = 3.39 , p<.01, and a significant negative 
relationship was identified between repayment amount and temporal preference, R2 = 
.11, F(1,77) = 10.8, p<.01, B = -323.87, t(77) = -3.287, p<.01. In condition 2, financial 
literacy was also found to positively correlate with repayment amount, R2 = .04, F(1,75) 
= 4.864, p<.05, B = 120.17, t(75) = 2.206, p<.05. When regressing repayment amount 
on each of the individual difference variables simultaneously per condition, the main 
effect of financial literacy held for condition two. In condition 1, temporal preference 
and education also remained significant, however financial literacy was no longer found 
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to be predictive of repayment amount, and instead gender presented as having a 
significant effect, R2 = .21, F(1,71) = 4.00, p<.001, B = 239.291, t(71) = 2.458, p<.05.   
Thus, although variations in the effects of individual differences were shown 
between participants in each condition, the key variables of importance to repayment 
amount when regressing across participants in both conditions were shown to be gender, 
financial literacy and temporal preference for gains.  
To assess the effectiveness of the framing manipulations across participants on the 
basis of these individual difference measures, separate regression models were 
conducted with repayment amount across groups as the dependent variable and the main 
effect of each individual difference parameter as the predictor variable plus an 
interaction term between the predictor and the framing manipulation (condition). This 
revealed a main effect for condition, R2 = .08, F(3,152) = 5.673, p<.01, B = 389.2,  
t(152) = 3.703, p<.001, with repayment amount increasing in condition 2, a main effect 
for education B = 669.6, t(152) = 2.822 , p<.01, indicating that higher educational level 
was predictive of higher repayment choices, and a significant interaction term between 
condition and education, B = -333.6, t(152) = -2.207, p<.05, indicating that the 
lower[higher] the educational level, the higher[lower] the impact of the framing 
manipulation on chosen repayment amount across conditions.  
6.2.3   Discussion 
Disclosing repayment information using a default manipulation in the form of 
loan repayment costs for the loan at a 50% reduced term was shown to positively impact 
the propensity to make monthly mortgage repayments above the minimum necessary to 
clear the loan over the full term in current rates. This manipulation was therefore 
effective in improving judgments by reducing the propensity to make financial 
decisions based on optimistic estimates of interest rate variability. However, with the 
addition of future rate context information to the data environment in condition 2, the 
effectiveness of peoples’ repayment judgments improved further.  
The positioning of the default figure in the future rate context data acted to raise 
the saliency of the default which heighted the anchoring effect, and increased the range 
between the minimum and maximum values. Based on the tendency to apply arithmetic 
operations to key referents and seek upper and lower bounds in numeric judgment 
environments, the mechanisms in condition 2 combined to yield more effective, less 
optimistic repayment judgments which were closer in value to the upper bound of the 
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judgment continuum. The findings have implications for data manipulations which may 
be effective in counteracting format biases and optimistic tendencies which are shown 
frequently to limit financial choice and behaviour across situations and groups.           
The results reflected those found with the retail forecasters in experiment 1 of 
chapter 3, in that people in both conditions formed judgments by applying additive 
operations to the two relevant data points to yield the arithmetic mean of the values. In 
the case of the retailers, forming predictions using the arithmetic mean led to judgments 
akin to a two-point linear regression model. In the current experiment, the propensity to 
additively combine two salient values to make a choice yielded repayment judgments 
which reflected the arithmetic mean of the most and least optimal repayment options. 
Based on this tendency, the framing of the data in both conditions 1 and 2 functioned to 
yield repayment judgments which significantly exceeded the minimum (least optimal) 
amount. In this respect, both conditions were successful in mitigating optimistic biases 
in financial choice, with condition 2 generating a larger effect based on the larger 
absolute difference between the minimum and maximum values presented in the data 
environment. 
The greater the value of the repayment judgments shown in condition 2 was not 
only associated with the tendency to arithmetically combine two points to generate a 
higher mean value in the context of a larger minimum and maximum range. The effect 
of disclosing the default value in the context of future rates further impacted the 
propensity to make higher repayment judgments by increasing the saliency of the rate 
information and the financial effects. Thus, combined with the propensity to form a 
judgment based on the arithmetic mean, increasing the saliency of potential costs by 
delivering future event information acted to highlight the size of the cost differences 
between the minimum and maximum suggested amounts and increase the relevance of 
the default in the data environment. When viewing the default, it is likely that disclosing 
the effects of future rate increases on loan repayments in condition 2 was effective in 
delivering a strong rationale for making a higher monthly repayment. This acted to 
emphasize the importance of the upper bound repayment figure in the judgment process 
to a greater extent than in condition 1. Heightening the relevance of the upper bound 
with the addition of the future rate context thus elicited a stronger anchoring effect from 
the default which increased peoples’ inclination to make judgments which were closer 
in value to the upper bound.   
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From this perspective, the strength of the anchoring effect of the default is likely 
to be associated with the saliency of the context information. In condition 1 (without the 
added context data) participants’ mean repayment judgment fell marginally below the 
average of the minimum and maximum suggested amounts, indicating a greater 
adjustment away from the maximum and towards the more optimistic minimum 
repayment option. In condition 2 however, the mean repayment fell above the average 
of the minimum and maximum values, indicating that the default manipulation was 
more effective in counteracting optimistic financial tendencies when positioned within 
the context of the future event data. It is therefore possible, that in the context of less 
salient additional information (e.g., context information which may be unrelated to rate 
rises and the cost implications), the default figure may have been less influential in the 
judgment process. This would likely result in an attenuation of the anchoring effect, 
leading to repayment decisions which would be closer in value to the lower end of the 
continuum and more akin to the less optimal minimum suggested amount.  
With respect to individual difference factors, lower levels of financial literacy and 
higher temporal preference for short term gains were associated with the tendency to 
make smaller (less optimal) monthly repayment decisions across conditions. When 
controlling for the effects of individual differences on the effectiveness of the framing 
manipulations, educational level was shown to interact with the framing manipulations 
across conditions. This interaction revealed that each framing manipulation was more 
effective among people with a higher educational level. A larger proportion of 
participants in condition 1 possessed a higher educational level (Bachelors or Graduate 
degree) compared to those in condition 2 (see table 6.2), yet the increases in repayment 
amounts above the minimum in condition 1 were only moderate compared to the 
improvements in condition 2.  
In conclusion to the supplementary analysis of individual factors, the significant 
interactions between the conditions and individual difference variables suggests that the 
effect of the framing manipulations in each condition may be associated with particular 
individual difference factors. However, when including all factors as covariates in the 
model to predict performance, the results remained robust which indicated the 
effectiveness of the framing manipulation in overriding any effects of individual 
differences. The increased effectiveness of condition 2 suggests that the disclosure of 
current versus future rate costs was a particularly advantageous component in addition 
to the framing of costs over different term horizons in overcoming limitations in 
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financial choice related to lower educational level, financial literacy and optimistic 
tendencies associated with a higher temporal preference. The combined informational 
disclosure of a reduced term default positioned within future rate context data is 
therefore concluded as robust in heightening financial judgment performance despite 
individual variations. This finding points strongly to potential applications for 
supporting effective financial judgment and behaviour across socio-economic and 
educational groups and real-world choice contexts.  
With respect to potential limitations, the study design involved repayment data 
disclosed in a format resembling a credit card statement, extracted from mortgage 
products available in the UK loan market in April 2015. In this sense, the framing was 
hypothetical, designed to impact monthly repayment decision making and behaviour in 
the same way that credit card statements are designed to increase the propensity to make 
higher monthly repayments. It must be noted therefore, that although the data presented 
in the experiment was representative of real-world products available in the market 
during April 2015, the participant group consisted of US citizens who were likely to be 
less familiar with the nature of the decision task compared to UK populations based on 
the American loan market which typically involves acquiring loans at fixed rates. Thus, 
rather than payments being subject to variable rates, US borrowers are able to make top 
up payments should and when they choose to. 
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Chapter 7  
General Discussion  
In this chapter, a summary of the main findings and scientific contributions is 
provided. This is followed by an overall review and evaluation of the key 
findings including alternative theoretical perspectives and limitations. This is 
proceeded by further research requirements and suggestions for practical 
applications and design, followed by final concluding comments.   
7.1   Summary and Contributions  
The aim of this thesis was to examine the biases and limitations in human 
probabilistic judgment which are associated with frames and formats of numerical 
information in different situations. By assessing performance in real-world judgment 
contexts, it was possible to contrast the performance of consumer and novice groups 
with that of professional populations using data frames and formats akin to those found 
in the real world.  
The findings revealed robust similarities in judgment processes across groups 
which provide critical evidence increasing our understanding of the role of linear 
tendencies in human rationality. Independent of skill and experience, the propensity to 
perceive linear relations and apply judgment strategies based on assuming concrete 
values was highly robust across contexts varying in complexity and format. Whether 
predicting sales, selecting between financial products, or forecasting refugee camp data, 
people used minimal cues and systematically applied additive methods to percentage 
data and exponential trends to yield linear estimates in both rich and sparse 
informational contexts. It is concluded that the linear bias is a key defining 
characteristic of human probabilistic inference, stemming from the notion of cognitive 
algorithms designed to compute frequency data as underlying judgment processes. From 
the ecological viewpoint, cognitive algorithms developed in accordance with peoples’ 
natural environment in a pre-mathematical world, thus creating the propensity to 
interpret and handle information in absolute terms or natural frequency formats.  
This conclusion is supported by the strong facilitative effects of frequency 
formats, showing that communicating base rate information by representing relations 
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between data using whole numbers, human rationality can be significantly improved. 
The use of icon arrays further increases peoples’ ability to contextualize data when 
communicated in absolute frequencies by facilitating correspondences between the data 
and the real-world. This heightened data saliency aids the conceptualization of 
judgment and choice implications in meaningful, real-world terms which enables people 
to better understand the impact of judgments in a broader sense and over longer time 
horizons.  
The findings deliver both theoretical and practical contributions. Across groups 
and individual differences, the effects of informational format and the tendency to 
linearly extrapolate are connected by the bias to perceive values in concrete terms and 
make sense of data by seeking simple reference points. People compare and combine 
referents using additive methods when inappropriate and adhere strongly to defaults 
when applied in simultaneous data frames in complex environments.  
The practical contribution involves a framing manipulation which shows that 
format biases (i.e., additive processing) and optimism (i.e., the propensity to delay costs 
and downplay risks) can be counteracted in judgments involving percentages and 
exponential growth rates by using absolute formats and framing data using defaults 
positioned within future event context information. This framing manipulation was 
highly effective in improving loan choice and repayment judgments compared to 
information in standard finance industry formats. There is a strong potential to increase 
rationality using this framing manipulation in other financial settings, as well as 
domains such as health behaviour judgment and choice in which peoples’ erroneous 
interpretation of percentages and non-linear relations between variables can negatively 
impact rationality, leading to maladaptive choices and behaviours.   
7.2   Overview and Evaluation of the Main Findings 
The findings from across the domains of retail, humanitarian aid and financial 
choice indicate that there were commonalities in the processes involved in the formation 
of judgments in each of these contexts which connect informational format with the 
linear bias. These processes which characterized judgments across settings involved the 
tendency to assume absolute values, seek relevant referents in data environments, and 
compare and combine the referents using arithmetic operations in numeric data. In 
graphical formats, the tendency to seek patterns and linearly project trends based on 
congruencies in noise was shown to characterize judgments (particularly for those with 
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specialist domain knowledge). In prediction domains, the extrapolation of judgments 
based on arithmetic computations results in linear forecasts. Thus, in the context of non-
linear growth trends and percentage data, arithmetic operations yield predictions which 
either under or overestimate outcomes, and ‘optimistic’ choices which reflect a high 
temporal preference. Results showed that in rich context environments involving 
absolute formats, adherence to defaults was strengthened by highly salient ‘future 
event’ information when framed simultaneously with information relating to events in 
the present. In this respect, optimistic tendencies relating to higher temporal discounting 
were shown to be minimised by this framing manipulation. The following section 
discusses how the judgment processes underpinning the linear bias are related in each 
setting.  
In sparse data environments, people in both retail and humanitarian aid contexts 
made judgments based on linearly extrapolating the cues in the absence of additional 
information. Akin to a two-point linear regression model, the retail forecasters focused 
on the last two observations per trial and computed forecasts based on the absolute 
difference between these two values, regardless of the format or whether sequences 
trended linearly or exponentially. The fact that error was greater when observed 
percentages trended linearly and vice versa (i.e., for mismatches), supports the 
viewpoint that processing errors (i.e., adding and subtracting values rather than 
processing points multiplicatively) underpinned the linear bias in this context.  
These findings indicate that when data is disclosed in numerical formats (as 
opposed to time series formats) people seek key reference points which they then 
combine using additive methods to generate linear judgments. Thus, in sparse contexts, 
where there is no additional data for comparison, people make sense of the environment 
by seeking relevant referents which can be easily and efficiently processed to make a 
fast, cognitively efficient judgment based on combining the referents arithmetically. A 
heuristic strategy such as this is logical, in that it minimizes effort and attentional 
resources where minimal information is available.  
The same processes and methodology were applied when viewing sparse data in 
time series format, except that this environment was less conducive to the identification 
of key referents. As in the retail context, both humanitarians and non-humanitarians 
with no prior forecasting experience formed consistently linear forecasts amidst 
cyclically trending data, which reflected a linear model based on all three cues (as 
opposed the last two points). This suggests that in time series formats, the tendency to 
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linearly extrapolate may be based more upon the visual comparison and combination of 
all available cues rather than a computation based on only two key data points. It is 
possible that the graphical display facilitated visual analysis to a greater extent than the 
numeric format which increased the inclination to additively compute estimates based 
on the arithmetic mean of two relevant points. Either way, the processes employed in 
each environment yielded consistently linear predictions based on the assumption of 
absolute values and the arithmetic processing of cues.  
When examining performance in rich data environments involving numerical 
formats, people making financial repayment judgments showed the same propensity to 
seek relevant reference points and combined them additively just as the retailers did in 
sparse numerical contexts. In this setting however, a default in the form of loan costs for 
a reduced mortgage term were displayed alongside costs for the full term in condition 1. 
In condition 2, the default was positioned in rich contextual data relating to loan costs in 
future rates. This future rate data for both the full and default (reduced) term 
information was disclosed simultaneously with the current rate data.  
When seeking meaning in more complex data environments such as those in 
experiment 4 which involved a wide range of cues (i.e., the reduced and full term cost 
information), people sought key referents in the form of the minimum and maximum 
repayment amounts. These two values were then additively combined to generate a 
decision based on the arithmetic mean. This indicates that when additional information 
is present, people make sense of the information in the environment by locating 
referents which represent an upper and lower bound. In the context of a repayment 
decision, this is a logical strategy in that it provides a summary of the most relevant 
information to the judgment and generates a range within which a repayment judgment 
can be made.  
In this setting, it is thus apparent that the framing mechanisms involving a 
numeric format and the simultaneous disclosure of default information in concrete terms 
worked in congruence with the judgment processes underpinning linear tendencies. The 
effect of the default thus interacted positively with the tendency to seek and combine 
referents based on minimum and maximum values which made this mechanism 
effective in operationalizing the linear bias to improve decision performance rather than 
to hinder it.  
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When presented with rich context information in time series formats, the 
propensity to make linear judgments based on additively combining cues remained 
robust. However, in this setting, non-causal cues as opposed to relevant context 
information was added to the data environment to create noise, which resulted in an 
increase in judgment error. In this situation, the same propensity to compare and 
combine data when simultaneously viewing target and added context cues was evident. 
However, it is possible that the time series format made the identification of useful 
numerical referents more difficult. Compounded by the lack of relevance of the context 
information, people thus sought meaning in the data environment based on visually 
comparing cues to identify similarities in the directions of the trends. Rather than 
seeking a clear upper and lower bound, this visual method appeared to characterize 
judgments, enabling people to derive a rationale for linearly projecting the target data in 
a particular direction.    
As in the sparse time series format, the target data cues were again combined 
additively to generate linear projections, however the direction of the linear 
extrapolations were guided by the direction of the trends in the noise. This shows that in 
complex environments where additional data is unrelated (and thus of no use), people 
are still prone to utilize the data to help guide and rationalize their judgments. Seeking 
patterns and similarities between data is therefore likely to be a strategy for making 
sense in incomprehensible environments when a clear judgment range is not 
numerically identifiable. This suggests that the increased judgment error in noise shown 
among humanitarians and novices is likely to stem not simply from linearly extending 
the target series, but from actively seeking patterns in noise to inform judgment 
directions.   
The key factors which influenced the linear bias in these two complex data 
environments are therefore the format of the data and context information, and the 
causality of the additional cues. Both situations involved rich information, however 
performance in the financial setting was facilitated whereas it was hindered in the 
humanitarian domain. It is probable that the time series format increased the difficulty 
of identifying referents, leading people to compare cues using a visual heuristic strategy 
based on similarities. Target data cues were then combined additively to produce linear 
extrapolations which followed the same direction of the other cues.  
However, in the financial scenario, the additional context information was 
delivered in numerical formats and the added information was highly relevant to the 
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task objective. Viewing the data in absolute formats in this situation made it easier for 
people to locate referents and established a clear meaning from the data, based on an 
upper and lower bound. In the context of the highly relevant additional information (i.e., 
the reduced term data), the propensity to seek an upper and lower bound and apply 
arithmetic operations becomes adaptive, based on people comparing and combining 
values across all observable cues. Therefore, the default (i.e., the reduced term data) in 
this particular setting represents an important mechanism impacting human judgment by 
harnessing the propensity to seek and compare key referents in complexity, and apply 
arithmetic operations. When presented simultaneously with the target information (i.e., 
the full term data) in concrete terms, the default utilized the processes involved in the 
linear bias to improve rationality by converting human propensities from erroneous 
processes into adaptive strategies within the given data environment. Rather than 
minimizing the linear bias therefore, the default increased performance by working in 
accordance with the propensities which promote it.  
The default further amplified judgment performance when the anchoring effect 
was amplified by positioning it in the context of future rate information. For example, 
the findings showed that loan repayment judgments were more optimal when people 
viewed the default (i.e., the reduced term data) alongside the full term data in ‘future 
rate’ context compared to when viewing the default information alongside the full term 
data in ‘current rates’ only. By disclosing the default in a future rate frame 
simultaneously with the target data in current rates, the absolute difference between the 
minimum and maximum suggested repayment amounts increased. This increase 
between the upper and lower bound improved judgment effectiveness (i.e., the amount 
people decided to repay) not only by increasing the value of the arithmetic mean, but 
also by heightening the saliency of costs associated with future interest rates, which 
within a financial choice scenario is extremely important.  
The strong relevance of the future rate information to the judgment task raised the 
significance of the increased costs, drawing greater attention to the default information 
containing the upper bound (i.e., the reduced term costs in future rates). As a result, the 
default had a stronger anchoring effect compared to when it conveyed reduced term 
costs in current rates. Under these conditions, people made lesser adjustments away 
from the default to form repayment judgments which fell above the arithmetic mean of 
the upper and lower bound. In contrast, when the default was positioned in a current 
rates frame, judgments fell slightly below the mean. 
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In sum, when observing numerical values without surrounding contextual 
information (i.e., in the retail environment), people utilize minimal data points (i.e., the 
two most relevant observations) and apply fast and frugal arithmetic operations. Where 
multiple cues exist, (i.e., in the humanitarian setting), the same linear prediction bias 
characterizes judgments, except that people use the surrounding information to guide 
their estimates as a means of deriving rationale for judgments based on patterns in the 
noise. Together, these findings point to the importance of the available contextual 
information in judgment situations. In the absence of contextual cues, people resort to 
basic linear strategies. When context is present, they combine the additional information 
to either guide linear projections, or to derive the arithmetic mean of two referent 
points. Depending on the causality and format, the propensity to combine context 
information can be either harmful or adaptive. Where irrelevant (i.e., in the context of 
non-causal context cues), the comparison and combination of cues leads to erroneous 
judgments which are linear in nature. Conversely, in the context of relevant, causal data 
cues and absolute numeric formats, the linear bias can be adaptive when default values 
are positioned within the context of future event data frames.   
The findings indicate that processes underpinning the linear bias characterize 
judgments across contexts and groups, and that data format impacts the linear bias via 
the human propensity to think in concrete terms, look for useful numerical benchmarks 
and add and subtract values to make choices and predictions. Depending on the format 
and relevance of contextual information in complex environments, data can be framed 
to counteract the negative effects of the linear bias in complex judgment domains 
involving non-linear relations. The robustness of the linear bias shown throughout the 
findings suggests that interventions aimed at minimizing it are unlikely to be effective. 
The results relating to the effectiveness of ‘future event’ defaults therefore deliver 
important theoretical and practical implications, indicating that it may be possible to 
facilitate more accurate estimates of the effects of exponential functions by displaying 
outcomes on a temporal continuum.  
Future event defaults delivered in concrete terms and disclosed simultaneously 
with current event data are effective in creating highly salient context which improves 
judgment by increasing the relevance of future events, and thus the anchoring effect of 
the default. It is possible therefore, that simultaneously framing ‘current’ versus ‘future’ 
outcomes at different points in time will facilitate more detailed comprehension of non-
linear relations between variables, and help to anchor people even more on ‘future’ 
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framed defaults. As described above, future event defaults may therefore provide a 
framing mechanism for improving human rationality by conveying information to work 
in accordance with linear biases. This approach is likely to be more effective than 
applying interventions aimed at correcting or retraining cognitive biases and irrational 
judgment processes. 
7.2.1   Alternative Theoretical Perspectives and Limitations in Design  
The remainder of this section evaluates the findings discussed above, delivering 
possible alternative perspectives and explanations for the results, including 
experimental effects and shortcomings in design which may have contributed to the 
results. 
When considering the linear bias in the retail forecasters for example, it is 
possible that more ‘conservative’ estimates based on forecasting towards the mean are 
less erroneous when considered in relation to wider supply chain factors and longer time 
horizons. When testing performance in real world settings, the tendency to under-
forecast and over-forecast may be adaptive in the context of other, un-modelled domain 
specific information. As a result, tendencies to project trends linearly could reflect tacit 
knowledge and beliefs about the data which are used in shaping judgments beyond the 
observable cues. However, data relating to peoples’ individual beliefs and knowledge 
about the domain and the data were not captured in the experiment. Further 
investigation using rich context is necessary to indicate how the linear bias may be 
impacted by beliefs and knowledge, based on how people synthesize data with beliefs 
and use additional context to guide judgments. Based on the sparse numerical cues used 
in the experiment, it is not possible to draw conclusions regarding how knowledge and 
beliefs are integrated in the judgment processes to yield the linear bias. However, it is 
clear that data format and framing is important to interpretation of cues and how people 
integrate additional data in the formation of linear judgments.  
This suggests that beliefs and knowledge will also be impacted by format. It is 
probable that they will shape judgments by feeding back into the interpretation of 
additional context data, and applied as a means of confirming initial interpretations of 
the data, based upon the format. For example, Hohle and Teigen (2015) showed that 
participants predicted experts’ climate change forecasts by endorsing trends which 
corresponded with their individual beliefs about the consequences of climatic changes. 
Predominantly, people continued the extension of upward trends for sea level and 
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temperature rises and downward trends for grain productivity. This propensity was 
particularly marked among people with stronger beliefs in anthropogenic climate 
changes. 
It is also possible that the linear bias may have arisen based on experience of the 
effects of trend-damping. For example, damping statistical model trends in the retail 
forecasting domain may have proven to be an effective strategy in the past, particularly 
in the context of sparse data, hence the strong propensity to linearly extend trends in the 
experiment. If the retailers were to show evidence of accurate non-linear extrapolation 
in contexts other than supply chain, this would indicate that the linear bias may be more 
associated with beliefs based on domain-specific experience, rather than global 
judgmental processes. Testing this hypothesis is warranted, because there may be a 
stronger element of domain specificity involved in the linear bias than these results 
indicate. Depending on the nature of the data, the linear bias may be more ‘rational’ in 
certain environments, and the impact of peoples’ knowledge and beliefs on probability 
estimates may vary greatly between settings (Lawrence, Goodwin, O’Connor, & Önkal, 
2006).  
Making conservative estimates or under-adjustments to statistical forecasts could 
also be an expression of the ‘golden rule’ of forecasting (Armstrong, Green & Graefe, 
2015), which states that ‘forecasters should be conservative by making proper use of 
cumulative knowledge and not go beyond that knowledge’. It is feasible that the 
conservativeness of the retailers’ estimates (i.e., the tendency to forecast towards the 
mean) reflected this concept, based on the assumption that their knowledge is not 
sufficiently greater than that of the systems or other experts involved in generating 
model data. A similar explanation to this is the ‘asymmetric loss function’ which 
accounts for operational logistics, marketing and sales forecasters’ propensity to over-
predict in an effort to minimize losses. This is based on the concept that over-ordering 
stock has less negative financial impact in the long term compared to under-ordering 
which risks empty stores. The retailers may therefore have underestimated increases as 
a mechanism for moderating risk associated with over-estimating returns (Lawrence, 
O'Connor, & Edmundson, 2000). Alternatively, the over-forecasting of decreases may 
reflect an optimistic belief that sales will not decline to extent the data suggests.  
In the case of both the retailers and the humanitarian aid workers in experiment 2, 
it is possible that the artificiality of the situation and the experimental presentation of 
the data encouraged participants to seek and extract trends leading to prediction 
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anomalies or atypical strategies which would not occur in the real-world setting. In 
unfamiliar situations for example, people are shown to make judgments based on 
strategies which are better suited to other circumstances which they are more familiar 
with (Oskarsson, Van Boven, McClelland & Hastie, 2009). An absence of real-world 
background information may have increased the propensity to seek patterns and 
regularities in the case where the underlying mechanisms and causal factors where 
unknown (Elliman, 2006).  
Throughout JDM research, biases which are identified are often recognised as 
arising from participants assuming that all available data is there to be used, and thus 
incorporating it in their judgments (Wanke, 2007). This could account for aid workers 
and novices’ tendency to linearly project trends in noise based on a perceived 
‘consensus’ between the directions of all observed cues. This finding may therefore 
have reflected an expectation bias, whereby people assumed that the trends were to be 
projected in the same direction, without considering what the task required or 
represented in reality. These possibilities point to some of the well-recognised 
difficulties and limitations associated with experimentally replicating field 
environments (Lipshitz, 1993; Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu & Salas, 2001). 
When viewed as an experimental context effect, the tendency to trend damp and 
anti-damp (i.e., under-estimate increases and over-estimate decreases) may be 
considered an adaptive strategy, despite that linearly extrapolating the data created error 
in the particular data environments tested. For example, people are shown to regress 
towards the mean trend encountered when forming forecasts in multiple trials (Stevens 
& Greenbaum, 1966; Warren, 1985). In this respect, linear regression towards the mean 
may be a rational strategy for minimizing expected error by forecasting according to the 
estimated mean trend, or by taking a weighted average of the estimated trend on a 
particular trial and the estimated mean trend (Harvey & Reimers, 2013). A similar 
perspective to this is the adaptation hypothesis which also explains trend damping as an 
adaptive strategy, suggesting that people are predisposed to forecast in accordance with 
degrees of growth and decay which are representative of natural environments.  
Patterns in ecological growth and decline, found widely throughout natural time 
series, tend to follow sigmoidal functions resulting from an initial positive acceleration 
followed by trend damping due to depletion of resources. This leads to a levelling off 
which reflects the carrying capacity of the environment (Tsoularis & Wallace, 2002). 
Trend-damping may be considered as the tendency to predict in accordance with these 
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natural functions, hence the apparent effectiveness of trend-damp in various contexts 
(Collopy & Armstrong, 1992; Gardner & McKenzie, 1985).  
Interestingly, Harvey and Reimers (2013) found that the tendency to trend damp 
in accordance with representative patterns of growth and decline in the natural 
environment occurs independently of context effects. In a single-shot between-
participants experiment involving a single time-series, damping was shown to occur 
with positively accelerated series and anti-damping with negatively accelerated series. 
In the absence of repeated trials, these results suggest that rather than a bias created by 
context effects, trend damping may be the result of long-term adaptation to the natural 
environment from which trends occur.  
In terms of the prediction patterns shown among retail forecasters, the propensity 
to extrapolate linearly could thus be an expression of the tendency to trend damp and 
anti-damp in accordance with patterns of growth and decline in the environment. These 
patterns may be associated directly with ecological factors such as seasonal variance, as 
well as specific supply chain factors, such as manufacturing lead times. For example, 
naturally occurring growth and decay is reflected in weather changes which shape 
patterns in supply and demand. Ecological factors are also likely to impact factors such 
as product lead times, and may thus have an indirect influence on supply and demand.  
Factors such as lead times also mean that estimates have to be formed for events 
far into the future, which suggests that both retailers and aid workers’ may be better at 
forecasting over longer time horizons, using more cues compared to the short three-
point sequences used in the experiments. The inclination to moderate increasing and 
decreasing trends may therefore be an effective ‘rational’ strategy over longer horizons 
in complex environments. Findings have shown for example, that novices with no prior 
experience of a given field tend to employ strategies which are more adapted to shorter 
time horizons compared to those with domain specific knowledge (Thomson, Pollock, 
Henriksen, & Macaulay, 2004). In this view, the linear bias (i.e., the propensity to trend 
damp) may arise from people being more adapted to forecast over longer time horizons 
based on the effectiveness of the strategy in terms of real-world supply chain or refugee 
camp morbidity indicator outcomes. Depending on whether the variance in these factors 
reflects natural patterns of growth and decline, it is possible that the linear bias in this 
context represents peoples’ inherent awareness of such variance, thus supporting the 
ecological perspective. 
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Although this view does not effectively explain the importance of beliefs and 
domain knowledge to judgment performance, it posits the idea that the linear bias could 
be related to judgment processes which are attuned to naturally occurring variance and 
that human judgment processes yield effective estimates when applied in the context of 
time lines which more accurately reflect those found in the real-world environment. It is 
possible therefore that people with more experience may potentially be more sensitive 
to environmental patterns of growth and decay, and thus possess a greater ability to 
form more effective judgments in the context of more data over longer time spans. 
Further studies are necessary to test this possibility in the retail and aid environments, 
and other complex domains involving people with and without specific experience in 
the field.  
In the domain of financial choice, the ecological viewpoint could also account for 
the linear bias and its harmful effects. For example, a tendency to trend damp based on 
judgment processes being geared for natural growth and decline in the context of 
compound interest (exponential growth) will yield underestimates of future outcomes. 
Moreover, the effects of compounding mean that inaccuracies increase (as opposed to 
decrease) over longer time spans. The linear bias may therefore be particularly non-
adaptive in environments where trends follow ‘un-natural’ (non-sigmoidal) patterns, 
such as the exponential growth of interest rates. This notion of the linear bias as a 
product of adaptation to the environment fits with the concept of ‘natural algorithms’ 
forming the basis of human rationality, which involve processing data in terms of 
absolute counts, and sampling from the environment in natural frequencies.  
In the context of exponential growth trends, optimism is another factor 
contributing to judgment inaccuracy. In domains such as financial decision making, 
consumer choice, or health, judgments which involve computing percentages and 
modelling exponential trends often include other factors such as marketing, or public 
health messages which can impact peoples’ motives and behaviours. For example, 
choosing between credit cards, or whether to give up smoking, or to take up exercise are 
all judgments which involve extrapolating compound effects (i.e., exponential 
functions) and are subject to powerful individual motives and drivers. In these contexts, 
there is a strong propensity to think optimistically and underestimate future outcomes. 
The linear bias is thus behaviourally amplified in such environments which acts to 
increase its detrimental impact on choice and behaviour.  
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The results of the framing manipulation tested in the financial repayment 
judgment context demonstrate a means of improving judgments by counteracting 
optimism where compounding is concerned. From the ecological viewpoint, the framing 
manipulation may be increasing peoples’ ability to control for the effects of ‘un-natural’ 
exponential trends, by increasing rationality in accordance with statistical models rather 
than naturally occurring variance. The framing effects also held when factoring in other 
important individual differences. Participants with lower levels of education, financial 
literacy and a preference for short-terms gains (i.e., financial optimism) made 
significantly higher (more optimal) repayment judgments compared to a minimum 
suggested amount in current rates over the full term. Previously, these individual 
differences have been associated with poor financial judgment and behaviour. However, 
the robustness of the framing effect across groups indicates that the framing of rates in 
the future is likely to be effective in overcoming such effects. Future event frames may 
therefore be a useful manipulation for promoting behaviour and choice in other 
exponential growth contexts where individual differences and behavioural motives are 
likely to have a strong impact.  
It is important to note however, that the association between financial literacy and 
behaviour is unclear, with some studies yielding negative associations between financial 
literacy and performance (e.g., Newall, 2016b), and others showing that raising 
financial literacy does not lead to improvements in judgments (e.g., Fernandes et al., 
2014). The current findings thus provide a strong basis for further examination of the 
framing effect among individual differences in complex non-linear judgment domains 
to identify mechanisms which may be mediating performance effects in these groups, 
and whether or not they hold across settings.     
In summary, various explanations for the linear bias have been posited, which 
include experimental effects and the impacts of domain specific knowledge and 
experience, and trend damping as a reflection of the propensity to predict in accordance 
with natural growth and decline. From these perspectives, the linear bias is potentially 
adaptive in the context of more data and longer time horizons which could be more 
representative of the temporality of events in the real-world (i.e., in ‘nature’). In the 
context of exponential growth (e.g., compound interest rates) which are less reflective 
of patterns found in nature, the linear bias is detrimental to performance, particularly so 
over longer time horizons. Presenting data in absolute terms with defaults positioned in 
‘future outcome’ information could be a useful mechanism for optimizing judgment 
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tendencies in accordance with the linear bias to yield effective choices and behaviours 
in the context of exponential trends and complex, varied cues. 
Although performance may be difficult to determine based on only three data 
points (particularly in the context of noise), the robustness of the linear bias shown 
across groups and contexts throughout the prior chapters suggests that barriers to 
computation based on the tendency to think in concrete terms and apply simultaneous 
processing to numerical data are key factors underpinning the widespread tendency to 
make linear judgments amidst non-linear trends and percentages.  
Differences in how the linear bias impacts performance is dependent on data 
frame and format, and the richness and relevance of context information. These 
components then interact with judgment processes to shape rationality depending on 
individual motives, knowledge, experience and beliefs in the context of the task and 
specific judgment objectives. In both sparse and complex environments, it is likely that 
experience and beliefs etc., are applied in the judgment process to aid in the 
interpretation and synthesis of cues. Based on mechanisms identified in the ‘summary 
and contributions’ above, it is posited that people linearly extrapolate data (or adjust 
additively computed estimates) in ways which are confirmatory of beliefs and 
experience. In time series formats for example, this can result in following trends and 
seeking patterns in data which fit with expectations and are congruent with beliefs. In 
numeric formats, it is likely that people look for relevant reference points to compute 
estimates which are then adjusted in accordance with beliefs.  
7.3   Further Research  
There are possible modifications and extensions which could be made to the 
experiments in each chapter to further examine the processes underpinning the linear 
bias in the settings investigated. Firstly, it would be useful to deliver a formal measure 
of numerical data processing in each context to verify the propensity to additively 
process percentage data in the settings investigated. This would strengthen the evidence 
for this characteristic as key human trait underpinning the linear bias. For example, this 
could involve (as previous studies have done) assessing retailers, aid workers and 
consumers’ ability to determine whether the final return value of a stock rising and 
falling in percentage points is smaller or larger than the initial value.  
  
191 
Overestimating investment returns in this task indicates the tendency to 
simultaneously process information (Newall, 2016a), which would confirm format 
confusion and failure to multiplicatively processes as a key mechanism contributing to 
the linear bias when viewing percentages and exponential trends in each of the settings 
investigated. A formal measure of numeracy could also provide support for the 
robustness of percentage processing errors across groups and settings. For example, 
numeracy is shown to correlate not only with numerical skills (Tubau, 2008), but also 
with performance in Bayesian inference tasks when data is presented in both probability 
(percentage) and frequency formats (Chapman & Liu, 2009; Johnson & Tubau, 2015).  
Another important set of variables warranting further analysis is the impact of 
peoples’ individual beliefs based on experience, knowledge and motives on judgment 
formation and how they affect the linear bias. In conjunction with how format 
influences peoples’ perception of numerical information, it is likely that beliefs about 
the data and its meaning in the real-world are imported into the judgment process to 
influence perceptions of context information and the interpretation of patterns and 
relevant reference points in the data environment. There is likely to be a tendency to 
then seek features and meanings in the data with support beliefs, and make judgments 
based on additively processing the data to form linear estimates which reflect those 
beliefs.  
It is necessary to examine how these factors interact with data format, frames and 
context information to impact judgment processes in different settings. In domains such 
as retail and humanitarian aid for example, methodologies used in naturalistic decision 
making research could be usefully applied to collect data in investigative field 
experiments. Methods such as these would deliver insights into how experience and 
beliefs are combined with data and incorporated into the linear judgment processes. As 
outlined in the above, it is probable that people form linear judgments in accordance 
with beliefs, experience and motives based on seeking patterns in data which align with 
these factors. In this sense, individual expectations and experiences feedback into 
judgmental processes to inform the interpretation of data and guide judgment 
adjustments via linear perceptual processes. (These processes may differ therefore, 
depending on data format and the nature of context information).   
A closer analysis of the behavioural and motivational factors impacting judgment 
formation in consumer choice and financial decision making is also required. In these 
areas, it is important to understand how individual motives and factors such as temporal 
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discounting can influence peoples’ interpretation of information and contribute to the 
linear bias. In situations such as online shopping, lottery playing, or selecting between 
credit cards for example, tendencies such as optimism and impulsiveness are likely to 
play a key role in mediating or amplifying the linear bias. These tendencies are 
connected with high temporal preference (or the strong desire to maximize short term 
gains). This may be reflected in irrational, non-cost effective purchase decisions, and 
the propensity to select options with the lowest repayment costs, despite the fact that 
these choices incur higher costs overall. It is necessary to tease apart the effects of 
motives and beliefs in these situations to understand how irrational choices and 
behaviours (associated with the linear bias) are connected to informational formats and 
framings steering the judgmental processes. 
The findings from across all domains investigated indicate that format is an 
important factor determining the judgment processes which contribute to the linear bias. 
To verify the effects of format, it is necessary to test whether the judgment processes 
are impacted in the same way when alternating data formats between each of the 
environments assessed. Drawing parallels between performance across fields based on 
format is important to verify the proposed mechanisms for how data format is connected 
to the linear bias. For example, by presenting the retail forecasters with sales data in 
sparse time series format, we would expect to see the same tendency to linearly project 
trends as was shown by the aid workers. Likewise, if aid workers were shown numeric 
formats in sparse context trials, we would expect the same propensity to additively 
process percentages and extrapolate trends based on the last two observations as shown 
among retailers.  
Evidence suggests that people tend to interpret statistical information (specifically 
percentage data) as ‘benign’, which can lead to less accurate assessments of risk 
compared to when information is viewed in frequency formats, which more effectively 
promote the meaningfulness of the information (Slovic, Monahan & MacGregor, 2000). 
In the financial choice setting, it may therefore be possible to further optimize 
rationality by using graphical displays to communicate the temporal effects of 
compounding in terms of absolute costs when considering different rates, product types, 
and loan terms. A visual representation of the exponential relations could be more 
effective in countering optimism (or high discounting) than simultaneously displaying 
the current versus future rate information in numeric formats.  
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It would be interesting to test if displaying current versus future rate data and 
repayment information graphically (either in line or bar format) would further optimize 
the framing effect to facilitate loan choice and repayment decision making. For 
instance, a dynamic line or bar format to communicate loan options and monthly costs 
(in which people manipulate variables to see physical effects in terms of size/shape 
changes) could increase visualization of the data. Being able to see the physical effects 
of compounding in dynamic formats is likely to heighten the saliency of future rates, 
thus drawing greater attention to the real-word implications. Thus, graphical formats 
may more effectively communicate the concepts and relations between variables 
involved in complex non-linear environments (particularly in low educational groups).  
Another means of increasing the meaningfulness and correspondence of the data 
with the real-world could be to use icons (i.e., graphical representations of the 
variables). When applied in frequency format, the use of dynamic icon arrays is shown 
to significantly improve statistical rationality, particularly among lower numeracy 
populations (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2009; Okan, Garcia-Retamero, Cokely & 
Maldonado, 2012). The mechanism is based on heightening the data saliency by using 
cues which reflect real-world populations, items or events. The frequency display thus 
conveys the set relations between the variables (i.e., the base rate information) to 
facilitate the comprehension of a risk factor as a proportion of a population whole. This 
is shown to greatly improve judgment by making transparent the implications of 
statistical data in terms of the real-world impacts on individuals and groups.  
It is possible that frequency formats using icon arrays may also be useful in the 
financial judgment setting to communicate cost differences between loan types, and 
between full versus reduced term information in current versus future rate frames. This 
could be effective by facilitating the comprehension of the temporal effects of 
compounding in relation to the continuum of absolute costs for different product types 
and loan terms over time more effectively than simply numeric formats involving a 
default in future rate context. Based on the results among lower educational 
populations, it is also possible that using icons in frequency format may be more 
effective in promoting judgmental rationality across groups compared to line or bar 
graph displays used to convey the framing effect.  
Other ways of facilitating judgment among low educational, or socio-economic 
groups could involve framing the data in terms of ‘losses’ versus ‘gains’. For example, 
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in addition to disclosing costs for the reduced term, it might increase the effect to also 
show the saving in relation to the full term alternative using the following manipulation:  
“You will save $104,703.80 over 10 years if you repay $2,811.12 per month” as 
opposed to “If you repay $2,811.12 per month, it will take 10 years to clear the 
balance”, and vice versa for the full term option; 
“You will lose $104,703.80 over 20 years if you repay $1,841.83 per month” 
rather than “If you repay $1,841.83 per month, it will take 20 years to clear the 
balance”.  
Loss/gain framing could also be applied to the interest costs in the same way, for 
example; 
 “You will save $6,007.93 in interest over 10 years” versus “You will lose 
$6,007.93 in interest over 20 years”. 
One interesting possibility is that framing costs associated with time spans as 
gains versus losses might interact with temporal preference. It would be worth 
investigating for example, whether people with higher temporal preference are more 
sensitive to higher long term costs when framed as gains and less sensitive to lower 
short term gains when framed as losses. Based on the ambiguity of the relation between 
financial literacy and financial judgment and behaviour (e.g., Fernandes et al., 2014), 
examining loss versus gain framings as a potential mediator of financial judgment 
among groups varying in educational abilities and temporal preferences could be 
beneficial. As outlined above, loss versus gain disclosures will act to increase the 
saliency of cost differences in easily relatable terms, thus potentially having a strong 
impact on rationality among lower educational groups. 
Increasing the effectiveness of informational formats and frames in financial 
judgment settings could also increase the quantity of data people are capable of 
processing. Past findings have shown that increasing the number of choice alternatives 
in various decision environments leads to a decline in judgment effectiveness (Benartzi 
& Thaler, 2002; Sethi-Iyengar, Huberman & Jiang, 2004), due to increases in noise 
which accompany more informational cues (e.g., Harvey, Bolger & McClelland, 1994). 
However, it is possible that graphical formats may increase the number of choice 
alternatives people are able to process onscreen at any one time. In a domain which 
involves hundreds of choice alternatives, exploring graphical data formats to increase 
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the proportion of data people can simultaneously process could greatly aid judgment 
effectiveness.  
The way in which people process complex cues when disclosed in simultaneous 
versus sequential frames requires closer analysis to understand how the process of 
comparative analysis contributes to judgment performance. Reconstructing the loan 
choice and repayment decision making experiments as eye-tracking studies would show 
how data was compared in each framing. The time spent viewing each rate frame and 
the number of comparisons made between each frame would indicate which data points 
were most important to the judgment process. Recording eye tracking information in 
combination with screen click data in the loan choice experiments would also show how 
people choose to reorder loans, providing data relating to which individual loan product 
attributes people deemed most important to the judgment process.  
Together, these results could provide further evidence of factors underpinning the 
linear bias in complex online choice environments. If tested in relation to standard 
financial data formats for example, we may see that people are inclined to focus more 
on percentage information despite miscomprehension of percentage formats, or that 
people pay particular attention to certain cues, or make particular data comparisons 
which are ineffective when analysing financial product attributes.   
In addition to testing alternative data formats, it is also necessary to assess how 
the linear bias may be effected by data presented over longer horizons and in different 
types of context information. It is possible that the three-point time horizons used to test 
performance in the retail and aid environments were not representative of real-world 
data, and thus generated unreliable reflections of peoples’ judgment processes. 
Examining performance over longer horizons in sparse and rich contexts is required to 
assess the robustness of the judgmental processes yielding the linear bias. For example, 
assessing judgment performance in relation to real-world outcomes (i.e., actual events) 
in the retail and aid environment may be useful in determining whether the linear bias 
(i.e., the propensity to trend damp) is effective over the longer time spans (i.e., leads to 
increased performance in terms of actual outcomes).  
As postulated in the ‘alternative theoretical perspectives’ section, we may find 
that people in complex environments are more capable of making effective predictions 
over longer time horizons. As well as reflecting adaptation to the variance in domain 
specific factors (e.g., product lead times), it could also represent a sensitivity to patterns 
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of variance in the natural world, thus supporting the adaptation perspective. This is 
possible, considering that naturally occurring patterns of growth and decline are echoed 
in domain specific factors (e.g., seasonally determined morbidity indicators). 
Based on the effects of sparse versus rich context on judgment processes in 
numeric and time series formats, it is likely that adding noise or relevant information to 
each environment will result in the same processing mechanisms. For example, we 
would expect that adding causal cues in numeric format to the retail environment would 
result in people seeking an upper and lower bound across the whole data environment, 
just as they did when viewing loan repayment data in current versus future rates. Thus, 
rather than computing the mean of the last two observations in each sequence, people 
would additively combine the last point in the target sequence with another point (or the 
mean of multiple points) in the context data. Depending on nature (and saliency) of the 
context information, people are likely to then adjust estimates above or below the mean, 
based on individual experience and beliefs.  
In the context of noise however, there is likely to be parallels with the aid 
workers, whereby people viewing noisy data numeric formats create meaning amidst 
the complexity by using simple heuristic strategies to identify patterns and similarities 
between all the observable cues. On strategy people might employ, could involve 
comparing the absolute differences between points two and three across all cues to 
identify similarities in trend directions. Akin to the aid worker, they may then 
incorporate noise into the judgment by predicting increases when all cues are rising 
from points two to three (based on the arithmetic mean of the last two points), and 
decreases when all cues are falling. Another possibility is that people will seek to match 
the final observations in each sequence based on the values in absolute terms, then 
additively combine points which have a similar absolute value to yield estimates based 
on the arithmetic mean of these referents.  
With respect to the ‘trend effect’ identified in the aid setting, it is necessary to 
examine its robustness in more varied time series data to see whether there is a limit in 
terms of complexity in which data becomes too noisy for trends to be visually compared 
and weighted. At this point, people may resort to different strategies to determine the 
direction in which to linearly project the target data. However, in the context of causal 
cues in time series formats, it is likely that the ‘trend effect’ will diminish because of the 
increase in meaningfulness of the additional information. This will decrease the 
inclination to look for ‘meaningful’ patterns in the data based on similarities in cue 
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directions, and increase the propensity to evaluate the data in the context of individual 
knowledge, experience and beliefs. The tendency to linearly project trends is likely to 
remain robust, based on the same tendency to additively combine cues in both noise and 
relevant context. However, the more relevant or salient the context, the more likely it 
will be to activate peoples’ individual experiences and beliefs, leading to judgments 
which are shaped and adjusted to a larger extent by these human factors than judgments 
formed in situations involving non-causal, noisy data.  
7.3.1   Practical Applications for Improving Judgment and Behaviour 
The findings offer several implications for design which may be effective in 
improving human rationality and judgment in the context of consumer choice and 
behaviour change, and also in professional settings which involve the formation of 
formal probabilistic judgments in complex, non-linear environments.  
Based on the findings in the retail and humanitarian aid environments, it may be 
considered that the linear bias renders human judgment relatively ineffective in noisy 
real-world domains. However, results also suggest that there are many un-modelled 
factors involved in complex environments which contribute to wider forecast 
performance, beyond the observable data. It is likely that peoples’ inherent knowledge 
and experience of a particular context provides an overall awareness and ability to 
conceptually synthesize the factors involved. This overarching understanding of the 
environment is likely to indirectly impact forecast performance via judgment processes 
and applications which are distinct from statistical knowledge or data handling skills. It 
is important therefore to facilitate human domain knowledge in complex judgment 
environments to maximize the benefits of integrating peoples’ experience and 
awareness of un-modelled factors, whilst minimizing the potentially harmful effects of 
the linear bias.  
This may be achieved by applying people in the development and monitoring of 
statistical models, rather than relying on people to form unaided judgments in noisy 
real-world settings. By using model forecasts as a basis, human knowledge and 
experience may be integrating into the data environment via the monitoring and 
controlling of statistical model predictions. This approach may be effective in extracting 
the benefits of peoples’ additional knowledge by changing the processes underpinning 
how knowledge and experience is applied to the data. This change in method may thus 
facilitate people in making informed judgmental adjustments to unbiased statistical 
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models without the risks of forecasts becoming linearly biased by the effects of the 
judgment mechanisms shown in this thesis to be involved when people form judgments 
unaided in noisy environments. In this view therefore, the advantages of human 
experience may be utilized and isolated to some extent from the tendency to erroneously 
seek trends and interpret congruencies in noise which do not exist. 
There is recent evidence which suggests this method of applying human 
experience and judgment processes is likely to be effective in the aid domain. In this 
instance, people are employed in the model building, monitoring and interpretation of 
systems designed to forecast humanitarian aid demands ahead of climate-related 
disasters (Cousin, 2015). People are also shown to be highly effective in the field of 
weather forecasting when applied to identify important variables in simulations (e.g., 
barometric pressure) which statistical models then weight to form weather forecasts. In 
this area, peoples’ domain experience and ability to perform sanity checks (Silver, 
2013) are shown to increase the predictive accuracy of weather simulations by up to 
twenty-five percent (Lynch, 2006, 2008). Combined with examples such as these, the 
current findings imply significant benefits from assimilating human experience and tacit 
knowledge with the statistical modelling necessary for analysing, interpreting and 
utilizing ever-growing data sets in increasingly complex environments.  
With regard to real-world probabilistic decision making in non-professional 
settings, the effectiveness of the future rate default framing manipulation in the financial 
choice and repayment judgment contexts, indicates there is a strong potential to apply 
this framing to increase rationality, choice and behaviour in saving, investment and 
insurance decision making, as well as other settings such as health. Judgments relating 
to health behaviours are commonly subject to optimistic biases which can lead people to 
downplay the negative effects of certain actions and choices and delay making decisions 
which effect behavioural changes. Optimistic tendencies such as these are compounded 
by problems in interpreting percentage information and estimating the effects of non-
linear relations between variables (or actions) and outcomes. 
Health outcomes are commonly related to actions and judgments in exponential 
relations (e.g., health exponentially improves with smoking cessation, reduced alcohol 
or fast food consumption, and increased exercise and healthy eating). The difficulties 
people experience in modelling exponential trends are therefore likely to impact the 
perceived benefits of making certain decisions and engaging in particular health 
behaviours. This may be reflected for example, in the tendency to regard exercise as an 
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ineffective use of time, or perceive the adversity involved in giving up smoking as 
outweighing the perceived benefits, based on an inaccurate estimate of the time 
necessary to achieve ‘worth-while’ health advantages.  
These perceptions are related to the tendency to assume linear relations between 
actions and events which result in underestimates of the benefits of implementing 
behavioural changes sooner, or the perception that it will take far longer to experience 
the benefits than is actually the case in reality. Thus, peoples’ failure to action change is 
likely to be associated with biased perceptions of costs (e.g., time, expense, discomfort) 
as outweighing the perceived advantages over given time horizons. However, the 
advantages of stopping smoking, exercising (particularly high intensity interval training, 
for instance), drinking less alcohol, eating healthier food, or saving money are all 
examples of actions with compound effects. I.e., the benefits are larger and accrued 
more quickly over a given time span than people may predict. 
It could be possible therefore, to motivate more optimal health related judgments 
and choices (thus reducing optimistic tendencies which are associated with delaying 
judgments and actions) by framing present behaviour (and the health/financial 
implications) in relation to target behaviour (and the health/financial implications) using 
a ‘current’ versus ‘future’ health status/financial advantage frame for a specific time 
horizon. Akin to the framing manipulation in the monthly loan repayment judgment 
scenario, this could involve presenting a smokers’ health status (e.g., in relation to 
someone who has never smoked) for the number of cigarettes they currently smoke per 
day (e.g., 20) versus a target amount (e.g., zero) in the present versus the future (e.g., 
two years from now). This would convey the relation between the effects of current 
versus alternative behaviours over the specified time horizon, illustrating the 
exponential change in health status associated with the reduction (or cessation) in 
cigarette smoking for the given period of time.  
Observing the effects of the target behaviour (e.g., reduced smoking, or total 
cessation) in the future frame compared to the effects of the current behaviour (e.g., 20 
cigarettes per day), is likely to anchor people on the optimal decision (i.e., to reduce or 
stop smoking now) based on the visualization of the extent of health benefits accrued by 
the target behaviour in the time frame. This may be effective in providing the 
motivation necessary to prompt judgment processes underpinning an effective rationale 
for supporting sustained behavioural adjustments. Thus, the future health status default 
creates an anchoring effect, increasing peoples’ inclination to make adjustments towards 
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this optimal state when the positive effects of certain choices or judgments are made 
salient. The ability to view increases in health or financial status over different time 
horizons is likely to increase the inclination to action changes sooner rather than 
delaying the benefits into the future. This framing therefore has the potential to help 
correct optimistic biases (associated with temporal discounting) which are shown 
widely to negatively affect peoples’ health and finances.  
  Using dynamic graphical displays, or icon arrays in frequency formats to convey 
the current versus future health/financial outcomes could further facilitate the effect by 
helping people conceptualize the absolute different in the effectiveness of choice 
alternatives over different time horizons. For example, sliding an icon from left to right 
across a display could show absolute increases in health status compared to an icon 
relating to heath status for current choices and behaviours. Using concrete 
representations to convey the effects of choices over time will also increase data 
saliency and heighten the perceived impact of certain judgments and behaviours in real-
world terms.  
As is the case with saving for example, people are prone to underestimate the 
benefits of small, but consistent behaviours when dealing with non-linear growth 
functions and tend to believe that only large scale changes, or extreme efforts over 
extended time periods will lead to positive results. This erroneous propensity to linearly 
estimate the benefits of certain actions thus impacts motivation and creates barriers to 
more adaptive choices and behaviours. Observing the behavioural benefits in terms of 
the levels of effort or costs involved over time necessary to achieve a particular 
outcome could be useful in conveying the achievability of goals which is important in 
providing a strong underpinning rationale necessary for motivating sustained 
behavioural changes.   
The findings relating to human performance across domains all point to the 
importance of appropriate goal setting and the frequent monitoring of goal behaviour 
which is necessary for the self-regulation underpinning behaviour change (Harkin et al., 
2016). Using future event defaults in dynamic graphic displays could therefore provide 
an effective mechanism for improving rationality underpinning behaviour change by 
impacting the linear judgment processes which lead people to underestimate the positive 
impacts that small, consistent changes can have on future health and wealth. By 
working in accordance with the judgment processes underpinning the linear bias, the 
framing of future events in concrete terms is a potentially useful tool in assisting 
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behaviour change, which could be more effective than interventions aimed at correcting 
biases or retraining cognitive processes associated with maladaptive choices and 
behaviours.  
This approach is likely to be more effective than current visual frames used to 
communicate the negative physical impacts of cigarette smoking for example, which 
involve images of lung damage etc., disclosed on cigarette packets. It is possible that 
‘shock-tactics’ such as this can lead to informational desensitization when people are 
repeatedly exposed to such stimuli. The severity of the images may also be acting to 
demotivate and disengage people rather than inspire (or scare) them into reducing 
smoking. For example, it may be assumed that the extent of internal damage incurred 
from smoking (as inferred by the images) is too great or potentially irreversible and thus 
effort to change behaviour is unwarranted. From this perspective, the time taken to 
repair the damage (i.e., years of smoking cessation), may be perceived as too great to 
warrant the effort involved in giving up, or even reducing cigarette smoking. 
Although it may be highly salient, emotive imagery and wording is potentially 
less effective than more pragmatic data disclosures in public health communications 
which involve conveying the positive temporal effects that behavioural changes can 
have. For example, the current approach fails to address the attitude that ‘just one more’ 
cigarette will create no significant effect, or that delaying reduction or cessation will 
have no overall impact on health or finances in the long term. It is likely that extreme 
images alone do not provide enough information to activate the relevant judgment 
processes.  
Thus, more information is necessary, but in a simplified format which delivers 
data appropriate for forming a rationale to motivate engagement in judgment processes 
which lead to self-generated conclusions and formulations of choice and behavioural 
intentions. Disclosing the positive effects of behaviours in future frames could therefore 
provide a motivational mechanism for impacting health behaviours, as opposed to using 
negative imagery which utilizes fear and avoidance as the motivating factors. By 
modelling the non-linearity of the relation between choices and future outcomes, people 
are able to form more accurate perceptions of the effects of their efforts. This is likely to 
prove highly motivational when perceived efforts are shown to yield greater benefits 
over shorter time horizons that previously judged.  
  
202 
Another context in which optimistic tendencies interact with format biases to limit 
judgment effectiveness is when making food choices based on product packaging and 
industry information. Effective judgment and choice in this area is increasingly difficult 
to achieve, based on food industry marketing and promotions delivering conflicting 
information regarding health versus desirability, combined with ambiguous product data 
and unsupported health claims regarding the benefits of particular products or dietary 
choices. As a result, people are confronted with increasing amounts of data regarding 
the benefits and harms of certain food choices or diets which increases the complexity 
of the shopping and food choice environment. Judgment processes are further impacted 
by marketing designed to activate behavioural factors such as optimism, locus of control 
and self-determination which are levered to work in opposition to optimal choice from 
both health and financial perspectives. Amidst an obesity epidemic and increases in the 
associated problems, it is important to therefore consider informational frames and 
formats applied in food packaging as a tool for impacting the rationality underpinning 
food and dietary choices and behaviours.  
In the UK, the Food Standards Agency provides a ‘traffic light’ labelling system 
in which energy and nutrient levels (i.e., fat, saturated fat, sugar and salt) are shown in 
grams and colour coded as ‘high’ ‘medium’ or ‘low’ per product serving alongside each 
data point as a percentage of the daily reference intake for energy and each nutrient 
type. The purpose is to define products as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ based on a larger 
proportion of ‘low’ or ‘high’ colour codes per choice. However, this system assumes 
higher levels of any nutrient as ‘bad’ regardless of its type, which can lead to some 
more optimal options being erroneously framed as ineffective choices, and vice versa. 
For example, a product may be low in calories yet high in salt, or high in good fat but 
low in saturated fat.  
This data format and framing may also encourage people to assess items in 
isolation, when it is necessary to determine overall nutrient and energy intake on a daily 
basis in relation to referent intakes across all options. It is therefore difficult to compare 
and combine products to form an overall judgment of choice effectiveness per day, 
specifically when it involves synthesizing and balancing nutrient and energy values 
across varying portion sizes. It is also probable that people will interpret the nutrient, 
energy and reference intake cues as representative of the whole product, when in fact 
they represent a single portion. When considering the effects of marketing combined 
with optimistic biases in food choices, this is potentially hazardous, leading people to 
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assume that unhealthy options are not as suboptimal as the data suggests (i.e., that it is 
possible to consume far more of an option per day whilst remaining within the reference 
intakes). Confirmation biases also dictate that people are more likely to seek or interpret 
information in ways which align with expectations or beliefs. Thus, when seeking a 
rationale for an unhealthy choice, it is possible that the current frame and format of 
nutrient information could actually promote biased judgments and suboptimal 
behaviours, rather than act to minimise them. 
Based on the findings relating to the financial choice framing manipulation, one 
way to improve the effectiveness of peoples’ food choices would be to present minimal 
data in absolute formats and use a single metric which normalizes choice effectiveness 
across options to simplify the task of interpreting and comparing data for different 
portions. For example, energy per serving delivers an overall indication of choice 
effectiveness which could be sufficient to determine optimality across nutrient types, 
and groups of products. By converting the percentage of energy per serving (in relation 
to the 2000 kcal daily reference intake) into absolute values, a simple score on a scale of 
1 to 10 could be provided, where 1 equates to 10% of the daily caloric reference intake 
and 10 equates to 100%. (Caloric values are strongly associated with sugar and fat 
content, thus making energy a relatively effective indicator of general choice 
optimality). The advantage of framing caloric values as the key data point for decision 
making, is that it provides a clear referent point for facilitating people in forming fast, 
effective judgments based on summing the points across all choices per day.  
To more effectively communicate the data relating to portion size, a graphic (as 
opposed to numeric) format could be used to convey the relative quantities in absolute 
terms. For example, product packaging may be visually segmented into individual 
serving sizes using calibrations or shaded squares to represent the absolute size of each 
serving in relation to the whole product. Energy scores could then be displayed in a 
large typeface within each serving segment per packet to communicate the size of the 
portion relative to the score, thus indicating the effectiveness of options in terms of 
caloric density (i.e., small sizes with high numbers being less optimal). To maintain 
clarity in the data environment, the data for fat, saturated fat, sugar and salt (also framed 
in absolutes, i.e., grams per serving), could remain secondary to the energy score, 
disclosed in a smaller typeface with no scores attached. This will encourage people to 
focus predominantly on the energy metric, increasing the likelihood of them using the 
data as a referent point to combine and compare scores across options.   
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Providing an alternative frame for the energy score, such as a physical activity 
metric, could create a more meaningful context for the energy cue which may increase 
the impact of the data on judgment processes. For example, disclosing the number of 
minutes of brisk walking necessary to counteract the energy intake per potion (based on 
the average expenditure of 44 kcal per 10 minutes), creates a highly saliency 
visualization of the data, conveying information in relatable terms. Given that exercise 
is a strong predictor of general health across the lifespan (not just weigh loss), this could 
be a particularly beneficial manipulation in addition to energy scores. Using a graphical 
icon (e.g., a green ‘fast walking man’) in conjunction with the absolute minutes of brisk 
walking per portion could also aid the conceptual connection between caloric and 
nutritional information and everyday actions and behaviours. Using imagery to promote 
relations between data and real-life experiences could therefore be effective in evoking 
sensory and emotional responses which may lead to better visualization of the meaning 
and implications of choices compared to communicating the data in less vivid, ‘benign’ 
numeric formats.  
In sum, using visual representations and concrete values to frame the future 
effects of judgment and choice in relatable, real-world terms could overcome biases 
limiting rationality and behaviour in finance and health. For example, conveying food 
portion sizes in relation to exercise requirements, or framing health or financial 
advantages as the impacts of behaviour modification over time, are likely to promote 
more effective judgment and choice compared to standard industry informational 
frames and formats. Overall, the findings indicate that the key to effective frames and 
formats in consumer choice settings is to create mechanisms which work in accordance 
with peoples’ tendency to form linear inferences based on the mechanisms identified 
throughout this thesis. By supporting human rationality based on the propensity to seek 
meaning via referents and apply simple additive methods, it may be possible to facilitate 
and improve judgment and choice to a greater extent than applying measures designed 
to correct or modify the biases and limitations in peoples’ judgment processes.  
The communication of data in formats which are compatible with inherent 
judgment tendencies also support people in reaching effective conclusions and choices 
independently, through the self-assimilation of information. Creating mechanisms for 
learning and self-discovery which improve the depth of informational processing are 
thus important for the acquisition of knowledge underpinning effective rationales for 
behaviour change. For example, disclosing an energy score from 1 to 10 provides an 
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initial indicator of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ which can then be assessed within the context of the 
wider nutrient data and exercise requirement. In this sense, the energy data is made 
sufficiently accessibility to encourage further analysis, leading people to generate a 
stronger rationale for more optimal choice and behaviour. An educational mechanism 
such as this is likely to be more effective in creating long term behaviour change 
compared to information delivered in a purely instructional format, based on creating a 
deeper level of engagement which is achieved through the self-accrual of knowledge 
and personal experience.  
7.4   Concluding Comments  
The findings in this thesis show that the propensity to make concrete comparisons, 
perceive linear relations, and interpret data in accordance with knowledge, experience 
and beliefs are important determinants of human rationality in complex numeric 
domains. By assessing human judgment in both professional and novice/consumer 
populations, it was possible to test the robustness of processes underpinning biases 
across groups and individual differences. The tendency to form linear inferences is 
shown to be connected to informational format by the systematic bias to perceive values 
as absolutes and make sense of data by seeking linear trends and additively processing 
simple numeric referents which indicate the numeric continuum or bounds within which 
a judgment may be placed.  
The direction and magnitude of linear judgments are shown to relate to context 
information in a given situation. The way in which context effects judgment 
performance depends on the data frame and format which interacts with judgment 
processes to either help or hinder rationality. For example, in sparse time series formats, 
people linearly project cues based on all observable points, and in sparse numeric 
formats, people combine two key referents using arithmetic operations. In the context of 
non-linear trends and percentages, both these judgment processes can have detrimental 
effects. The potential for error is particularly high in varied time series formats, in 
which people tend to seek meaning in noise by utilizing the additional information as a 
directional guide for linear trend projections. However, when highly relevant context 
information (in the form of a future event default) is delivered numeric formats, the 
tendency to additively combine referents across the informational environment can be 
levered to generate highly effective judgment and choice.  
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In contextually richer environments therefore, formatting and framing information 
to operate in accordance with the judgment processes underpinning how people make 
sense of numeric environments (i.e., the processes which give rise to the linear bias), 
can lead to significant improvements in rationality and choice effectiveness. The 
importance of context data on human rationality suggests that judgment processes 
involve a far wider, more complex array of factors than those disclosed in the 
immediate data environment. Richer data settings activate peoples’ individual 
knowledge, experience and beliefs which are then imparted into the judgment process to 
guide formation of inferences and choices. How knowledge and experience etc., 
impacts rationality and judgment effectiveness thus depends on informational framings 
and formats. In both professional and consumer choice domains, the findings point 
towards individual knowledge and beliefs as having an impact on judgment 
performance which may be greater than statistical rationality, or the interpretation of 
cues in the immediate data environment alone.  
Although human judgment processes are strongly linearly biased, there is 
evidence that peoples’ inherent judgment abilities underpinned by individual knowledge 
and experience, can be significantly beneficial when applied in combination with model 
predictions in complex domains. This suggests there could be an evolutionary basis to 
human judgment processes which provides people with insights which cannot be 
captured effectively by statistical models in modern data environments.  
From the adaptive heuristics perspective for example, the strong tendency to 
assume linear relations makes sense when considering cognitive algorithms developed 
in accordance with sampling and summing natural frequencies in a pre-mathematical 
environment. It is possible therefore that people are more cognitively attuned to the 
variances which occur throughout natural environments and to data communicated in 
concrete terms, than to the variances in complex statistical environments which involve 
information in probabilistic and non-linear formats. Our evolutionary basis may 
therefore account for the inability to accurately process the base rate information which 
is conveyed in percentage formats, thus underpinning the robustness of the propensity 
to seek and perceive linear functional relations, thus viewing the world in absolute 
terms based on concrete objects. This also accounts for why multiplicative operations 
are particularly challenging and unintuitive to perform. Compared to arithmetic 
methods, the attentional resources involved in performing sequential processing far 
outweigh the cognitive effort involved in adding and subtracting whole values.        
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Assessing methods for optimizing human judgment in combination with statistical 
models is thus an effective use of resources, necessary to preserve the benefits of human 
intuition whilst safeguarding against the pitfalls of our ‘hard-wired’ linear cognitive 
propensities. For example, focusing on developing and expanding practical experience 
and domain knowledge, and applying people in the development, monitoring and 
controlling of systems in professional settings could help isolate and utilize the 
advantages of human intuition and inferences. This approach would optimize peoples’ 
ability to identify important wider, un-modelled factors, and develop a rich, tacit 
awareness of how those wider factors interact and connect in a real-world sense.   
In consumer settings, the harmful effects of the linear bias and optimistic 
behavioural propensities may be counteracted by re-framing percentages in concrete 
terms and disclosing the temporal effects of non-linear functional relations between 
stimulus and response variables. This is particularly relevant in domains such as finance 
and health, where disclosing future outcomes as a default, employing dynamic visual 
representations may facilitate the comprehension of ratios and proportional differences 
in terms of the size of an effect relative to a particular action or event for a given time 
horizon. Modelling the effects of judgments or behavioural modifications in terms of 
absolute size differences between icons, could therefore convey the non-linearity of the 
relation between variables without the need for multiplicative processing or 
extrapolation of exponential trends. The effect of visual data frames could be further 
optimized by utilizing highly salient metrics to communicate the meaning of the data in 
terms of real-world experiences. Thus, in combination, the use of relatable, ‘real-world’ 
frames and visual formats could help reduce the barriers to peoples’ intuitive judgment 
processes which are created by standard industry data formats in many highly important 
choice environments.  
In sum, the thorough explication of the relation between judgment processes and 
data frames and formats in this thesis contributes to our understanding of human 
rationality in terms of factors underlying the robustness of linear judgment biases across 
groups and domains. Whether forming predictions in varied statistical data, or making 
financial or consumer choices, human rationality is dependent on inherent processes 
which are hard-wired to utilize data in concrete terms and form linear inferences which 
optimize effort and efficiency. Rather than working to correct or align judgment 
processes with probabilistic models in complex data environments, the focus should be 
  
208 
on preserving the value and strengths of human intuition based on these innate cognitive 
processes and judgment abilities.  
Devising more effective mechanisms of data disclosure which facilitate judgment 
processes will thus enable us to optimize choice and enhance judgment by extracting the 
advantages of peoples’ knowledge and experience whilst minimizing the negative 
impacts of the linear bias in complex modern decision making domains. Despite 
cognitive limitations and individual differences, reducing the barriers to judgment 
processes will thus heighten our ability to reap the true benefits of human inferences 
and harness the insights and intuitions which exceed model capabilities in many real-
world situations.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1 
Chapter 3, Experiment 1. Method of conversion of the onscreen stimuli and the 
participants’ responses in the percentage condition into absolute values.  
Percentage condition 
 
Percentage 
numbers 
(observed) 
Base rate 
changes in 
absolute 
values 
(hidden) 
Conversions of 
percentages seen onscreen 
into absolute values of 
base rates 
Base rate changes 
calculated in 
absolute vales 
 
Linear 
increase 
101.56 % 
(101.5625) 200 
101.5625*200/100 
= 203.125 
203.125 + 200 
= 403.125 
50.39 % 
(50.387597) 403.125 
50.387597*403.125/100 
= 203.125 
203.125+403.125 
= 606.25 
33.51 % 
(33.505155) 
 
606.25 
 
33.505155*606.25/100 
= 203.125 
203.125+606.25 
= 809.375 
4th point 
prediction 
25.01 % 
(un-rounded = 
25.096525) 
 
809.375 
 
 
25.096525*809.375/100 
= 203.125 
 
203.125+809.375 
= 1012.5 
Exponential 
increase 
50 % 
(1.5) 200 50*200/100 = 100 
100+200 
= 300 
50 % 
(1.5) 300 50*300/100 = 150 
150+300 
= 450 
50 % 
(1.5) 450 50*450/100 = 225 
225+450 
= 675 
4th point 
prediction 
50 % 
(1.5) 675 50*675/100 = 337.5 
337.5+675 
= 1012.5 
 
Linear 
decrease 
-20.06 % 
(-20.061728) 
 
1012.5 
 
-20.061728*1012.5/100 
= -203.124996 
-203.125+1012.5 
= 809.375 
-25.01 % 
(-25.096525) 809.375 
-25.096525*809.375/100 
= -203.1249992 
-203.125+809.375 
= 606.25 
-33.51 % 
(-33.505155) 606.25 
-33.505155*606.25/100 
= -203.125 
-203.125+606.25 
= 403.125 
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4th point 
prediction 
-50.39 % 
(un-rounded = 
-50.387597) 
403.125 -50.387597*403.125/100 = -203.125 
-203.125+403.125 
= 200 
Exponential 
decrease 
-33.3 % 
(0.666667) 
 
1012.5 
 
-33.3*1012.5/100 = -
337.5 
-337.5+1012.5 
= 675 
-33.3 % 
(0.666667) 675 -33.3*675/100 = -225 
-225+675 
= 450 
-33.3 % 
(0.666667) 450 -33.3*450/100 = -150 
-150+450 
= 300 
4th point 
prediction 
-33.3 % 
(0.666667) 300 -33.3*300/100 = -100 
-100+300 
= 200 
Appendix 2 
Chapter 3, Experiment 1. Generation of the formal model predictions for the 
human-model fitting procedure. 
The 2-Regression Model Construction 
The 2-regression model was constructed by applying linear regression to the 
second and third data points observed in the absolute condition exponential increase and 
exponential decrease sequences and the percentage condition linear increase and linear 
decrease sequences. The fourth point predictions were then generated from the 
regression of these second and third points. Shown below are the numbers that were 
entered into the 2-regression model and the regression equation and fourth point 
predictions for the absolute and percentage condition. (x is the presentation order of the 
numbers in each trial, i.e., the last two observations are numbered x = 1 and 2 which 
represents the first and second numbers presented in each trial).  
Absolute condition: 
Exponential increase (1, 150) (2, 225);  y = 75x + 75; model prediction = 300.00. 
Exponential decrease (1, -225) (2, -150);  y = 75x – 300; model prediction = -75.00. 
Percentage condition: 
Linear increase (1, 50.387597) (2, 33.505155);  y = -16.882x + 67.27; model prediction 
= 16.622713000; conversion into absolute value = 134.54008379752700. 
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Linear decrease (1, -25.096525) (2, -33.505155); y = -8.4086x - 16.688; model 
prediction = -41.91378500; conversion into absolute value = -168.96494591716300. 
The 3-Regression Model Construction 
The 3-regression model was constructed in the same way as the 2-regression 
model, except all three observed values were used to generate the predictions. The 
numbers that were entered into the 3-regression model and the regression equations and 
fourth point predictions are given below for the absolute and percentage condition ( x = 
1, 2 and 3 which represents the first, second and third numbers presented in each trial).   
Absolute condition: 
Exponential increase (1, 100) (2, 150) (3, 225);  y = 62.5x + 33.333;  
model prediction = 283.33333333333300. 
Exponential decrease (1, -337.5) (2, -225) (3, -150);  y = 93.75x - 425; model prediction 
= -50.00. 
The percentage values given in the following linear regression model parameters 
are the un-rounded percentage values. In the trials, the values shown onscreen were 
rounded to two decimal places and labelled with a % sign and a plus/minus to signify 
increases and decreases. (E.g., +101.56%, +50.39%, +33.51%). 
Percentage condition: 
Linear increase (1, 101.5625) (2, 50.387597) (3, 33.505155);  y = -34.029x + 129.88;  
model prediction = -6.23892766666668000; conversion into absolute value =  
-50.4963209723977000. 
Linear decrease (1, -20.061728) (2, -25.096525) (3, -33.505155); y = -6.7217x - 12.778;  
model prediction = -39.6645630000; conversion into absolute value = -
159.8977697223700000. 
The 3-Mean Model Construction 
For both the absolute and percentage conditions, the fourth point predictions for 
the 3-mean model were calculated as the arithmetic mean of all three observed values. 
For the arithmetic mean calculations in the percentage condition, the outputs were 
converted in absolute values.  
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3-mean model predictions 
 Linear increase Linear decrease Exponential increase 
Exponential 
decrease 
Absolute 
condition +203.125 -203.125 +158.33 -237.5 
Percentage 
condition +61.82 -26.2 +50 -33.3 
Appendix 3  
Chapter 3, Experiment 1. Conversions of 3-mean model predictions from 
percentages into absolute values. 
Conversion of 3-mean model predictions into absolute values 
Percentage 
condition 
Arithmetic mean 
calculation 
Design function 
fourth point base rate 
Conversion into 
absolute value 
Linear increase 101.56 + 50.39 + 33.51/3 = 61.82 809.375 
809.375 * 61.82/100 
= 500.355625 
Exponential 
increase 
50 + 50 + 50/3 
= 50 675 
675 * 50/100 
= 337.5 
Linear decrease -20.06 + -25.01 + -33.51/3 = -26.19333333 403.125 
403.125 * -
26.19333333/100 
= -105.591875 
Exponential 
decrease 
-33.3 + -33.3 + -33.3/3 
= -33.3 300 
300 * -33.3/100 
= -99.9 
 
